Reply-To: "Udo von Massenbach" From: "Udo von Massenbach" Subject: Massenbach-Letter: NEWS 02/09/11 - Libya Special Date: Thu, 1 Sep 2011 08:52:20 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0368_01CC6884.95334A00" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal Importance: Normal X-Unsent: 1 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V15.4.3538.513 Dies ist eine mehrteilige Nachricht im MIME-Format. ------=_NextPart_000_0368_01CC6884.95334A00 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Guten Morgen. Uri Avnery: Zu den K=C3=BCsten von Tripolis RUSI: Curious victory for NATO in Libya =20 Massenbach Endkampf um Libyen: Loyalit=C3=A4t in der libyschen = Gesellschaft und das Geld des Regimes im Ausland=20 (aus: Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft www.d-a-g.de) =20 Manche bef=C3=BCrchten, der libysche Staat k=C3=B6nne in der Zeit = nach Gaddafi wieder zerfallen. Doch die alten Trennlinien spielen in den = K=C3=B6pfen der Libyer kaum noch eine Rolle. Von Rainer Hermann FRANKFURT, 25. August. Der Nationale =C3=9Cbergangsrat will so = rasch wie m=C3=B6glich von Benghasi nach Tripolis umziehen, = m=C3=B6glichst noch in dieser Woche. Die F=C3=BChrung der Gaddafi-Gegner = will damit zeigen, dass sie sich ganz Libyen verpflichtet f=C3=BChlen = und nicht nur dem Osten des Landes. Gerade in Tripolis gibt es = Bef=C3=BCrchtungen, das Land werde nun in zwei Teile zerfallen - oder in = mehr. Das Bekenntnis zur Hauptstadt des libyschen Nationalstaats soll = Sorgen zerstreuen, dass sich dieser nun entlang von = Stammesloyalit=C3=A4ten spalten k=C3=B6nnte. Gesch=C3=BCrt wurden derlei = =C3=84ngste vom Gaddafi-Clan. Ende Februar hatte Saif al Islam al = Gaddafi, der Sohn des Machthabers, der Welt zu erkl=C3=A4ren versucht, = dass die Libyer unpolitisch seien. Falle die Regierung seines Vaters, = w=C3=BCrde ein Vakuum entstehen, das die St=C3=A4mme f=C3=BCllen = w=C3=BCrden, dozierte er. F=C3=BCr beide Szenarien - eine Zweiteilung in Ost- und = West-Libyen oder ein chaotisches Nebeneinander einander befehdender = St=C3=A4mme - g=C3=A4be es historische Vorbilder. Doch viel spricht = dagegen, dass das neue Libyen an eines dieser Vorbilder ankn=C3=BCpft. = Zum einen wei=C3=9F die Bev=C3=B6lkerung, dass der =C3=96lreichtum nur = dann zu Wohlstand f=C3=BChrt, wenn die Einheit des Landes Bestand hat = und nicht eine doppelte Infrastruktur f=C3=BCr die =C3=96lindustrie = angelegt werden muss. Zum anderen hatte die Erhebung gegen Gaddafi zwar = am 15. Februar in Benghasi begonnen, sprang aber in Windeseile auch auf = den Westen des Landes =C3=BCber. Tripolis war nur deswegen lange immun gegen Massenproteste, weil = Gaddafis Sicherheitsapparat in der Hauptstadt konzentriert war und die = Opposition unterdr=C3=BCckte. Die Aufst=C3=A4ndischen lie=C3=9Fen sich = von den Revolutionen in Tunesien und =C3=84gypten inspirieren und nicht = von den Interessen ihrer St=C3=A4mme leiten. St=C3=A4dter tragen die = Revolution, die meisten sind nicht einmal 30 Jahre alt. Eine Trennlinie, die Libyen in der Mitte von Norden nach = S=C3=BCden teilt, steht in den Geschichtsb=C3=BCchern, spielt aber in = den K=C3=B6pfen der heutigen Libyer kaum eine Rolle. Nahezu alle Libyer = sind sunnitische Muslime, alle sprechen Arabisch. Es gibt keine = kulturellen Vorbehalte, die Libyer aus dem Osten des Landes von Reisen = nach Tripolis abhalten w=C3=BCrden. Viele Menschen aus Benghasi haben in = der Hauptstadt Arbeit gefunden und Familien gegr=C3=BCndet. In die = Gegenrichtung freilich gab es weniger Bewegung, denn die = zweitgr=C3=B6=C3=9Fte Stadt des Landes wurde unter Gaddafi = vernachl=C3=A4ssigt und verarmte. Es war das milit=C3=A4rische Patt in den vergangenen Monaten, das = Anlass zu Sorgen gab, Libyen k=C3=B6nne wieder in seine historischen = Provinzen zerfallen: Gaddafi, so lautete diese Sorge, w=C3=BCrde = =C3=BCber die fr=C3=BChere Provinz Tripolitania gebieten, w=C3=A4hrend = die Rebellen ihre Vorstellungen eines freien Libyens nur in der = =C3=B6stlichen Provinz Cyreneica durchsetzen k=C3=B6nnten. Die dritte = historische Provinz, Fezzan im S=C3=BCden, ist mit ihren scheinbar = endlosen W=C3=BCsten heute nahezu menschenleer, sieht man von = W=C3=BCstenomaden wie den Tuareg ab. Zu Zeiten der r=C3=B6mischen = Herrschaft war das heutige Libyen in diese drei Provinzen geteilt. Erst = unter der Kolonialherrschaft Italiens, die 1911 begonnen hatte, entstand = durch die Erhebung gegen die fremden Herrscher ein Nationalbewusstsein. Im Zweiten Weltkrieg besetzten 1943 die Briten Tripolitania und = Cyreneica, Frankreich erhielt Fezzan. In ihrem Kampf gegen die neuen = Kolonialherren einigten sich die Libyer aller drei Provinzen auf einen = Nachkommen des Sufiordens der Sanoussi, Idris, als den K=C3=B6nig eines = geeinten Libyens. Als Monarchie wurde Libyen 1951 unabh=C3=A4ngig. Idris = residierte in Baida in der Cyreneica, wo das Zentrum des neuen Staats = entstand. Da es in dem damals sehr d=C3=BCnnbesiedelten Land kaum = Stra=C3=9Fen gab und keine Telekommunikation, f=C3=BChlte sich das ferne = Tripolitania benachteiligt. Doch nichts ist heute wie damals. Die = allermeisten der inzwischen sechs Millionen Libyer leben in den = St=C3=A4dten entlang der K=C3=BCste. In den drei Staaten des Maghreb - Marokko, Algerien und Tunesien - = ver=C3=A4nderte der franz=C3=B6sische Einfluss die Kultur in den = St=C3=A4dten. Die St=C3=A4dte der Tripolitania und Cyreneica wurden = nicht in gleicher Weise italienisiert. So blieben die St=C3=A4dter, die = das Land heute pr=C3=A4gen, der arabisch-muslimischen Kultur eng = verbunden. Sie behielten die Anbindung an die St=C3=A4mme aufrecht, = deren Namen sie h=C3=A4ufig weiter tragen. Trotzdem messen die meisten = Libyer ihrer Stammeszugeh=C3=B6rigkeit keine gro=C3=9Fe Bedeutung bei. = Von den 140 St=C3=A4mmen, die die Wissenschaftler in Libyen = identifiziert haben, sind 30 weiter von Bedeutung. Die meisten = k=C3=B6nnen bestimmten Regionen zugeordnet werden. Zwar haben lediglich = 15 Prozent der Libyer keinerlei Bindungen an einen Stamm - aber auch = f=C3=BCr die restlichen 85 Prozent der Bev=C3=B6lkerung spielen = Stammesloyalit=C3=A4ten keine bestimmende Rolle mehr. Das liegt an der = Urbanisierung, die sich im =C3=96lzeitalter beschleunigt hat, und an den = vielen Ehen, die =C3=BCber Stammesgrenzen hinweg geschlossen werden. = Bereits 1969 war die Bedeutung der St=C3=A4mme so gering, dass die = Libyer massenhaft einen jungen Offizier namens Muammar al Gaddafi aus = dem bis dahin nachrangigen Stamm der Gaddafa als Nachfolger des = K=C3=B6nigs akzeptierten. Gaddafi hatte Idris wegen der starken panarabischen Welle, die = Gamal Abd al Nasser in =C3=84gypten ausgel=C3=B6st hatte, st=C3=BCrzen = k=C3=B6nnen - aber auch, weil er f=C3=BCr die St=C3=A4mme im Westen des = Landes sprach, die sich von der Verschiebung des Gravitationszentrums = unter der Monarchie nach Osten benachteiligt f=C3=BChlten. An der Macht = spielte Gaddafi die St=C3=A4mme gegeneinander aus. Auch deshalb hatten = sie als Institution Bestand: In einem Staat der Willk=C3=BCr boten sie = dem Individuum Schutz, bei Wohlverhalten gegen=C3=BCber Gaddafi auch = Aufstiegsm=C3=B6glichkeiten. Es =C3=BCberlebte auch die Institution der = Stammesf=C3=BChrer, die als Personen mit nat=C3=BCrlicher Autorit=C3=A4t = in der Schlichtung von Konflikten ge=C3=BCbt waren und dadurch Ansehen = besa=C3=9Fen. Dank dieser politischen F=C3=A4higkeiten spielten sie auch = in der Revolution eine Rolle. Zwar z=C3=A4hlt kein Stammesf=C3=BChrer = zur F=C3=BChrung der Rebellen. Ihr Wort hat aber Gewicht. So hat der = F=C3=BChrer des Zawija-Stamms, Scheich Faradsch al Zawi, bereits in der = ersten Woche der Proteste Gaddafi gedroht, er werde die Unterbrechung = des =C3=96lexports veranlassen, sollte die Brutalit=C3=A4t des = Sicherheitsapparats gegen die Demonstranten anhalten. Muhammad al Zawi = vom selben Stamm war lange Botschafter in London. Nach dem Beginn der = Revolution verhandelte er mit vielen St=C3=A4mmen, um sie auf eine Linie = gegen den Diktator zu bringen. Je l=C3=A4nger die Revolution dauerte, desto geschlossener traten = die St=C3=A4mme gegen Gaddafi auf. Vergessen sind die Spannungen = zwischen ihnen nicht, die sich in Gaddafis langer Herrschaft aufgebaut = haben. Doch selbst wenn Gaddafi als Feind entf=C3=A4llt, eint die = St=C3=A4mme noch die Furcht vor militanten Islamisten, die auch im neuen = Libyen Tritt fassen wollen. Mahmud Dschibril, der Ministerpr=C3=A4sident = der =C3=9Cbergangsregierung, hatte j=C3=BCngst ausgeschlossen, dass = St=C3=A4mme und ein moderner Staat zusammenpassen. Die St=C3=A4mme seien = kein politisches Instrument mehr, sagte er - aber eine gesellschaftliche = Einheit, welche die libysche Kultur bereichere. Den vollst=C3=A4ndigen Artikel finden Sie in der F.A.Z. vom = 26.08.2011, Nr. 198 / Seite 2 =20 = https://www.d-a-g.de/index.php?option=3Dcom_content&task=3Dview&id=3D792&= Itemid=3D143=20 *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= **************************************** *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= **************************************** = Social Policy = =20 = Los Angeles Times (Oped): Freudenberg-Pilster Beyond suffrage: How far have women = come since? Rechtsanw=C3=A4ltin- Staatssekret=C3=A4rin a.D. =20 American women won the right to vote in 1920. But how far have we come = since on other issues important to women? By Eve Weinbaum and Rachel Roth*August 26, 2011 Today we celebrate the anniversary of female suffrage, a victory that = took more than 70 years of political struggle to achieve. After women = won the right to vote in 1920, socialist feminist Crystal Eastman = observed that suffrage was an important first step but that what women = really wanted was freedom. In an essay titled "Now We Can Begin," she = laid out a plan toward this goal that is still relevant today. Eastman outlined a four-point program: economic independence for women = (including freedom to choose an occupation and equal pay), gender = equality at home (raising "feminist sons" to share the responsibilities = of family life), "voluntary motherhood" (reproductive freedom) and = "motherhood endowment," or financial support for child-rearing and = homemaking. Since the 1920s, women have won many rights and opportunities in areas = as diverse as higher education, professional sports and, in six states, = same-sex marriage. But on the core priorities that Eastman identified, = how far have we come? Eastman optimistically called equality in the workplace "the easiest = part of our program," noting that "the ground is already broken" on = women's participation in various professions, trades and unions. One of = the chief barriers was "inequality in pay," a problem that has proved = remarkably enduring. Women on average still make only 77 cents for every dollar paid to their = male counterparts, according to the National Women's Law Center. This = pay disparity is worst for women of color, who earn only 61 cents if = they are African American and 52 cents if they are Latina. This pattern = has been remarkably constant. Women's lower earnings are related to gender segmentation in the = workplace that relegates women to the lower rungs of the economic = ladder. At Wal-Mart, for example =E2=80=94 the nation's biggest employer = =E2=80=94 women make up about 70% of hourly workers but only about 30% = of managers. The Supreme Court recently ruled that the retailer's female = employees could not join together in a class-action lawsuit, making it = nearly impossible for them to challenge patterns of discrimination. Although women now outnumber men on college campuses, the upper echelons = of most professions and political bodies remain male-dominated. Just = look at Congress: Only 17% of its members are women. Between 1923 and = 2011, only 28 women have chaired congressional committees, and only 45 = women of color have ever served in Congress =E2=80=94 just one in the = Senate. The new congressional "super-committee" of 12 legislators = charged with reducing the federal deficit has one white woman and not a = single woman of color. On the home front, gender norms have changed significantly since 1920, = but women still do the lion's share of child care, elder care and = household planning. And child-rearing is still regarded as a private = matter rather than a contribution to society. Although a recent Time = magazine cover story suggested an end to "chore wars," its own data = showed that married women with children still do more work at home than = their husbands, and full-time employed moms with children under age 6 = spend more hours on household chores than any other group. Given women's disproportionate responsibility for child-rearing amid = lesser economic opportunities, the ability to plan whether and when to = have children is critically important. As Eastman said: "Freedom of any = kind is hardly worth considering unless it is assumed that [women] will = know how to control the size of their families." This was a tall order in 1920, when it was a crime simply to disseminate = information about contraception. Fertility control is now legal, but = women's reproductive freedom is under intense attack. The 2011 = legislative session saw a record number of anti-choice bills introduced = =E2=80=94 and passed into law. In just six months, state legislatures = passed 80 laws to restrict access to abortion. State legislatures also have made deep cuts to family planning budgets, = which has the perverse result of increasing unintended pregnancies. The = Hyde Amendment bans federal Medicaid coverage of abortion, and only 15 = states pay for abortion care with their own revenue. This means that = low-income women in most of the country can have an abortion only if = they can afford to pay for it out of pocket, making the right to = abortion an empty promise for millions of women. When it comes to support for child-rearing, the United States is the = only major industrialized nation without a national policy guaranteeing = paid parental leave. While a few states and cities have taken the = initiative to implement their own policies, the vast majority of mothers = (and fathers) have no right to paid time off to care for a newborn baby. = Many workers do not even have a right to take unpaid leave, because the = federal Family and Medical Leave Act applies only to relatively = long-term workers in workplaces with 50 or more employees, leaving out = small businesses, new employees and workers who have put in fewer than = 1,250 hours at that job. With no paid leave, and discrimination against pregnant women on the = rise, women are a long way from Eastman's vision of having child-rearing = "recognized by the world as work, requiring a definite economic reward = and not merely entitling the performer to be dependent on some man." In all four areas that Eastman discussed, female suffrage has not = ushered in the wide-ranging changes that its opponents feared and its = advocates championed. Eastman understood that work and home are inextricably bound, that = women's freedom depends on resolving what we now call "work/family" = conflict. As long as women face a "motherhood penalty" while men benefit = from a "fatherhood bonus," gender equality will remain out of reach. = Racial discrimination has made the path to equality that much harder for = women of color. The real question now is, in Eastman's words, "how to arrange the world" = so that women have "a chance to exercise their infinitely varied gifts = in infinitely varied ways, instead of being destined by the accident of = their sex" to lesser economic opportunities and heavier domestic = burdens. To do this, our institutions must become more responsive. The workplace = has to change to allow people with families to hold good jobs, and = policies must change to allow women to plan their families and to ensure = that no one is left behind. In the 90 years since winning the right to = vote, women have achieved gains by organizing in the streets and the = workplace, by lobbying legislatures and bringing lawsuits. Arranging a = more just world will require a new wave of political action at all = levels, from local to national, home to workplace. On Aug. 26, 2020, we will celebrate the 100th anniversary of women's = suffrage. Let's make this the decade we create the conditions that bring = true equality. Eve Weinbaum is director of the Labor Center and an associate professor = of sociology at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.=20 Rachel Roth is director of communications and foundation support at the = National Network of Abortion Funds and the author of a book on women's = rights.=20 http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-roth-women-20110826,0,1276223.s= tory = *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************************ *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************** = Politics: from Vision to Action Barandat Curious victory for NATO in Libya = =20 Bundeswehr =20 =E2=80=9C Germany not only refused to participate = militarily but publicly criticised the whole endeavour.=E2=80=9D Few dispute the assertion that NATO jets enabled Libyan rebels to come = knocking on Qadhafi's door in Tripoli. But as he falls, it will be = difficult to avoid the conclusion that NATO emerges from this successful = operation weaker than it went into it. By Professor Michael Clarke, Director-General, RUSI The NATO-led campaign to protect Libyan civilians - and thereby becoming = effectively the air arm of the revolution against Colonel Qadhafi - was = always politically controversial. For that reason alone it was evident = from the beginning that if it was not successful quickly, the campaign = would not be judged successful at all. And after five and a half months, = NATO and its allies can claim military success just about in time to = avoid the tag of failure on the grounds that it all took too long. In truth, for an improvised air campaign supporting groups of = disorganised rebels on the ground, against a brutal and well-armed = regime, and operating under all the domestic political constraints and = international sensitivities of a UN resolution, military success inside = six months is pretty good going. British and French leaders can claim = vindication for their resolve and UK military planners can breathe a = sigh of relief that they will not now have to make big planning = adjustments to keep the mission going beyond September. For all this, we can be duly grateful. A collective failure of political = will; a stalemate on the ground; or glacial progress that put Libya in = the 'Iraq' or 'Afghanistan' categories, would have been so much worse = for the alliance. NATO analysts will take some heart from this. It is = said to demonstrate President Obama's new approach of 'facilitating = success' rather than leading it; the European members of NATO have = stepped up to do what was necessary; NATO again provided the military = core for a wider coalition operation; and even the most sceptical = observers could not deny that the rebel's success was dependent on NATO = destroying over 50 per cent of all the regime's military assets.[1] For all the vindication that success provides, however - not least to = British, French and American political leaders and the Secretary General = of NATO for their commitment - it is difficult to avoid the conclusion = that NATO emerges from this successful operation weaker than it went = into it. The military operation itself created an image of NATO's = limitations rather than its power. Was this really a grand alliance? In a big alliance, numbers matter. Only nine of its twenty-eight members = were prepared to put themselves on the line physically and politically = and attack ground targets.[2] Only two - France and the UK - were = prepared to deploy attack helicopters (five British and around twelve = French machines) which make all the difference to the ground forces. In = a NATO-led coalition that supposedly consisted of more than thirty [3] = contributing nations, only ten countries committed forces to ground = attack, and one of them pulled out of it[4] for reasons that have still = to be fully explained. This combined commitment produced between seventy = and eighty available aircraft most of the time. Of that, the British and = French contribution, with about twenty attack aircraft each, amounted to = more than half the total. Around 20 naval vessels were actively involved = at any one time. The extensive no-fly-zone over Libya employed no fewer than 280-300 = aircraft throughout the five months of the operation. Running the no fly = zone in this environment was certainly complex - if only because so many = different nations were involved - but not particularly dangerous or = operationally difficult given the limitations of Qadhafi's air force and = air defence system after the early days of the conflict when American = power degraded them so severely. Among the NATO allies, those prepared = to undertake ground attack missions at some stage over this period, = consisted of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, Italy, = Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Canada. Among the non-NATO = countries the United Arab Emirates and Qatar also used their aircraft in = an offensive role. The role of the United States In a transatlantic alliance, the role of the United States must always = be a factor. President Obama may have taken the US out of the direct = combat role, but he certainly did not take American forces out of the = front line. The European allies were hardly 'going it alone' in this = operation. Air-to-air refuelling is vital to maintain fighter jets on constant = patrol and in getting them to and from most targets. The US has provided = 30 of the 40 or so air-to-air refuelling tankers that have been deployed = for this operation. Even with a severely degraded air defence system, = suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) assets are critical to avoid = occasional loss of aircraft. Very few allied attack missions were flown = without a US electronic warfare aircraft above them acting as guardian = angel. British and French forces had some of their own SEAD capabilities = but were happy enough to rely on US coverage where possible. Not least, = the US has continued to deploy unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) = throughout the campaign, with hellfire missiles, some of which have been = used. And it has maintained an active reconnaissance role both with its = satellites and its own helicopter force. There has been no shortage of = US service personnel in-theatre. Reluctant coalition partners Meanwhile, other European-NATO members have been extremely reticent to = engage in an operation to which the alliance as a whole was supposedly = committed. Turkish and Spanish aircraft, for example, were prohibited = from flying any attack missions, Poland sent no forces. Germany not only = refused to participate militarily but publicly criticised the whole = endeavour. The Arab League nations exhibited a similar inconsistency. Despite its = unequivocal call in mid-March for decisive action to halt Qadhafi's = offensive on Benghazi, some Arab League nations refused to participate = at all. Others, like Jordan, maintained air patrols but would not = undertake any offensive action. Still others, like Qatar and the UAE, = have engaged in offensive operations, but are not keen to trumpet the = fact. Indeed, the United Arab Emirates have displayed an interesting = capacity to field both UAVs and Special Forces and have reportedly used = them along the Libyan/Tunisian border. Of most value, however, some Arab = countries have provided weapons to the rebels, albeit in defiance of the = UN arms embargo on Libya, and have taken responsibility for = internationally illegal actions that the NATO powers were never = prepared, and perhaps never could have, taken themselves. The fact that = there has been no international outcry over this defiance of a UN = resolution (UNSCR 1970) is probably due to a general pragmatism among = the world community. A laboured success All this can be interpreted positively in a military sense: that NATO = has achieved some flexibility as an alliance and as a leader for broader = coalitions and that it finds ways through the difficulties, ultimately = to prevail. But NATO is more likely to be judged negatively in a = political sense, especially in Washington. The Europeans could not get = their act together in a convincing way, even over a comparatively small = operation against a weak and crazy opponent. The greatest military = alliance the world has ever known was made to look puny in what it could = really deploy. Even with the US providing so many combat enablers, it = should have been able to sweep Gaddafi's 1970s, Warsaw Pact weapons and = his badly organised army straight off the board; the British alone have = attacked just on 900 targets since the start of operations, so why has = the effect not been more obvious?; and so on. And the strain that this = curious little war has already put on the forces of the most capable = European allies - the UK and France - is a poor omen for the future. When the policy elite in Washington speak about 'NATO' these days, they = really mean 'the Europeans'. That has been the case for some time now. = And when they look at the Libya operation this week, they don't see = NATO's canny adaptation and political guile at work so much as a = laboured success that came just in time to save everyone's blushes. NATO = should think long and hard about this operation. Whatever it represents = to the Libyan people, it may come to look like a tipping point in the = transatlantic evolution of NATO. NOTES -------------------------------------------------------------------------= ------- [1] See, for example, Tomas Valasek, 'What Libya says about the future = of the transatlantic alliance', Centre for European Reform, July 2011. [2] Of that nine, only seven were European nations and two of them = subsequently withdrew their aircraft. [3] NATO insists that all twenty-eight member states contributed = 'directly or indirectly' and at least three other Arab League states = made tangible military contributions; other Arab states made more = indirect contributions. [4] Norway. http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4E53CF030EB3B/ *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ********************************************** *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ********************************************** R=C3=B6sler h=C3=A4lt Westerwelle im Amt 30.08.2011, 20:31 Von Nico Fried und Daniel Br=C3=B6ssler Machtwort vom Parteichef: Bei der FDP-Fraktionsklausur stellt sich = Philipp R=C3=B6sler hinter seinen angeschlagenen Au=C3=9Fenminister und = erkl=C3=A4rt die Westerwelle-Debatte f=C3=BCr "beendet". Seine = Garantieerkl=C3=A4rung enth=C3=A4lt aber auch einen deutlichen Hinweis. Au=C3=9Fenminister Guido Westerwelle bleibt im Amt. Noch vor Beginn = einer FDP-Fraktionsklausur gab Parteichef Philipp R=C3=B6sler am = Dienstag eine Garantieerkl=C3=A4rung f=C3=BCr Westerwelle ab. Zugleich = erkl=C3=A4rte R=C3=B6sler die Personaldebatte der vergangenen Tage = f=C3=BCr "beendet". FDP-Chef Philipp R=C3=B6sler stellt sich trotz der harten Kritik an = Bundesau=C3=9Fenminister Guido Westerwelle hinter seinen Parteikollegen. = (=C2=A9 dpa) Das F=C3=BChrungsteam der Liberalen bestehe aus der Spitze von Partei, = Fraktion und den Regierungsmitgliedern in der jetzigen Zusammensetzung, = sagte R=C3=B6sler. Der FDP-Chef wiederholte damit zun=C3=A4chst eine = Stellungnahme, mit der er schon zuletzt den Personalspekulationen = begegnet war. Diesmal allerdings f=C3=BCgte er hinzu: "Und das wird auch = in Zukunft so bleiben." Diese =C3=84u=C3=9Ferung entsprach auch den = Erwartungen der CDU. An der Spitze des Koalitionspartners war ein klares = Signal als notwendig bezeichnet worden, um die Situation zu beruhigen. R=C3=B6sler hat sich damit zum zweiten Mal seit seiner Berufung an die = Parteispitze im Mai 2011 eindeutig f=C3=BCr Westerwelle als = Au=C3=9Fenminister ausgesprochen. K=C3=BCnftige Versuche, Westerwelle = doch noch aus dem Amt zu dr=C3=A4ngen, w=C3=A4ren also mit einem = Autorit=C3=A4tsverlust R=C3=B6slers verbunden. Andererseits verband der = Parteichef seine Aussage nochmals mit dem Hinweis, dass er Westerwelle = zum Einlenken im Streit um die Interpretation des Libyen-Kriegs gebracht = habe. Er selbst habe als Vorsitzender in der vergangenen Woche klar die = FDP-Linie in au=C3=9Fenpolitischen Fragen vorgegeben. Westerwelle sei = dieser Linie ebenso klar gefolgt. Der Au=C3=9Fenminister war wegen seiner Reaktion auf das Ende des = Gaddafi-Regimes in Libyen in die Kritik geraten und hatte mit seiner = Betonung der deutschen Sanktionspolitik =C3=BCber mehrere Tage hinweg = auch in der schwarz-gelben Koalition Unmut ausgel=C3=B6st. Erst nachdem = R=C3=B6sler den Nato-Truppen Dank ausgesprochen und ihren Einsatz als = entscheidend bezeichnet hatte, w=C3=BCrdigte auch Westerwelle das = Engagement der westlichen Verb=C3=BCndeten. Deutschland hatte sich im = UN-Sicherheitsrat bei der Abstimmung =C3=BCber den Milit=C3=A4reinsatz = enthalten. Die Bundestagsabgeordneten der Liberalen kamen am Dienstag zu einer = Klausurtagung auf Schloss Bensberg in Bergisch Gladbach nahe K=C3=B6ln = zusammen. Bereits am Montag hatten innerhalb in der FDP Ger=C3=BCchte = f=C3=BCr Unruhe gesorgt, Westerwelle erw=C3=A4ge, auf der Klausursitzung = die Vertrauensfrage zu stellen. R=C3=B6sler hatte zun=C3=A4chst am = Montagnachmittag und dann erneut am Dienstagvormittag mit Westerwelle = telefoniert. Nach =C3=BCbereinstimmenden Darstellungen aus dem Umfeld = beider Politiker sagte Westerwelle in beiden Gespr=C3=A4chen, diese = Ger=C3=BCchte tr=C3=A4fen nicht zu. Entschlossene T=C3=B6ne Gleichwohl soll R=C3=B6sler quasi vorbeugend darauf hingewiesen haben, = dass eine solche Vertrauensfrage sehr sch=C3=A4dlich f=C3=BCr die Partei = sein k=C3=B6nne. Zudem k=C3=A4me sie einem Misstrauensvotum gegen = R=C3=B6slers Aussage gleich, Westerwelle im Amt zu halten. Auch aus = Sorge vor einer negativen Wirkung auf die Landtagswahlen in Berlin und = Mecklenburg-Vorpommern will es die FDP nun dabei bewenden lassen. = Wahlk=C3=A4mpfer in beiden L=C3=A4ndern beklagten, dass die = Personaldebatte die ohnehin mageren Chancen verringere. a.. =20 b.. Bildstrecke zum Thema: Westerwelle und die FDP Der lange Lauf des = Guido W.=20 c..=20 Westerwelle selbst =C3=A4u=C3=9Ferte sich in Bensberg zun=C3=A4chst = nicht vor den Medien. W=C3=A4hrend einer Botschafterkonferenz im = Ausw=C3=A4rtigen Amt in Berlin hatte er wenige Stunden zuvor aber einen = entschlossenen Ton angeschlagen. "Die Autorit=C3=A4t unseres Landes in = der Welt h=C3=A4ngt eben nicht zuerst damit zusammen, dass wir besonders = stark w=C3=A4ren mit Armeen oder milit=C3=A4rischer Ausr=C3=BCstung, = sondern dass wir mit einem besonders stark sind: mit Wirtschaft." URL: = http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/aussenminister-in-der-kritik-roesler-h= aelt-westerwelle-im-amt-1.1137084 =20 *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************************************ *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************************************************************ = Middle East Peninsula (Qatar): Nato must = extend stay: NTC (Libya) =20 DOHA: Libya=E2=80=99s National Transitional Council has urged Nato to = continue with its presence in the country saying that it fears that a = defiant Colonel Muammar Ghadafi might do something unexpected. Nato is mandated by the UN Security Council to stay in Libya until = September 27. Addressing a meeting of chiefs of staff of the armed forces of the = countries that participated in anti-Gaddafi military operations in = Libya, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, NTC Chairman, said yesterday that thanks to = Nato large-scale massacre of civilians in his country was avoided. =E2=80=9CLibyan rebels couldn=E2=80=99t have achieved victory without = the support of Nato and international alliance forces,=E2=80=9D Jalil = said. The rebels were no match for Ghadafi=E2=80=99s forces since he had = massive wealth and military might, he added. In the nearly 10,000 air strikes and 5,000 military assaults no civilian = casualties were reported since the people were informed in advance about = these strikes, the NTC chief noted. The meeting was held to discuss the = current situation in Libya after the end of Gaddafi=E2=80=99s rule. Nato = was represented at the meet. Major general Hamad bin Ali al Attiya, chief of staff of Qatari armed = forces, the Libyan Minister of Defense Jalal al Digheily and the = representative of Libyan rebels, Abdul Hakim Belhaj, were in attendance. The meeting discussed Nato=E2=80=99s views and position on the ongoing = events in Libya and the general military situation in the country. Major-General Hamad bin Ali al Attiyah, also said that Nato=E2=80=99s = stay in Libya was needed. =E2=80=9CThe ongoing developments and field indicators in Libya require = the Nato to provide military and security support to the Libyan people = to protect and maintain his surprising achievements. Military and = security efforts should coincide to normalize the life of = Libyans,=E2=80=9D he added. Speech of Jalal al Digheily, the Libyan Minister of Defense, thanked = Qatar, Emirates, Jordan and Sudan for providing support to the rebels. =E2=80=9CWar is still going on to defeat Gaddafi, his sons and aides and = the sleeper cells, the so called =E2=80=9Crevolutionary = committees=E2=80=9D, and the fifth column,=E2=80=9D he said. =E2=80=9CWe = are still in need of the Nato=E2=80=99s logistic and military support to = achieve our goals,=E2=80=9D he said. Admiral Samuel Le Claire, commander of the Nato military operations in = Libya, congratulated the NTC. =E2=80=9CWe effectively conducted 23,000 flights and destroyed 5,000 = military targets in Libya. Nato forces participated in field operations = which were accurately led round the clock and the week,=E2=80=9D he = said. =E2=80=9CWe are committed and authorized to continue the military = operation till September 27, 2011. We hope the vision will be obvious = during the upcoming weeks and we will discuss the suitable ways to = support Libya after the end of military operation,=E2=80=9D he said. = =20 http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/qatar/163189-nato-must-extend-stay-ntc.h= tml *************************************************************************= ******************************************* The Peninsula (Qatar-Editorial): = Post-Gaddafi Libya The Arab Spring has received a fresh lease of life. The momentum which = the Spring had maintained right from beginning was blocked by an = obdurate Muammar Gaddafi, prompting many to think that the Spring was = blinking. The doubters will now feel relieved, and Arabs who are = fighting other dictators will feel emboldened to stick to their path. = Libya teaches that success is guaranteed, though it can be delayed. The capture of Gaddafi or his surrender yesterday would have brought the = Libyan revolution to a complete, dramatic end. But there is no need. The = rebels have overtaken his compound and the dictator and his family were = nowhere to be seen. The rebel leaders are saying the whole operation = will come to an end in a day or two. Their success is irreversible. The = global media have started writing the obituary of the Gaddafi regime and = the focus is now on Libya=E2=80=99s future sans Gaddafi. In the book on Arab revolution so far, Libya=E2=80=99s will be the most = important chapter. Gaddafi is the longest-serving Arab ruler with an = unquestioned 42 years in power, and the most controversial, enigmatic, = brutal and unpredictable dictator =E2=80=93 the only leader who fought = against his own people and killed them in thousands to stay in power. = Secondly, his expulsion was achieved with the help of other Arab = brothers and the international community. Libyans enthusiastically = welcomed the support from Nato and other Arab countries to overthrow = Gaddafi, something which the people of other Arab countries were not = given. The rebels would have been unable to achieve their objective = without the air support of Nato. The opposition led by the National Transitional Council (NTC) now has = the onerous task of forming a government that will ensure stability, = peace and justice. The NTC must avoid the mistakes committed in other = Arab Spring countries. It must also avoid infiltration by Gaddafi = loyalists, give representation to all segments of the society, work in = close coordination with its allies, especially Nato and Arab countries = including Qatar, to put in place an effective administration and avoid = revenge which will drag the country into a vicious cycle of violence. The success of Libyan revolution is also the success of Qatar=E2=80=99s = diplomacy. Qatar is one of the few Arab countries which stood solidly = behind the Libyan people and Doha is now playing a crucial role in the = reconstruction of the country and the formation of the new government. A = senior leader of the NTC is in Doha to plan their future. As a first = step, Qatar will host a meeting today to organise $2.4bn in aid for the = country. Speaking at a press conference in Doha, Mahmud Jibril, the number two in = NTC said =E2=80=9Cwe will build a new Libya, with all Libyans as = brothers for a united, civil and democratic nation. http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/the-editorial/editorial/162490-post-gadd= afi-libya.html *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *********************************************** *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *********************************************** = =20 Massenbach'sRecommendation =20 = Libya: A Premature Victory Celebration by George Friedman August 30, 2011=20 The war in Libya is over. More precisely, governments and media have = decided that the war is over, despite the fact that fighting continues. = The unfulfilled expectation of this war has consistently been that = Moammar Gadhafi would capitulate when faced with the forces arrayed = against him, and that his own forces would abandon him as soon as they = saw that the war was lost. What was being celebrated last week, with = presidents, prime ministers and the media proclaiming the defeat of = Gadhafi, will likely be true in due course. The fact that it is not yet = true does not detract from the self-congratulations.=20 For example, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini reported that only = 5 percent of Libya is still under Gadhafi=E2=80=99s control. That seems = like a trivial amount, save for this news from Italian newspaper La = Stampa, which reported that =E2=80=9CTripoli is being cleaned = up=E2=80=9D neighborhood by neighborhood, street by street and home by = home. Meanwhile, bombs from above are pounding Sirte, where, according = to the French, Gadhafi has managed to arrive, although it is not known = how. The strategically important town of Bali Walid =E2=80=94 another = possible hiding place and one of only two remaining exit routes to = another Gadhafi stronghold in Sabha =E2=80=94 is being encircled. To put it differently, Gadhafi=E2=80=99s forces still retain military = control of substantial areas. There is house-to-house fighting going on = in Tripoli. There are multiple strongholds with sufficient defensive = strength that forces cannot enter them without significant military = preparation. Although Gadhafi=E2=80=99s actual location is unknown, his = capture is the object of substantial military preparations, including = NATO airstrikes, around Bali Walid, Sirte and Sabha. When Saddam Hussein = was captured, he was hiding in a hole in the ground, alone and without = an army. Gadhafi is still fighting and posing challenges. The war is not = over. It could be argued that while Gadhafi retains a coherent military force = and significant territory, he no longer governs Libya. That is certainly = true and significant, but it will become more significant when his = enemies do take control of the levers of power. It is unreasonable to = expect that they should be in a position to do so a few days after = entering Tripoli and while fighting continues. But it does raise a = critical question: whether the rebels have sufficient coherence to form = an effective government or whether new rounds of fighting among Libyans = can be expected even after Gadhafi=E2=80=99s forces cease functioning. = To put it simply, Gadhafi appears to be on his way to defeat but he is = not there yet, and the ability of his enemies to govern Libya is = doubtful. Immaculate Intervention Given that the dying is far from over, it is interesting to consider why = Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron, the major players in = this war, all declared last week that Gadhafi had fallen, implying an = end to war, and why the media proclaimed the war=E2=80=99s end. To = understand this, it is important to understand how surprising the course = of the war was to these leaders. From the beginning, there was an = expectation that NATO intervention, first with a no-fly zone, then with = direct airstrikes on Gadhafi=E2=80=99s position, would lead to a rapid = collapse of his government and its replacement with a democratic = coalition in the east. Two forces combined to lead to this conclusion. The first consisted of = human-rights groups outside governments and factions in foreign = ministries and the State Department who felt an intervention was = necessary to stop the pending slaughter in Benghazi. This faction had a = serious problem. The most effective way to quickly end a brutal regime = was military intervention. However, having condemned the American = invasion of Iraq, which was designed, at least in part, to get rid of a = brutal regime, this faction found it difficult to justify rapid military = intervention on the ground in Libya. Moral arguments require a degree of = consistency. In Europe, the doctrine of =E2=80=9Csoft power=E2=80=9D has become a = central doctrine. In the case of Libya, finding a path to soft power was = difficult. Sanctions and lectures would probably not stop Gadhafi, but = military action ran counter to soft power. What emerged was a doctrine = of soft military power. Instituting a no-fly zone was a way to engage in = military action without actually hurting anyone, except those Libyan = pilots who took off. It satisfied the need to distinguish Libya from = Iraq by not invading and occupying Libya but still putting crushing = pressure on Gadhafi.=20 Of course, a no-fly zone proved ineffective and irrelevant, and the = French began bombing Gadhafi=E2=80=99s forces the same day. Libyans on = the ground were dying, but not British, French or American soldiers. = While the no-fly zone was officially announced, this segue to an air = campaign sort of emerged over time without a clear decision point. For = human-rights activists, this kept them from addressing the concern that = airstrikes always cause unintended deaths because they are never as = accurate as one might like. For the governments, it allowed them to be = seen as embarking upon what I have called an =E2=80=9Cimmaculate = intervention.=E2=80=9D The second force that liked this strategy was the various air forces = involved. There is no question of the importance of air power in modern = war, but there is a constant argument over whether the application of = air power by itself can achieve desired political ends without the = commitment of ground forces. For the air community, Libya was going to = be the place where it could demonstrate its effectiveness in achieving = such ends.=20 So the human-rights advocates could focus on the ends =E2=80=94 = protecting Libyan civilians in Benghazi =E2=80=94 and pretend that they = had not just advocated the commencement of a war that would itself leave = many people dead. Political leaders could feel that they were not = getting into a quagmire but simply undertaking a clean intervention. The = air forces could demonstrate their utility in delivering desired = political outcomes. Why and How The question of the underlying reason for the war should be addressed = because stories are circulating that oil companies are competing for = vast sums of money in Libya. These stories are all reasonable, in the = sense that the real story remains difficult to fathom, and I sympathize = with those who are trying to find a deep conspiracy to explain all of = this. I would like to find one, too. The problem is that going to war = for oil in Libya was unnecessary. Gadhafi loved selling oil, and if the = governments involved told him quietly that they were going to blow him = up if he didn=E2=80=99t make different arrangements on who got the oil = revenues and what royalties he got to keep, Gadhafi would have made = those arrangements. He was as cynical as they come, and he understood = the subtle idea that shifting oil partners and giving up a lot of = revenue was better than being blown up. Indeed, there is no theory out there that explains this war by way of = oil, simply because it was not necessary to actually to go war to get = whatever concessions were wanted. So the story =E2=80=94 protecting = people in Benghazi from slaughter =E2=80=94 is the only rational = explanation for what followed, however hard it is to believe. It must also be understood that given the nature of modern air warfare, = NATO forces in small numbers had to be inserted on the ground from the = beginning =E2=80=94 actually, at least a few days before the beginning = of the air campaign. Accurately identifying targets and taking them out = with sufficient precision involves highly skilled special-operations = teams guiding munitions to those targets. The fact that there have been = relatively few friendly-fire accidents indicates that standard = operational procedures have been in place. These teams were probably joined by other special operators who trained = =E2=80=94 and in most cases informally led =E2=80=94 indigenous forces = in battle. There were ample reports in the early days of the war that = special operations teams were on the ground conducting weapons training = and organizing the fighters who opposed Gadhafi. But there proved to be two problems with this approach. First, Gadhafi = did not fold his tent and capitulate. He seemed singularly unimpressed = by the force he was facing. Second, his troops turned out to be highly = motivated and capable, at least compared to their opponents. Proof of = this can be found in the fact that they did not surrender en masse, they = did maintain a sufficient degree of unit coherence and =E2=80=94 the = final proof =E2=80=94 they held out for six months and are still holding = out. The view of human-rights groups that an isolated tyrant would break = in the face of the international community, the view of political = leaders that an isolated tyrant facing the might of NATO=E2=80=99s air = forces would collapse in days and the view of the air forces that air = strikes would shatter resistance, all turned out to be false. A War Prolonged Part of this was due to a misunderstanding of the nature of Libyan = politics. Gadhafi was a tyrant, but he was not completely isolated. He = had enemies but he also had many supporters who benefitted from him or = at least believed in his doctrines. There was also a general belief = among ordinary government soldiers (some of whom are mercenaries from = the south) that capitulation would lead to their slaughter, and the = belief among government leaders that surrender meant trials in The Hague = and terms in prison. The belief of the human-rights community in an = International Criminal Court (ICC) trying Gadhafi and the men around him = gives them no room for retreat, and men without room for retreat fight = hard and to the end. There was no way to negotiate capitulation unless = the U.N. Security Council itself publicly approved the deal. The winks = and nods that got dictators to leave in the old days aren=E2=80=99t = enough anymore. All countries that are party to the Rome Statute are = required to turn a leader like Gadhafi over to the ICC for trial.=20 Therefore, unless the U.N. Security Council publicly strikes a deal with = Gadhafi, which would be opposed by the human-rights community and would = become ugly, Gadhafi will not give up =E2=80=94 and neither will his = troops. There were reports last week that some government soldiers had = been executed. True or not, fair or not, that would not be a great = motivator for surrender. The war began with the public mission of protecting the people of = Benghazi. This quickly morphed into a war to unseat Gadhafi. The problem = was that between the ideological and the military aims, the forces = dedicated to the war were insufficient to execute the mission. We do not = know how many people were killed in the fighting in the past six months, = but pursuing the war using soft military power in this way certainly = prolonged the war and likely caused many deaths, both military and = civilian. After six months, NATO got tired, and we wound up with the assault on = Tripoli. The assault appears to have consisted of three parts. The first = was the insertion of NATO special operations troops (in the low = hundreds, not thousands) who, guided by intelligence operatives in = Tripoli, attacked and destabilized the government forces in the city. = The second part was an information operation in which NATO made it = appear that the battle was over. The bizarre incident in which = Gadhafi=E2=80=99s son, Seif al-Islam, announced as being captured only = to show up in an SUV looking very un-captured, was part of this game. = NATO wanted it to appear that the leadership had been reduced and = Gadhafi=E2=80=99s forces broken to convince those same forces to = capitulate. Seif al-Islam=E2=80=99s appearance was designed to signal = his troops that the war was still on.=20 Following the special operations strikes and the information operations, = western rebels entered the city to great fanfare, including celebratory = gunfire into the air. The world=E2=80=99s media chronicled the end of = the war as the special operations teams melted away and the victorious = rebels took the bows. It had taken six months, but it was over.=20 And then it became obvious that it wasn=E2=80=99t over. Five percent of = Libya =E2=80=94 an interesting calculation =E2=80=94 was not liberated. = Street fighting in Tripoli continued. Areas of the country were still = under Gadhafi=E2=80=99s control. And Gadhafi himself was not where his = enemies wanted him to be. The war went on. A number of lessons emerge from all this. First, it is important to = remember that Libya in itself may not be important to the world, but it = matters to Libyans a great deal. Second, do not assume that tyrants lack = support. Gadhafi didn=E2=80=99t govern Libya for 42 years without = support. Third, do not assume that the amount of force you are prepared = to provide is the amount of force needed. Fourth, eliminating the option = of a negotiated end to the war by the means of international courts may = be morally satisfying, but it causes wars to go on and casualties to = mount. It is important to decide what is more important =E2=80=94 to = alleviate the suffering of people or to punish the guilty. Sometimes it = is one or the other. Fifth, and most important, do not kid the world = about wars being over. After George W. Bush flew onto an aircraft = carrier that was emblazoned with a =E2=80=9Cmission = accomplished=E2=80=9D banner, the Iraq war became even more violent, and = the damage to him was massive. Information operations may be useful in = persuading opposing troops to surrender, but political credibility = bleeds away when the war is declared over and the fighting goes on. Gadhafi will likely fall in the end. NATO is more powerful then he is, = and enough force will be brought to bear to bring him down. The = question, of course, is whether there was another way to accomplish that = with less cost and more yield. Leaving aside the war-for-oil theory, if = the goal was to protect Benghazi and bring down Gadhafi, greater force = or a negotiated exit with guarantees against trials in The Hague would = likely have worked faster with less loss of life than the application of = soft military power. As the world contemplates the situation in Syria, this should be borne = in mind. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110829-libya-premature-victory-celebrati= on?utm_source=3Dfreelist-f&utm_medium=3Demail&utm_campaign=3D20110830&utm= _term=3Dgweekly&utm_content=3Dreadmore&elq=3D5936d18634934517bc84b7932128= edf6=20 *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= **************************************** *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= **************************************** Zu den K=C3=BCsten von Tripolis Uri Avnery OBWOHL UNS die Bibel sagt =E2=80=9EFreue dich nicht =C3=BCber den Fall = deines Feindes=E2=80=9C (Spr=C3=BCche 24), konnte ich nicht anders, als = mich freuen. Muammar al-Gaddafi war der Feind jeder anst=C3=A4ndigen Person in der = Welt. Er war einer der schlimmsten Tyrannen in j=C3=BCngster = Vergangenheit. Diese Tatsache war verborgen hinter einer Fassade von Clownerie. Er = liebte es, sich selbst als Philosoph darzustellen (s. das = =E2=80=9EGr=C3=BCne Buch=E2=80=9C), als vision=C3=A4rem Staatsmann = (Israelis und Pal=C3=A4stinenser m=C3=BCssen sich zum Staat Isratin = vereinen), selbst als unreifem Teenager (seine unz=C3=A4hligen Uniformen = und Kost=C3=BCme). Aber haupts=C3=A4chlich war er ein erbarmungsloser = Diktator, umgeben von korrupten Verwandten und Freunden, die den = gro=C3=9Fen Reichtum Libyens verschwendeten. Das war f=C3=BCr jeden offensichtlich, der sehen wollte. Leider gab es = nicht wenige, die ihre Augen verschlossen hielten. ALS ICH meine Unterst=C3=BCtzung f=C3=BCr die internationale = Intervention zum Ausdruck brachte, erwartete ich, von wohlmeinenden = Leuten angegriffen zu werden. Ich wurde nicht entt=C3=A4uscht. Wie konnte ich nur? Wie konnte ich die amerikanischen Imperialisten und = die gr=C3=A4ssliche NATO unterst=C3=BCtzen? War mir denn nicht klar, = dass es nur ums =C3=96l ging? Ich war nicht =C3=BCberrascht. Ich habe dies schon einmal erlebt. Als = die Nato begann, das serbische Gebiet zu bombardieren, um den Verbrechen = des Slobodan Milosevic im Kosovo ein Ende zu bereiten, wandten sich = viele meiner politischen Freunde gegen mich. War mir denn nicht klar, dass dies alles nur eine imperialistische = Verschw=C3=B6rung war? Dass die hinterh=C3=A4ltigen Amerikaner = Jugoslawien (oder Serbien) nur auseinander rei=C3=9Fen wollten? Dass die = Nato eine b=C3=B6se Organisation war? Dass Milosevic, auch wenn er ein = paar Fehler haben mag, eine progressive Menschlichkeit vertrat? Dies wurde gesagt, als die grausamen Akte des Massenmordes in Bosnien = f=C3=BCr jeden offensichtlich waren, als Milosevic schon als = kaltbl=C3=BCtiges Monster blo=C3=9Fgestellt war. Ariel Sharon bewunderte = ihn. Wie k=C3=B6nnen also anst=C3=A4ndige, wohlmeinende Linke, Menschen mit = makelloser humanistischer Vorgeschichte, solch eine Person umarmen? = Meine einzige Erkl=C3=A4rung war, dass ihr Hass auf die USA und die NATO = so stark, so leidenschaftlich war, dass jeder, der von ihnen angegriffen = wurde, gewiss ein Wohlt=C3=A4ter der Menschheit sein muss und alle = Anklagen gegen sie reine Erfindungen waren. Sogar Pol-Pot. Nun geschah es noch einmal. Ich wurde bombardiert mit Mails von = wohlmeinenden Leuten, die Gaddafi f=C3=BCr alle seine guten Taten = lobten. Man hat den Eindruck bekommen k=C3=B6nnen, dass er ein zweiter = Nelson Mandela, wenn nicht gar ein zweiter Mahatma Gandhi war. W=C3=A4hrend die Rebellen sich schon durch seine gro=C3=9Fe ummauerte = Anlage k=C3=A4mpfen, lobte ihn der sozialistische F=C3=BChrer Venezuelas = Hugo Chavez als wahres Modell aufrichtiger Menschlichkeit, ein Mann, der = es wagt, sich gegen die amerikanischen Aggressoren zu stellen. Nun, tut mir leid, da mache ich nicht mit. Ich habe diese irrationale = Abscheu vor blutigen Diktatoren, vor v=C3=B6lkerm=C3=B6rderischen = Massenm=C3=B6rdern, vor F=C3=BChrern , die gegen ihr eigenes Volk Krieg = f=C3=BChren. Und bei meinem fortgeschrittenen Alter ist es schwierig, = sich zu =C3=A4ndern. Ich bin bereit, sogar den Teufel zu unterst=C3=BCtzen, wenn es = n=C3=B6tig ist, diese Art Grausamkeit zu beenden. Ich w=C3=BCrde nicht = einmal nach seinen genauen Motiven fragen. Was immer man auch =C3=BCber = die USA und/oder die NATO denken mag =E2=80=93 wenn sie einen Milosevic = oder einen Gaddafi entwaffnen, dann haben sie meinen Segen. WIE GROSS ist die Rolle der NATO bei der Niederlage des libyschen = Diktators? Die Rebellen h=C3=A4tten Tripolis nicht erreicht, gewiss nicht bis = heute, wenn sie nicht die NATO-Unterst=C3=BCtzung aus der Luft gehabt = h=C3=A4tten. Libyen ist eine gro=C3=9Fe W=C3=BCste. Die Offensive war = auf eine lange Stra=C3=9Fe angewiesen. Ohne die technische Beherrschung = der Luft, w=C3=BCrden die Rebellen massakriert worden sein. Jeder, der = w=C3=A4hrend des 2.Weltkrieges lebte und den Feldz=C3=BCgen Rommels und = Montgomery folgte, wei=C3=9F dies. Ich vermute, dass die Rebellen auch Waffen und Rat erhalten haben, der = ihre Offensive erleichterte. Aber ich bin gegen die g=C3=B6nnerhafte Behauptung, dass dies alles ein = Sieg der NATO war. Es ist die alte kolonialistische Haltung in neuer = Gestalt. Nat=C3=BCrlich konnten diese armen, primitiven Araber nicht = alles ohne den Wei=C3=9Fen Mann machen. Aber Kriege werden nicht mit Waffen gewonnen, sie werden von Menschen = gewonnen. =E2=80=9EMit Stiefeln auf dem Boden=E2=80=9C, wie die = Amerikaner dies nennen. Selbst mit all der Hilfe, die die libyschen = Rebellen erhielten, so unorganisiert und schlecht bewaffnet sie waren, = so haben sie doch einen erstaunlichen Sieg errungen. Dies w=C3=A4re so = nicht ohne wirkliche revolution=C3=A4re Leidenschaft, ohne Tapferkeit = und Entschlossenheit geschehen. Es ist ein libyscher Sieg, kein = englischer oder franz=C3=B6sischer. Dies ist von den internationalen Medien heruntergespielt worden. Ich = habe keine einzige echte Kampf-Reportage gesehen (und ich wei=C3=9F, wie = das aussieht). Journalisten haben sich nicht mit Ruhm bekleckert. Sie = zeigten exemplarische Feigheit, blieben in sicherem Abstand von der = Front, sogar w=C3=A4hrend des Falles von Tripolis. Im Fernsehen sahen = sie mit ihren gro=C3=9Fen Helmen l=C3=A4cherlich aus, als sie von = barh=C3=A4uptigen K=C3=A4mpfern umgeben waren. Was her=C3=BCber kam, war endloser Jubel =C3=BCber den Sieg, der = scheinbar vom Himmel gefallen war. Aber das waren Heldentaten, die vom = Volk begangen worden waren =E2=80=93 ja von einem arabischen Volk. Dies ist f=C3=BCr unsere israelischen = =E2=80=9EMilit=C3=A4rkorrespondenten=E2=80=9C und unsere = =E2=80=9EExperten von arabischen Angelegenheiten=E2=80=9C besonders = =C3=A4rgerlich. Daran gew=C3=B6hnt, =E2=80=9Edie Araber=E2=80=9C zu = verachten oder zu hassen, schrieben sie dem Sieg der Nato zu. Es = scheint, dass das Volk von Libyen eine kleinere Rolle gespielt hat, wenn = =C3=BCberhaupt eine. Nun plappern sie endlos =C3=BCber die =E2=80=9ESt=C3=A4mme=E2=80=9C, die = Demokratie und eine ordentliche Regierung in Libyen unm=C3=B6glich = machen werden. Libyen sei kein wirkliches Land. Es war ,bevor es eine = italienische Kolonie wurde, nie ein geeintes Volk. So etwas wie ein = libysches Volk gibt es gar nicht. (Man erinnere sich, was die Franzosen = =C3=BCber die Algerier und Golda Meir =C3=BCber die Pal=C3=A4stinenser = sagten). Nun, daf=C3=BCr, dass ein Volk nicht existiert, k=C3=A4mpften die Libyer = sehr gut. Und was die =E2=80=9ESt=C3=A4mme=E2=80=9C angeht =E2=80=93 wie = kommt es, dass es nur in Afrika und Asien St=C3=A4mme gibt, niemals = unter Europ=C3=A4ern? Warum nicht ein walisischer Stamm oder ein = bayrischer Stamm? (Als ich 1986 vor dem Friedensvertrag Jordanien besuchte, wurde ich von = einem sehr zivilisierten, hochrangigen jordanischen Beamten eingeladen. = Nach einer interessanten Unterhaltung beim Mittagessen =C3=BCberraschte = er mich, als er erw=C3=A4hnte, er w=C3=BCrde zu einem bestimmten Stamm = geh=C3=B6ren. Am n=C3=A4chsten Tag, als ich mit einem Pferd nach Petra = ritt, fragte mich der Reiter neben mir mit leiser Stimme, ob ich = =E2=80=9Ezum Stamm=E2=80=9C geh=C3=B6ren w=C3=BCrde. Ich brauchte eine = Zeitlang, bis ich verstand, dass er mich fragte, ob ich Jude sei. Es = scheint, dass amerikanische Juden =C3=BCber sich selbst in dieser Weise = sprechen.) Die =E2=80=9ESt=C3=A4mme=E2=80=9C von Libyen w=C3=BCrden in Europa = =E2=80=9Eethnische Gruppen=E2=80=9C genannt und in Israel = =E2=80=9EKommunen=E2=80=9C. Der Terminus =E2=80=9EStamm=E2=80=9C hat = eine herablassende Assoziation. Wir sollten diesen Ausdruck nicht mehr = ben=C3=BCtzen. ALL JENE, die die Intervention der NATO verdammen, sollten auf eine = einfache Frage antworten: Wer h=C3=A4tte denn sonst diesen Job getan? Die Menschheit des 21. Jahrhunderts kann keine Akte von Genoziden und = Massenmorden tolerieren, egal, wo sie geschehen. Sie k=C3=B6nnen nicht = zusehen, wenn Diktatoren ihr eigenes Volk abschlachten. Die Doktrin des = =E2=80=9ENicht-Eingreifens=E2=80=9C in die inneren Angelegenheiten = souver=C3=A4ner Staaten=E2=80=9C geh=C3=B6rt in die Vergangenheit. Wir = Juden, die wir die Menschheit angeklagt haben, unt=C3=A4tig abseits = gestanden zu haben, w=C3=A4hrend Millionen Juden, einschlie=C3=9Flich = deutscher B=C3=BCrger, von der legitimen deutschen Regierung vernichtet = wurden, schulden der Welt gewiss eine Antwort. Ich habe einige Male erw=C3=A4hnt, dass ich f=C3=BCr eine Art effektiver = Weltregierung sei und erwarte, dass es sie am Ende dieses Jahrhunderts = gibt. Dies w=C3=BCrde eine demokratisch gew=C3=A4hlte Welt-Exekutive = einschlie=C3=9Fen, die auch milit=C3=A4rische Kr=C3=A4fte zu ihrer = Verf=C3=BCgung hat, die eingreifen k=C3=B6nnen, wenn ein Weltparlament = dies entscheidet. Damit dies geschieht, m=C3=BCssen die Vereinigten Nationen vollkommen = umorganisiert werden. Die Veto-Macht muss verschwinden. Es ist = unertr=C3=A4glich, dass die US mit einem Veto die Aufnahme = Pal=C3=A4stinas als Mitgliedstaat verhindern oder dass Russland und = China mit einem Veto eine Intervention in Syrien verhindern kann. Gewiss sollten die Stimmen der Gro=C3=9Fm=C3=A4chte wie die der USA und = Chinas gewichtiger sein als - sagen wir mal =E2=80=93 Luxemburg oder die = Fidschi-Inseln, aber eine Zwei-Drittel-Mehrheit in der Vollversammlung = sollte die Macht haben, Washington, Moskau und Peking zu = =C3=BCberstimmen. Das mag Zukunftsmusik sein oder, wie andere sagen, ein Hirngespinst. Was = die Gegenwart betrifft, so leben wir in einer sehr unvollkommenen Welt = und m=C3=BCssen mit den uns zur Verf=C3=BCgung stehenden Mitteln = auskommen. Die NATO ist leider eines davon. Die EU ist ein anderes, = obwohl in diesem Fall das arme, ewig von schlechtem Gewissen geschlagene = Deutschland sie gel=C3=A4hmt hat. Wenn Russland oder China sich ihr = anschlie=C3=9Fen w=C3=BCrden, w=C3=A4re dies gut. Dies ist kein fernes Problem. Gaddafi ist am Ende, aber Bashar al-Assad = ist es nicht. Er schlachtet sein Volk ab, w=C3=A4hrend Sie dies lesen, = und die Welt sieht hilflos zu. Gibt es Freiwillige, die bereit sind zu intervenieren? http://www.uri-avnery.de/news/152/15/Zu-den-Kuesten-von-Tripolis=20 *************************************************************************= **************************************** THE ROVING EYE=20 How al-Qaeda got to rule in Tripoli=20 By Pepe Escobar=20 His name is Abdelhakim Belhaj. Some in the Middle East might have, but = few in the West and across the world would have heard of him.=20 Time to catch up. Because the story of how an al-Qaeda asset turned out = to be the top Libyan military commander in still war-torn Tripoli is = bound to shatter - once again - that wilderness of mirrors that is the = "war on terror", as well as deeply compromising the carefully = constructed propaganda of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's = (NATO's) "humanitarian" intervention in Libya.=20 Muammar Gaddafi's fortress of Bab-al-Aziziyah was essentially invaded = and conquered last week by Belhaj's men - who were at=20 the forefront of a militia of Berbers from the mountains southwest of = Tripoli. The militia is the so-called Tripoli Brigade, trained in secret = for two months by US Special Forces. This turned out to be the rebels' = most effective militia in six months of tribal/civil war.=20 Already last Tuesday, Belhaj was gloating on how the battle was won, = with Gaddafi forces escaping "like rats" (note that's the same metaphor = used by Gaddafi himself to designate the rebels).=20 Abdelhakim Belhaj, aka Abu Abdallah al-Sadek, is a Libyan jihadi. Born = in May 1966, he honed his skills with the mujahideen in the 1980s = anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.=20 He's the founder of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and its de = facto emir - with Khaled Chrif and Sami Saadi as his deputies. After the = Taliban took power in Kabul in 1996, the LIFG kept two training camps in = Afghanistan; one of them, 30 kilometers north of Kabul - run by Abu = Yahya - was strictly for al-Qaeda-linked jihadis.=20 After 9/11, Belhaj moved to Pakistan and also to Iraq, where he = befriended none other than ultra-nasty Abu Musab al-Zarqawi - all this = before al-Qaeda in Iraq pledged its allegiance to Osama bin Laden and = Ayman al-Zawahiri and turbo-charged its gruesome practices.=20 In Iraq, Libyans happened to be the largest foreign Sunni jihadi = contingent, only losing to the Saudis. Moreover, Libyan jihadis have = always been superstars in the top echelons of "historic" al-Qaeda - from = Abu Faraj al-Libi (military commander until his arrest in 2005, now = lingering as one of 16 high-value detainees in the US detention center = at Guantanamo) to Abu al-Laith al-Libi (another military commander, = killed in Pakistan in early 2008).=20 Time for an extraordinary rendition=20 The LIFG had been on the US Central Intelligence Agency's radars since = 9/11. In 2003, Belhaj was finally arrested in Malaysia - and then = transferred, extraordinary rendition-style, to a secret Bangkok prison, = and duly tortured.=20 In 2004, the Americans decided to send him as a gift to Libyan = intelligence - until he was freed by the Gaddafi regime in March 2010, = along with other 211 "terrorists", in a public relations coup advertised = with great fanfare.=20 The orchestrator was no less than Saif Islam al-Gaddafi - the = modernizing/London School of Economics face of the regime. LIFG's = leaders - Belhaj and his deputies Chrif and Saadi - issued a 417-page = confession dubbed "corrective studies" in which they declared the jihad = against Gaddafi over (and illegal), before they were finally set free.=20 A fascinating account of the whole process can be seen in a report = called "Combating Terrorism in Libya through Dialogue and = Reintegration". [1] Note that the authors, Singapore-based terrorism = "experts" who were wined and dined by the regime, express the "deepest = appreciation to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and the Gaddafi International = Charity and Development Foundation for making this visit possible".=20 Crucially, still in 2007, then al-Qaeda's number two, Zawahiri, = officially announced the merger between the LIFG and al-Qaeda in the = Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM). So, for all practical purposes, since then, = LIFG/AQIM have been one and the same - and Belhaj was/is its emir.=20 In 2007, LIFG was calling for a jihad against Gaddafi but also against = the US and assorted Western "infidels".=20 Fast forward to last February when, a free man, Belhaj decided to go = back into jihad mode and align his forces with the engineered uprising = in Cyrenaica.=20 Every intelligence agency in the US, Europe and the Arab world knows = where he's coming from. He's already made sure in Libya that himself and = his militia will only settle for sharia law.=20 There's nothing "pro-democracy" about it - by any stretch of the = imagination. And yet such an asset could not be dropped from NATO's war = just because he was not very fond of "infidels".=20 The late July killing of rebel military commander General Abdel Fattah = Younis - by the rebels themselves - seems to point to Belhaj or at least = people very close to him.=20 It's essential to know that Younis - before he defected from the regime = - had been in charge of Libya's special forces fiercely fighting the = LIFG in Cyrenaica from 1990 to 1995.=20 The Transitional National Council (TNC), according to one of its = members, Ali Tarhouni, has been spinning Younis was killed by a shady = brigade known as Obaida ibn Jarrah (one of the Prophet Mohammed's = companions). Yet the brigade now seems to have dissolved into thin air.=20 Shut up or I'll cut your head off=20 Hardly by accident, all the top military rebel commanders are LIFG, from = Belhaj in Tripoli to one Ismael as-Salabi in Benghazi and one Abdelhakim = al-Assadi in Derna, not to mention a key asset, Ali Salabi, sitting at = the core of the TNC. It was Salabi who negotiated with Saif al-Islam = Gaddafi the "end" of LIFG's jihad, thus assuring the bright future of = these born-again "freedom fighters".=20 It doesn't require a crystal ball to picture the consequences of = LIFG/AQIM - having conquered military power and being among the war = "winners" - not remotely interested in relinquishing control just to = please NATO's whims.=20 Meanwhile, amid the fog of war, it's unclear whether Gaddafi is planning = to trap the Tripoli brigade in urban warfare; or to force the bulk of = rebel militias to enter the huge Warfallah tribal areas.=20 Gaddafi's wife belongs to the Warfallah, Libya's largest tribe, with up = to 1 million people and 54 sub-tribes. The inside word in Brussels is = that NATO expects Gaddafi to fight for months if not years; thus the = Texas George W Bush-style bounty on his head and the desperate return to = NATO's plan A, which was always to take him out.=20 Libya may now be facing the specter of a twin-headed guerrilla Hydra; = Gaddafi forces against a weak TNC central government and NATO boots on = the ground; and the LIFG/AQIM nebula in a jihad against NATO (if they = are sidelined from power).=20 Gaddafi may be a dictatorial relic of the past, but you don't monopolize = power for four decades for nothing, and without your intelligence = services learning a thing or two.=20 From the beginning, Gaddafi said this was a foreign-backed/al-Qaeda = operation; he was right (although he forgot to say this was above all = neo-Napoleonic French President Nicolas Sarkozy's war, but that's = another story).=20 He also said this was a prelude for a foreign occupation whose target = was to privatize and take over Libya's natural resources. He may - again = =E2=80=93 turn out to be right.=20 The Singapore "experts" who praised the Gaddafi regime's decision to = free the LIFG's jihadis qualified it as "a necessary strategy to = mitigate the threat posed to Libya".=20 Now, LIFG/AQIM is finally poised to exercise its options as an = "indigenous political force".=20 Ten years after 9/11, it's hard not to imagine a certain decomposed = skull in the bottom of the Arabian Sea boldly grinning to kingdom come.=20 Note=20 1. Click here=20 Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is = Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a = snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama = does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).=20 He may be reached at pepeasia@yahoo.com.=20 To follow Pepe's articles on the Great Arab Revolt, please click here.=20 http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/MH30Ak01.html=20 *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************** *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************** see our letter on: http://www.massenbach-world.de/41259.html Wir w=C3=BCnschen Ihnen ein angenehmes Wochenende. Ihr Team. *************************************************************************= **************************************** Udo von Massenbach - B=C3=A4rbel Freudenberg-Pilster - J=C3=B6rg = Barandat =20 UdovonMassenbach@t-online.de Mail@Freudenberg-Pilster.de =20 JoergBarandat@yahoo.de ------=_NextPart_000_0368_01CC6884.95334A00 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Guten = Morgen.
 
Uri=20 Avnery: Zu den K=C3=BCsten von Tripolis
RUSI: =  Curi= ous=20 victory for NATO in Libya
          &nbs= p;            = ;            = =20
 
Massenbach  =20 Endkampf um = Libyen:=20 Loyalit=C3=A4t in der libyschen Gesellschaft und das Geld des = Regimes im=20 Ausland
 
(aus: Deutsch-Arabische Gesellschaft = www.d-a-g.de)
 

Manche bef=C3=BCrchten, der = libysche Staat k=C3=B6nne=20 in der Zeit nach Gaddafi wieder zerfallen. Doch die alten = Trennlinien=20 spielen in den K=C3=B6pfen der Libyer kaum noch eine = Rolle.

Von Rainer Hermann

FRANKFURT, 25. August. Der = Nationale=20 =C3=9Cbergangsrat will so rasch wie m=C3=B6glich von Benghasi nach = Tripolis=20 umziehen, m=C3=B6glichst noch in dieser Woche. Die F=C3=BChrung = der Gaddafi-Gegner=20 will damit zeigen, dass sie sich ganz Libyen verpflichtet = f=C3=BChlen und nicht=20 nur dem Osten des Landes. Gerade in Tripolis gibt es = Bef=C3=BCrchtungen, das=20 Land werde nun in zwei Teile zerfallen - oder in mehr. Das = Bekenntnis zur=20 Hauptstadt des libyschen Nationalstaats soll Sorgen zerstreuen, = dass sich=20 dieser nun entlang von Stammesloyalit=C3=A4ten spalten = k=C3=B6nnte. Gesch=C3=BCrt wurden=20 derlei =C3=84ngste vom Gaddafi-Clan. Ende Februar hatte Saif al = Islam al=20 Gaddafi, der Sohn des Machthabers, der Welt zu erkl=C3=A4ren = versucht, dass die=20 Libyer unpolitisch seien. Falle die Regierung seines Vaters, = w=C3=BCrde ein=20 Vakuum entstehen, das die St=C3=A4mme f=C3=BCllen w=C3=BCrden, = dozierte er.

F=C3=BCr beide Szenarien - eine = Zweiteilung in=20 Ost- und West-Libyen oder ein chaotisches Nebeneinander einander=20 befehdender St=C3=A4mme - g=C3=A4be es historische Vorbilder. Doch = viel spricht=20 dagegen, dass das neue Libyen an eines dieser Vorbilder = ankn=C3=BCpft. Zum=20 einen wei=C3=9F die Bev=C3=B6lkerung, dass der =C3=96lreichtum nur = dann zu Wohlstand=20 f=C3=BChrt, wenn die Einheit des Landes Bestand hat und nicht eine = doppelte=20 Infrastruktur f=C3=BCr die =C3=96lindustrie angelegt werden muss. = Zum anderen hatte=20 die Erhebung gegen Gaddafi zwar am 15. Februar in Benghasi = begonnen,=20 sprang aber in Windeseile auch auf den Westen des Landes = =C3=BCber.

Tripolis war nur deswegen lange = immun gegen=20 Massenproteste, weil Gaddafis Sicherheitsapparat in der Hauptstadt = konzentriert war und die Opposition unterdr=C3=BCckte. Die = Aufst=C3=A4ndischen=20 lie=C3=9Fen sich von den Revolutionen in Tunesien und =C3=84gypten = inspirieren und=20 nicht von den Interessen ihrer St=C3=A4mme leiten. St=C3=A4dter = tragen die=20 Revolution, die meisten sind nicht einmal 30 Jahre alt.

Eine Trennlinie, die Libyen in = der Mitte von=20 Norden nach S=C3=BCden teilt, steht in den Geschichtsb=C3=BCchern, = spielt aber in=20 den K=C3=B6pfen der heutigen Libyer kaum eine Rolle. Nahezu alle = Libyer sind=20 sunnitische Muslime, alle sprechen Arabisch. Es gibt keine = kulturellen=20 Vorbehalte, die Libyer aus dem Osten des Landes von Reisen nach = Tripolis=20 abhalten w=C3=BCrden. Viele Menschen aus Benghasi haben in der = Hauptstadt=20 Arbeit gefunden und Familien gegr=C3=BCndet. In die Gegenrichtung = freilich gab=20 es weniger Bewegung, denn die zweitgr=C3=B6=C3=9Fte Stadt des = Landes wurde unter=20 Gaddafi vernachl=C3=A4ssigt und verarmte.

Es war das milit=C3=A4rische Patt = in den=20 vergangenen Monaten, das Anlass zu Sorgen gab, Libyen k=C3=B6nne = wieder in=20 seine historischen Provinzen zerfallen: Gaddafi, so lautete diese = Sorge,=20 w=C3=BCrde =C3=BCber die fr=C3=BChere Provinz Tripolitania = gebieten, w=C3=A4hrend die Rebellen=20 ihre Vorstellungen eines freien Libyens nur in der =C3=B6stlichen = Provinz=20 Cyreneica durchsetzen k=C3=B6nnten. Die dritte historische = Provinz, Fezzan im=20 S=C3=BCden, ist mit ihren scheinbar endlosen W=C3=BCsten heute = nahezu menschenleer,=20 sieht man von W=C3=BCstenomaden wie den Tuareg ab. Zu Zeiten der = r=C3=B6mischen=20 Herrschaft war das heutige Libyen in diese drei Provinzen geteilt. = Erst=20 unter der Kolonialherrschaft Italiens, die 1911 begonnen hatte, = entstand=20 durch die Erhebung gegen die fremden Herrscher ein=20 Nationalbewusstsein.

Im Zweiten Weltkrieg besetzten = 1943 die=20 Briten Tripolitania und Cyreneica, Frankreich erhielt Fezzan. In = ihrem=20 Kampf gegen die neuen Kolonialherren einigten sich die Libyer = aller drei=20 Provinzen auf einen Nachkommen des Sufiordens der Sanoussi, Idris, = als den=20 K=C3=B6nig eines geeinten Libyens. Als Monarchie wurde Libyen 1951 = unabh=C3=A4ngig.=20 Idris residierte in Baida in der Cyreneica, wo das Zentrum des = neuen=20 Staats entstand. Da es in dem damals sehr d=C3=BCnnbesiedelten = Land kaum=20 Stra=C3=9Fen gab und keine Telekommunikation, f=C3=BChlte sich das = ferne=20 Tripolitania benachteiligt. Doch nichts ist heute wie damals. Die=20 allermeisten der inzwischen sechs Millionen Libyer leben in den = St=C3=A4dten=20 entlang der K=C3=BCste.

In den drei Staaten des Maghreb - = Marokko,=20 Algerien und Tunesien - ver=C3=A4nderte der franz=C3=B6sische = Einfluss die Kultur in=20 den St=C3=A4dten. Die St=C3=A4dte der Tripolitania und Cyreneica = wurden nicht in=20 gleicher Weise italienisiert. So blieben die St=C3=A4dter, die das = Land heute=20 pr=C3=A4gen, der arabisch-muslimischen Kultur eng verbunden. Sie = behielten die=20 Anbindung an die St=C3=A4mme aufrecht, deren Namen sie h=C3=A4ufig = weiter tragen.=20 Trotzdem messen die meisten Libyer ihrer Stammeszugeh=C3=B6rigkeit = keine gro=C3=9Fe=20 Bedeutung bei. Von den 140 St=C3=A4mmen, die die Wissenschaftler = in Libyen=20 identifiziert haben, sind 30 weiter von Bedeutung. Die meisten = k=C3=B6nnen=20 bestimmten Regionen zugeordnet werden. Zwar haben lediglich 15 = Prozent der=20 Libyer keinerlei Bindungen an einen Stamm - aber auch f=C3=BCr die = restlichen=20 85 Prozent der Bev=C3=B6lkerung spielen Stammesloyalit=C3=A4ten = keine bestimmende=20 Rolle mehr. Das liegt an der Urbanisierung, die sich im = =C3=96lzeitalter=20 beschleunigt hat, und an den vielen Ehen, die =C3=BCber = Stammesgrenzen hinweg=20 geschlossen werden. Bereits 1969 war die Bedeutung der St=C3=A4mme = so gering,=20 dass die Libyer massenhaft einen jungen Offizier namens Muammar al = Gaddafi=20 aus dem bis dahin nachrangigen Stamm der Gaddafa als Nachfolger = des K=C3=B6nigs=20 akzeptierten.

Gaddafi hatte Idris wegen der = starken=20 panarabischen Welle, die Gamal Abd al Nasser in =C3=84gypten = ausgel=C3=B6st hatte,=20 st=C3=BCrzen k=C3=B6nnen - aber auch, weil er f=C3=BCr die = St=C3=A4mme im Westen des Landes=20 sprach, die sich von der Verschiebung des Gravitationszentrums = unter der=20 Monarchie nach Osten benachteiligt f=C3=BChlten. An der Macht = spielte Gaddafi=20 die St=C3=A4mme gegeneinander aus. Auch deshalb hatten sie als = Institution=20 Bestand: In einem Staat der Willk=C3=BCr boten sie dem Individuum = Schutz, bei=20 Wohlverhalten gegen=C3=BCber Gaddafi auch = Aufstiegsm=C3=B6glichkeiten. Es =C3=BCberlebte=20 auch die Institution der Stammesf=C3=BChrer, die als Personen mit = nat=C3=BCrlicher=20 Autorit=C3=A4t in der Schlichtung von Konflikten ge=C3=BCbt waren = und dadurch=20 Ansehen besa=C3=9Fen. Dank dieser politischen F=C3=A4higkeiten = spielten sie auch in=20 der Revolution eine Rolle. Zwar z=C3=A4hlt kein Stammesf=C3=BChrer = zur F=C3=BChrung der=20 Rebellen. Ihr Wort hat aber Gewicht. So hat der F=C3=BChrer des = Zawija-Stamms,=20 Scheich Faradsch al Zawi, bereits in der ersten Woche der Proteste = Gaddafi=20 gedroht, er werde die Unterbrechung des =C3=96lexports = veranlassen, sollte die=20 Brutalit=C3=A4t des Sicherheitsapparats gegen die Demonstranten = anhalten.=20 Muhammad al Zawi vom selben Stamm war lange Botschafter in London. = Nach=20 dem Beginn der Revolution verhandelte er mit vielen St=C3=A4mmen, = um sie auf=20 eine Linie gegen den Diktator zu bringen.

Je l=C3=A4nger die Revolution = dauerte, desto=20 geschlossener traten die St=C3=A4mme gegen Gaddafi auf. Vergessen = sind die=20 Spannungen zwischen ihnen nicht, die sich in Gaddafis langer = Herrschaft=20 aufgebaut haben. Doch selbst wenn Gaddafi als Feind entf=C3=A4llt, = eint die=20 St=C3=A4mme noch die Furcht vor militanten Islamisten, die auch im = neuen Libyen=20 Tritt fassen wollen. Mahmud Dschibril, der Ministerpr=C3=A4sident = der=20 =C3=9Cbergangsregierung, hatte j=C3=BCngst ausgeschlossen, dass = St=C3=A4mme und ein=20 moderner Staat zusammenpassen. Die St=C3=A4mme seien kein = politisches=20 Instrument mehr, sagte er - aber eine gesellschaftliche Einheit, = welche=20 die libysche Kultur bereichere.

Den vollst=C3=A4ndigen Artikel = finden Sie in der=20 F.A.Z. vom 26.08.2011, Nr. 198 / Seite=20 2

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          = ;            =             &= nbsp;           &n= bsp;           &nb= sp;          =20 Los Angeles Times (Oped):
3D"B=C3=A4rbel<= /STRONG>Freudenberg-Pilster            =  =20 Beyond suffrage: How far have women come=20 since?
Rechtsanw=C3=A4ltin-
Staatssekret=C3=A4rin = a.D.     =20    =20

American women won the = right to vote=20 in 1920. But how far have we come since on other issues important to=20 women?

By Eve Weinbaum = and Rachel=20 Roth*August 26, = 2011

Today we celebrate the anniversary of female suffrage, a = victory=20 that took more than 70 years of political struggle to achieve. After = women won=20 the right to vote in 1920, socialist feminist Crystal Eastman observed = that=20 suffrage was an important first step but that what women really wanted = was=20 freedom. In an essay titled "Now We Can Begin," she laid out a plan = toward this=20 goal that is still relevant today.

Eastman outlined a four-point = program:=20 economic independence for women (including freedom to choose an = occupation and=20 equal pay), gender equality at home (raising "feminist sons" to share = the=20 responsibilities of family life), "voluntary motherhood" (reproductive = freedom)=20 and "motherhood endowment," or financial support for child-rearing and=20 homemaking.

Since the 1920s, women have won many rights and = opportunities=20 in areas as diverse as higher education, professional sports and, in six = states,=20 same-sex marriage. But on the core priorities that Eastman identified, = how far=20 have we come?

Eastman optimistically called equality in the = workplace=20 "the easiest part of our program," noting that "the ground is already = broken" on=20 women's participation in various professions, trades and unions. One of = the=20 chief barriers was "inequality in pay," a problem that has proved = remarkably=20 enduring.

Women on average still make only 77 cents for every = dollar paid=20 to their male counterparts, according to the National Women's Law = Center. This=20 pay disparity is worst for women of color, who earn only 61 cents if = they are=20 African American and 52 cents if they are Latina. This pattern has been=20 remarkably constant.

Women's lower earnings are related to gender = segmentation in the workplace that relegates women to the lower rungs of = the=20 economic ladder. At Wal-Mart, for example =E2=80=94 the nation's biggest = employer =E2=80=94=20 women make up about 70% of hourly workers but only about 30% of = managers. The=20 Supreme Court recently ruled that the retailer's female employees could = not join=20 together in a class-action lawsuit, making it nearly impossible for them = to=20 challenge patterns of discrimination.

Although women now = outnumber men on=20 college campuses, the upper echelons of most professions and political = bodies=20 remain male-dominated. Just look at Congress: Only 17% of its members = are women.=20 Between 1923 and 2011, only 28 women have chaired congressional = committees, and=20 only 45 women of color have ever served in Congress =E2=80=94 just one = in the Senate.=20 The new congressional "super-committee" of 12 legislators charged with = reducing=20 the federal deficit has one white woman and not a single woman of=20 color.

On the home front, gender norms have changed significantly = since=20 1920, but women still do the lion's share of child care, elder care and=20 household planning. And child-rearing is still regarded as a private = matter=20 rather than a contribution to society. Although a recent Time magazine = cover=20 story suggested an end to "chore wars," its own data showed that married = women=20 with children still do more work at home than their husbands, and = full-time=20 employed moms with children under age 6 spend more hours on household = chores=20 than any other group.

Given women's disproportionate = responsibility for=20 child-rearing amid lesser economic opportunities, the ability to plan = whether=20 and when to have children is critically important. As Eastman said: = "Freedom of=20 any kind is hardly worth considering unless it is assumed that [women] = will know=20 how to control the size of their families."

This was a tall order = in=20 1920, when it was a crime simply to disseminate information about = contraception.=20 Fertility control is now legal, but women's reproductive freedom is = under=20 intense attack. The 2011 legislative session saw a record number of = anti-choice=20 bills introduced =E2=80=94 and passed into law. In just six months, = state legislatures=20 passed 80 laws to restrict access to abortion.

State legislatures = also=20 have made deep cuts to family planning budgets, which has the perverse = result of=20 increasing unintended pregnancies. The Hyde Amendment bans federal = Medicaid=20 coverage of abortion, and only 15 states pay for abortion care with = their own=20 revenue. This means that low-income women in most of the country can = have an=20 abortion only if they can afford to pay for it out of pocket, making the = right=20 to abortion an empty promise for millions of women.

When it comes = to=20 support for child-rearing, the United States is the only major = industrialized=20 nation without a national policy guaranteeing paid parental leave. While = a few=20 states and cities have taken the initiative to implement their own = policies, the=20 vast majority of mothers (and fathers) have no right to paid time off to = care=20 for a newborn baby. Many workers do not even have a right to take unpaid = leave,=20 because the federal Family and Medical Leave Act applies only to = relatively=20 long-term workers in workplaces with 50 or more employees, leaving out = small=20 businesses, new employees and workers who have put in fewer than 1,250 = hours at=20 that job.

With no paid leave, and discrimination against pregnant = women=20 on the rise, women are a long way from Eastman's vision of having = child-rearing=20 "recognized by the world as work, requiring a definite economic reward = and not=20 merely entitling the performer to be dependent on some man."

In = all four=20 areas that Eastman discussed, female suffrage has not ushered in the=20 wide-ranging changes that its opponents feared and its advocates=20 championed.

Eastman understood that work and home are = inextricably bound,=20 that women's freedom depends on resolving what we now call "work/family" = conflict. As long as women face a "motherhood penalty" while men benefit = from a=20 "fatherhood bonus," gender equality will remain out of reach. Racial=20 discrimination has made the path to equality that much harder for women = of=20 color.

The real question now is, in Eastman's words, "how to = arrange the=20 world" so that women have "a chance to exercise their infinitely varied = gifts in=20 infinitely varied ways, instead of being destined by the accident of = their sex"=20 to lesser economic opportunities and heavier domestic burdens.

To = do=20 this, our institutions must become more responsive. The workplace has to = change=20 to allow people with families to hold good jobs, and policies must = change to=20 allow women to plan their families and to ensure that no one is left = behind. In=20 the 90 years since winning the right to vote, women have achieved gains = by=20 organizing in the streets and the workplace, by lobbying legislatures = and=20 bringing lawsuits. Arranging a more just world will require a new wave = of=20 political action at all levels, from local to national, home to=20 workplace.

On Aug. 26, 2020, we will celebrate the 100th = anniversary of=20 women's suffrage. Let's make this the decade we create the conditions = that bring=20 true equality.

Eve Weinbaum is = director of the=20 Labor Center and an associate professor of sociology at the University = of=20 Massachusetts Amherst.

Rachel Roth is director of = communications=20 and foundation support at the National Network of Abortion Funds and the = author=20 of a book on women's rights.

http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/la-oe-roth-women-201108= 26,0,1276223.story
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Barandat=20            =             &= nbsp;  =20 Curious victory for NATO in=20 Libya          &= nbsp;           &n= bsp;           =20        =20
Bundeswehr      =20                          &nbs= p;            = ;     =20
         &nbs= p;      =20 =E2=80=9C Germany not only refused to participate = militarily but=20 publicly criticised the whole = endeavour.=E2=80=9D

Few dispute the assertion that NATO jets = enabled Libyan=20 rebels to come knocking on Qadhafi's door in Tripoli. But as he falls, = it will=20 be difficult to avoid the conclusion that NATO emerges from this = successful=20 operation weaker than it went into it.

By Professor Michael=20 Clarke, Director-General,=20 RUSI

The NATO-led campaign to protect Libyan = civilians - and=20 thereby becoming effectively the air arm of the revolution against = Colonel=20 Qadhafi - was always politically controversial. For that reason alone it = was=20 evident from the beginning that if it was not successful quickly, the = campaign=20 would not be judged successful at all. And after five and a half months, = NATO=20 and its allies can claim military success just about in time to avoid = the tag of=20 failure on the grounds that it all took too long.

In truth, for an improvised air campaign = supporting=20 groups of disorganised rebels on the ground, against a brutal and = well-armed=20 regime, and operating under all the domestic political constraints and=20 international sensitivities of a UN resolution, military success inside = six=20 months is pretty good going. British and French leaders can claim = vindication=20 for their resolve and UK military planners can breathe a sigh of relief = that=20 they will not now have to make big planning adjustments to keep the = mission=20 going beyond September.

For all this, we can be duly grateful. A = collective=20 failure of political will; a stalemate on the ground; or glacial = progress that=20 put Libya in the 'Iraq' or 'Afghanistan' categories, would have been so = much=20 worse for the alliance. NATO analysts will take some heart from this. It = is said=20 to demonstrate President Obama's new approach of 'facilitating success' = rather=20 than leading it; the European members of NATO have stepped up to do what = was=20 necessary; NATO again provided the military core for a wider coalition=20 operation; and even the most sceptical observers could not deny that the = rebel's=20 success was dependent on NATO destroying over 50 per cent of all the = regime's=20 military assets.[1]

For all the vindication that success provides, = however -=20 not least to British, French and American political leaders and the = Secretary=20 General of NATO for their commitment - it is difficult to avoid the = conclusion=20 that NATO emerges from this successful operation weaker than it went = into it.=20 The military operation itself created an image of NATO's limitations = rather than=20 its power.

Was this really a grand alliance?

In a big alliance, numbers matter. Only nine of = its=20 twenty-eight members were prepared to put themselves on the line = physically and=20 politically and attack ground targets.[2] Only two - France and the UK - = were=20 prepared to deploy attack helicopters (five British and around twelve = French=20 machines) which make all the difference to the ground forces. In a = NATO-led=20 coalition that supposedly consisted of more than thirty [3] contributing = nations, only ten countries committed forces to ground attack, and one = of them=20 pulled out of it[4] for reasons that have still to be fully explained. = This=20 combined commitment produced between seventy and eighty available = aircraft most=20 of the time. Of that, the British and French contribution, with about = twenty=20 attack aircraft each, amounted to more than half the total. Around 20 = naval=20 vessels were actively involved at any one time.

The extensive no-fly-zone over Libya employed = no fewer=20 than 280-300 aircraft throughout the five months of the operation. = Running the=20 no fly zone in this environment was certainly complex - if only because = so many=20 different nations were involved - but not particularly dangerous or=20 operationally difficult given the limitations of Qadhafi's air force and = air=20 defence system after the early days of the conflict when American power = degraded=20 them so severely. Among the NATO allies, those prepared to undertake = ground=20 attack missions at some stage over this period, consisted of the United = States,=20 France and the United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, = Belgium, and=20 Canada. Among the non-NATO countries the United Arab Emirates and Qatar = also=20 used their aircraft in an offensive role.

The role of the United States

In a transatlantic alliance, the role of the = United=20 States must always be a factor. President Obama may have taken the US = out of the=20 direct combat role, but he certainly did not take American forces out of = the=20 front line. The European allies were hardly 'going it alone' in this=20 operation.

Air-to-air refuelling is vital to maintain = fighter jets=20 on constant patrol and in getting them to and from most targets. The US = has=20 provided 30 of the 40 or so air-to-air refuelling tankers that have been = deployed for this operation. Even with a severely degraded air defence = system,=20 suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD) assets are critical to avoid = occasional=20 loss of aircraft. Very few allied attack missions were flown without a = US=20 electronic warfare aircraft above them acting as guardian angel. British = and=20 French forces had some of their own SEAD capabilities but were happy = enough to=20 rely on US coverage where possible. Not least, the US has continued to = deploy=20 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) throughout the campaign, with hellfire = missiles,=20 some of which have been used. And it has maintained an active = reconnaissance=20 role both with its satellites and its own helicopter force. There has = been no=20 shortage of US service personnel in-theatre.

Reluctant coalition partners

Meanwhile, other European-NATO members have = been=20 extremely reticent to engage in an operation to which the alliance as a = whole=20 was supposedly committed. Turkish and Spanish aircraft, for example, = were=20 prohibited from flying any attack missions, Poland sent no forces. = Germany not=20 only refused to participate militarily but publicly criticised the whole = endeavour.

The Arab League nations exhibited a similar=20 inconsistency. Despite its unequivocal call in mid-March for decisive = action to=20 halt Qadhafi's offensive on Benghazi, some Arab League nations refused = to=20 participate at all. Others, like Jordan, maintained air patrols but = would not=20 undertake any offensive action. Still others, like Qatar and the UAE, = have=20 engaged in offensive operations, but are not keen to trumpet the fact. = Indeed,=20 the United Arab Emirates have displayed an interesting capacity to field = both=20 UAVs and Special Forces and have reportedly used them along the = Libyan/Tunisian=20 border. Of most value, however, some Arab countries have provided = weapons to the=20 rebels, albeit in defiance of the UN arms embargo on Libya, and have = taken=20 responsibility for internationally illegal actions that the NATO powers = were=20 never prepared, and perhaps never could have, taken themselves. The fact = that=20 there has been no international outcry over this defiance of a UN = resolution=20 (UNSCR 1970) is probably due to a general pragmatism among the world=20 community.

A laboured success

All this can be interpreted positively in a = military=20 sense: that NATO has achieved some flexibility as an alliance and as a = leader=20 for broader coalitions and that it finds ways through the difficulties,=20 ultimately to prevail. But NATO is more likely to be judged negatively = in a=20 political sense, especially in Washington. The Europeans could = not get=20 their act together in a convincing way, even over a comparatively small=20 operation against a weak and crazy opponent. The greatest military = alliance the=20 world has ever known was made to look puny in what it could really = deploy. Even=20 with the US providing so many combat enablers, it should have been able = to sweep=20 Gaddafi's 1970s, Warsaw Pact weapons and his badly organised army = straight off=20 the board; the British alone have attacked just on 900 targets since the = start=20 of operations, so why has the effect not been more obvious?; and so on. = And the=20 strain that this curious little war has already put on the forces of the = most=20 capable European allies - the UK and France - is a poor omen for the=20 future.

When the policy elite in Washington speak about = 'NATO'=20 these days, they really mean 'the Europeans'. That has been the case for = some=20 time now. And when they look at the Libya operation this week, they = don't see=20 NATO's canny adaptation and political guile at work so much as a = laboured=20 success that came just in time to save everyone's blushes. NATO should = think=20 long and hard about this operation. Whatever it represents to the Libyan = people,=20 it may come to look like a tipping point in the transatlantic evolution = of=20 NATO.

NOTES

[1] See, for example, Tomas Valasek, 'What = Libya says=20 about the future of the transatlantic alliance', Centre for European = Reform,=20 July 2011.

[2] Of that nine, only seven were European = nations and=20 two of them subsequently withdrew their aircraft.

[3] NATO insists that all twenty-eight member = states=20 contributed 'directly or indirectly' and at least three other Arab = League states=20 made tangible military contributions; other Arab states made more = indirect=20 contributions.

[4] Norway.

http= ://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary/ref:C4E53CF030EB3B/

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R=C3=B6sler = h=C3=A4lt Westerwelle=20 im Amt

30.08.2011,=20 20:31

Von = Nico Fried und Daniel = Br=C3=B6ssler

Machtwort vom=20 Parteichef: Bei der FDP-Fraktionsklausur stellt sich Philipp R=C3=B6sler = hinter=20 seinen angeschlagenen Au=C3=9Fenminister und erkl=C3=A4rt die = Westerwelle-Debatte f=C3=BCr=20 "beendet". Seine Garantieerkl=C3=A4rung enth=C3=A4lt aber auch einen = deutlichen=20 Hinweis.

Au=C3=9Fenminister = Guido=20 Westerwelle bleibt im Amt. = Noch vor=20 Beginn einer FDP-Fraktionsklausur gab Parteichef Philipp R=C3=B6sler am Dienstag eine = Garantieerkl=C3=A4rung f=C3=BCr=20 Westerwelle ab. Zugleich erkl=C3=A4rte R=C3=B6sler die Personaldebatte = der vergangenen=20 Tage f=C3=BCr "beendet".

FDP-Chef Philipp = R=C3=B6sler stellt sich=20 trotz der harten Kritik an Bundesau=C3=9Fenminister Guido Westerwelle = hinter seinen=20 Parteikollegen. (=C2=A9=20 dpa)3D"Westerwelle

Das F=C3=BChrungsteam der = Liberalen bestehe=20 aus der Spitze von Partei, Fraktion und den Regierungsmitgliedern in der = jetzigen Zusammensetzung, sagte R=C3=B6sler. Der FDP-Chef wiederholte = damit zun=C3=A4chst=20 eine Stellungnahme, mit der er schon zuletzt den Personalspekulationen = begegnet=20 war. Diesmal allerdings f=C3=BCgte er hinzu: "Und das wird auch in = Zukunft so=20 bleiben." Diese =C3=84u=C3=9Ferung entsprach auch den Erwartungen der = CDU. An der Spitze=20 des Koalitionspartners war ein klares Signal als notwendig bezeichnet = worden, um=20 die Situation zu beruhigen.

R=C3=B6sler hat sich damit = zum zweiten Mal=20 seit seiner Berufung an die Parteispitze im Mai 2011 eindeutig f=C3=BCr = Westerwelle=20 als Au=C3=9Fenminister ausgesprochen. K=C3=BCnftige = Versuche,=20 Westerwelle doch noch aus dem Amt zu dr=C3=A4ngen, w=C3=A4ren also mit = einem=20 Autorit=C3=A4tsverlust R=C3=B6slers verbunden. Andererseits verband der = Parteichef seine=20 Aussage nochmals mit dem Hinweis, dass er Westerwelle zum Einlenken im = Streit um=20 die Interpretation des Libyen-Kriegs gebracht habe. Er selbst habe als=20 Vorsitzender in der vergangenen Woche klar die FDP-Linie in = au=C3=9Fenpolitischen=20 Fragen vorgegeben. Westerwelle sei dieser Linie ebenso klar=20 gefolgt.

Der Au=C3=9Fenminister war wegen seiner Reaktion = auf das Ende=20 des Gaddafi-Regimes in Libyen in die Kritik geraten und hatte mit seiner = Betonung der deutschen Sanktionspolitik =C3=BCber mehrere Tage hinweg = auch in der=20 schwarz-gelben Koalition Unmut ausgel=C3=B6st. Erst nachdem R=C3=B6sler = den Nato-Truppen=20 Dank ausgesprochen und ihren Einsatz als entscheidend bezeichnet hatte, = w=C3=BCrdigte=20 auch Westerwelle das Engagement der westlichen Verb=C3=BCndeten. = Deutschland hatte=20 sich im UN-Sicherheitsrat bei der Abstimmung =C3=BCber den = Milit=C3=A4reinsatz=20 enthalten.

Die Bundestagsabgeordneten = der=20 Liberalen kamen am Dienstag zu einer Klausurtagung auf Schloss Bensberg = in=20 Bergisch Gladbach nahe K=C3=B6ln zusammen. Bereits am Montag hatten = innerhalb in der=20 FDP Ger=C3=BCchte f=C3=BCr Unruhe gesorgt, Westerwelle = erw=C3=A4ge, auf der=20 Klausursitzung die Vertrauensfrage zu stellen. R=C3=B6sler hatte = zun=C3=A4chst am=20 Montagnachmittag und dann erneut am Dienstagvormittag mit Westerwelle=20 telefoniert. Nach =C3=BCbereinstimmenden Darstellungen aus dem Umfeld = beider=20 Politiker sagte Westerwelle in beiden Gespr=C3=A4chen, diese = Ger=C3=BCchte tr=C3=A4fen nicht=20 zu.

Entschlossene T=C3=B6ne

Gleichwohl soll = R=C3=B6sler quasi=20 vorbeugend darauf hingewiesen haben, dass eine solche Vertrauensfrage = sehr=20 sch=C3=A4dlich f=C3=BCr die Partei sein k=C3=B6nne. Zudem k=C3=A4me sie = einem Misstrauensvotum gegen=20 R=C3=B6slers Aussage gleich, Westerwelle im Amt zu halten. Auch aus = Sorge vor einer=20 negativen Wirkung auf die Landtagswahlen in Berlin und=20 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern will es die FDP nun dabei bewenden lassen. Wahlk=C3=A4mpfer in beiden = L=C3=A4ndern=20 beklagten, dass die Personaldebatte die ohnehin mageren Chancen=20 verringere.

 
  • =20
  • Bildstrecke zum Thema: Westerwelle=20 und die FDP Der lange Lauf des Guido W.=20
 
 

Westerwelle selbst = =C3=A4u=C3=9Ferte sich in=20 Bensberg zun=C3=A4chst nicht vor den Medien. W=C3=A4hrend einer = Botschafterkonferenz im=20 Ausw=C3=A4rtigen Amt in Berlin hatte er wenige Stunden = zuvor aber einen=20 entschlossenen Ton angeschlagen. "Die Autorit=C3=A4t unseres Landes in = der Welt h=C3=A4ngt=20 eben nicht zuerst damit zusammen, dass wir besonders stark w=C3=A4ren = mit Armeen oder=20 milit=C3=A4rischer Ausr=C3=BCstung, sondern dass wir mit einem besonders = stark sind: mit=20 Wirtschaft."

URL:=20
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         &nbs= p;            = ;            =        =20 Peninsula (Qatar): Nato must extend = stay:=20 NTC=20 (Libya)



 

DOHA: Libya=E2=80=99s National Transitional = Council has urged Nato=20 to continue with its presence in the country saying that it fears that a = defiant=20 Colonel Muammar Ghadafi might do something unexpected.

Nato is mandated by the UN Security Council to = stay in Libya=20 until September 27.

Addressing a meeting of chiefs of staff of the = armed forces=20 of the countries that participated in anti-Gaddafi military operations = in Libya,=20 Mustafa Abdul Jalil, NTC Chairman, said yesterday that thanks to Nato=20 large-scale massacre of civilians in his country was avoided.

=E2=80=9CLibyan rebels couldn=E2=80=99t have = achieved victory without the=20 support of Nato and international alliance forces,=E2=80=9D Jalil = said.

The rebels were no match for Ghadafi=E2=80=99s = forces since he had=20 massive wealth and military might, he added.

In the nearly 10,000 air strikes and 5,000 = military assaults=20 no civilian casualties were reported since the people were informed in = advance=20 about these strikes, the NTC chief noted. The meeting was held to = discuss the=20 current situation in Libya after the end of Gaddafi=E2=80=99s rule. Nato = was represented=20 at the meet.

Major general Hamad bin Ali al Attiya, chief of = staff of=20 Qatari armed forces, the Libyan Minister of Defense Jalal al Digheily = and the=20 repres= entative=20 of Libyan rebels, Abdul Hakim Belhaj, were in=20 attendance.

The meeting discussed Nato=E2=80=99s views and = position on the=20 ongoing events in Libya and the general military situation in the=20 country.

Major-General Hamad bin Ali al Attiyah, also = said that=20 Nato=E2=80=99s stay in Libya was needed.

=E2=80=9CThe ongoing developments and field = indicators in Libya=20 require the Nato to provide military and security support to the Libyan = people=20 to protect and maintain his surprising achievements. Military and = security=20 efforts should coincide to normalize the life of Libyans,=E2=80=9D he = added.

Speech of Jalal al Digheily, the Libyan = Minister of=20 Defense, thanked Qatar, Emirates, Jordan and Sudan for providing support = to the=20 rebels.

=E2=80=9CWar is still going on to defeat = Gaddafi, his sons and aides=20 and the sleeper cells, the so called =E2=80=9Crevolutionary = committees=E2=80=9D, and the fifth=20 column,=E2=80=9D he said. =E2=80=9CWe are still=20 in need of the Nato=E2=80=99s logistic and military support to achieve = our goals,=E2=80=9D he=20 said.

Admiral Samuel Le Claire, commander of the Nato = military=20 operations in Libya, congratulated the NTC.

=E2=80=9CWe effectively conducted 23,000 flights = and destroyed 5,000=20 military targets in Libya. Nato forces participated in field operations = which=20 were accurately led round the clock and the week,=E2=80=9D he = said.

=E2=80=9CWe are committed and authorized to = continue the military=20 operation till September 27, 2011. We hope the vision will be obvious = during the=20 upcoming weeks and we will discuss the suitable ways to support Libya = after the=20 end of military operation,=E2=80=9D he said.

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         &nbs= p;            = ;            =    =20 The Peninsula (Qatar-Editorial): Post-Gaddafi=20 Libya
 

The Arab Spring has received = a fresh lease=20 of life. The momentum which the Spring had maintained right from = beginning was=20 blocked by an obdurate Muammar Gaddafi, prompting many to think that the = Spring=20 was blinking. The doubters will now feel relieved, and Arabs who are = fighting=20 other dictators will feel emboldened to stick to their path. Libya = teaches that=20 success is guaranteed, though it can be delayed.

The capture of Gaddafi or = his surrender=20 yesterday would have brought the Libyan revolution to a complete, = dramatic end.=20 But there is no need. The rebels have overtaken his compound and the = dictator=20 and his family were nowhere to be seen. The rebel leaders are saying the = whole=20 operation will come to an end in a day or two. Their success is = irreversible.=20 The global media have started writing the obituary of the Gaddafi regime = and the=20 focus is now on Libya=E2=80=99s future sans Gaddafi.

In the book on Arab = revolution so far,=20 Libya=E2=80=99s will be the most important chapter. Gaddafi is the = longest-serving Arab=20 ruler with an unquestioned 42 years in power, and the most = controversial,=20 enigmatic, brutal and unpredictable dictator =E2=80=93 the only leader = who fought=20 against his own people and killed them in thousands to stay in power. = Secondly,=20 his expulsion was achieved with the help of other Arab brothers and the=20 international community. Libyans enthusiastically welcomed the support = from Nato=20 and other Arab countries to overthrow Gaddafi, something which the = people of=20 other Arab countries were not given. The rebels would have been unable = to=20 achieve their objective without the air support of = Nato.

The opposition led by the = National=20 Transitional Council (NTC) now has the onerous task of forming a = government that=20 will ensure stability, peace and justice. The NTC must avoid the = mistakes=20 committed in other Arab Spring countries. It must also avoid = infiltration by=20 Gaddafi loyalists, give representation to all segments of the society, = work in=20 close coordination with its allies, especially Nato and Arab countries = including=20 Qatar, to put in place an effective administration and avoid revenge = which will=20 drag the country into a vicious cycle of violence.

The success of = Libyan revolution=20 is also the success of Qatar=E2=80=99s diplomacy. Qatar is one of the = few Arab countries=20 which stood solidly behind the Libyan people and Doha is now playing a = crucial=20 role in the reconstruction of the country and the formation of the new=20 government. A senior leader of the NTC is in Doha to plan their future. = As a=20 first step, Qatar will host a meeting today to organise $2.4bn in aid = for the=20 country.

Speaking at a press = conference in Doha,=20 Mahmud Jibril, the number two in NTC said =E2=80=9Cwe will build a new = Libya, with all=20 Libyans as brothers for a united, civil and democratic=20 nation.


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Massenbach's= = Recommendation  =20  =20     =20

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by George Friedman

August 30, 2011

The war in Libya is over. More precisely, governments and = media=20 have decided that the war is over, despite the fact that fighting = continues. The=20 unfulfilled expectation of this war has consistently been that Moammar = Gadhafi=20 would capitulate when faced with the forces arrayed against = him, and that his own forces would abandon him as = soon as they=20 saw that the war was lost. What was being celebrated last week, with = presidents,=20 prime ministers and the media proclaiming the defeat of Gadhafi, will = likely be=20 true in due course. The fact that it is not yet true does not detract = from the=20 self-congratulations.

For example, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini = reported that=20 only 5 percent of Libya is still under Gadhafi=E2=80=99s control. That = seems like a=20 trivial amount, save for this news from Italian newspaper La Stampa, = which=20 reported that =E2=80=9CTripoli is being cleaned up=E2=80=9D neighborhood = by neighborhood, street=20 by street and home by home. Meanwhile, bombs from above are pounding = Sirte,=20 where, according to the French, Gadhafi has managed to arrive, although = it is=20 not known how. The strategically important town of Bali Walid =E2=80=94 = another possible=20 hiding place and one of only two remaining exit routes to another = Gadhafi=20 stronghold in Sabha =E2=80=94 is being encircled.

To put it differently, Gadhafi=E2=80=99s forces still = retain military=20 control of substantial areas. There is house-to-house fighting going on = in=20 Tripoli. There are multiple strongholds with sufficient defensive = strength that=20 forces cannot enter them without significant military preparation. = Although=20 Gadhafi=E2=80=99s actual location is unknown, his capture is the object = of substantial=20 military preparations, including NATO airstrikes, around Bali Walid, = Sirte and=20 Sabha. When Saddam Hussein was = captured, he was hiding in a hole in the ground, alone = and without=20 an army. Gadhafi is still fighting and posing challenges. The war is not = over.

It could be argued that while Gadhafi retains a coherent = military=20 force and significant territory, he no longer governs Libya. That is = certainly=20 true and significant, but it will become more significant when his = enemies do=20 take control of the levers of power. It is unreasonable to expect that = they=20 should be in a position to do so a few days after entering Tripoli and = while=20 fighting continues. But it does raise a critical question: whether the rebels have = sufficient coherence=20 to form an effective government = or whether=20 new rounds of fighting among Libyans can be expected even after = Gadhafi=E2=80=99s forces=20 cease functioning. To put it simply, Gadhafi appears to be on his way to = defeat=20 but he is not there yet, and the ability of his enemies to govern Libya = is=20 doubtful.

Immaculate Intervention

Given that the dying is far from over, it is interesting = to=20 consider why Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron, the major = players=20 in this war, all declared last week that Gadhafi had fallen, implying an = end to=20 war, and why the media proclaimed the war=E2=80=99s end. To understand = this, it is=20 important to understand how surprising the course of the war was to = these=20 leaders. From the beginning, there was an expectation that NATO intervention, first with a = no-fly zone,=20 then with direct airstrikes on Gadhafi=E2=80=99s = position, would lead to a rapid collapse of his government and = its=20 replacement with a democratic coalition in the east.

Two forces combined to lead to this conclusion. The first = consisted=20 of human-rights groups outside governments and factions in foreign = ministries=20 and the State Department who felt an intervention was necessary to stop = the=20 pending slaughter in Benghazi. This faction had a serious problem. The = most=20 effective way to quickly end a brutal regime was military intervention. = However,=20 having condemned the American invasion of Iraq, which was designed, at = least in=20 part, to get rid of a brutal regime, this faction found it difficult to = justify=20 rapid military intervention on the ground in Libya. Moral arguments = require a=20 degree of consistency.

In Europe, the doctrine of =E2=80=9Csoft power=E2=80=9D = has become a central=20 doctrine. In the case of Libya, finding a path to soft power was = difficult.=20 Sanctions and lectures would probably not stop Gadhafi, but military = action ran=20 counter to soft power. What emerged was a doctrine of soft military = power.=20 Instituting a no-fly zone was a way to engage in military action without = actually hurting anyone, except those Libyan pilots who took off. It = satisfied=20 the need to distinguish Libya from Iraq by not invading and occupying = Libya but=20 still putting crushing pressure on Gadhafi.

Of course, a no-fly zone proved ineffective and = irrelevant, and the=20 French began bombing = Gadhafi=E2=80=99s forces the same=20 day. Libyans on the ground were = dying, but=20 not British, French or American soldiers. While the no-fly zone was = officially=20 announced, this segue to an air campaign sort of emerged over time = without a=20 clear decision point. For human-rights activists, this kept them from = addressing=20 the concern that airstrikes always cause unintended deaths because they = are=20 never as accurate as one might like. For the governments, it allowed = them to be=20 seen as embarking upon what I have called an =E2=80=9Cimmaculate = intervention.=E2=80=9D

The second force that liked this strategy was the various = air=20 forces involved. There is no question of the importance of air power in = modern=20 war, but there is a constant argument over whether the application of = air power=20 by itself can achieve desired political ends without the commitment of = ground=20 forces. For the air community, Libya was going to be the place where it = could=20 demonstrate its effectiveness in achieving such ends.

So the human-rights advocates could focus on the ends = =E2=80=94 protecting=20 Libyan civilians in Benghazi =E2=80=94 and pretend that they had not = just advocated the=20 commencement of a war that would itself leave many people dead. = Political=20 leaders could feel that they were not getting into a quagmire but simply = undertaking a clean intervention. The air forces could demonstrate their = utility=20 in delivering desired political outcomes.

Why and How

The question of the underlying reason for the war should = be=20 addressed because stories are circulating that oil companies are = competing for=20 vast sums of money in Libya. These stories are all reasonable, in the = sense that=20 the real story remains difficult to fathom, and I sympathize with those = who are=20 trying to find a deep conspiracy to explain all of this. I would like to = find=20 one, too. The problem is that going to war for oil in Libya was = unnecessary.=20 Gadhafi loved selling oil, and if the governments involved told him = quietly that=20 they were going to blow him up if he didn=E2=80=99t make different = arrangements on who=20 got the oil revenues and what royalties he got to keep, Gadhafi would = have made=20 those arrangements. He was as cynical as they come, and he understood = the subtle=20 idea that shifting oil partners and giving up a lot of revenue was = better than=20 being blown up.

Indeed, there is no theory out there that explains this = war by way=20 of oil, simply because it was not necessary to actually to go war to get = whatever concessions were wanted. So the story =E2=80=94 protecting people in Benghazi = from=20 slaughter =E2=80=94 is the only = rational=20 explanation for what followed, however hard it is to believe.

It must also be understood that given the nature of = modern air=20 warfare, NATO forces in small numbers had to be inserted on the ground = from the=20 beginning =E2=80=94 actually, at least a few days before the beginning = of the air=20 campaign. Accurately identifying targets and taking them out with = sufficient=20 precision involves highly skilled special-operations teams guiding = munitions to=20 those targets. The fact that there have been relatively few = friendly-fire=20 accidents indicates that standard operational procedures have been in=20 place.

These teams were probably joined by other special = operators who=20 trained =E2=80=94 and in most cases informally led =E2=80=94 indigenous = forces in battle. There=20 were ample reports in the early days of the war that special operations = teams=20 were on the ground conducting weapons training and organizing the = fighters who=20 opposed Gadhafi.

But there proved to be two problems with this approach. = First,=20 Gadhafi did not fold his tent and capitulate. He seemed singularly = unimpressed=20 by the force he was facing. Second, his troops turned out to be = highly motivated=20 and capable, at least compared = to their=20 opponents. Proof of this can be found in the fact that they did not = surrender en=20 masse, they did maintain a sufficient degree of unit coherence and = =E2=80=94 the final=20 proof =E2=80=94 they held out for six months and are still holding out. = The view of=20 human-rights groups that an isolated tyrant would break in the face of = the=20 international community, the view of political leaders that an isolated = tyrant=20 facing the might of NATO=E2=80=99s air forces would collapse in days and = the view of the=20 air forces that air strikes would shatter resistance, all turned out to = be=20 false.

A War Prolonged

Part of this was due to a misunderstanding of the nature = of Libyan=20 politics. Gadhafi was a tyrant, but he was not completely isolated. He = had=20 enemies but he also had many supporters who benefitted from him or at = least=20 believed in his doctrines. There was also a general belief among = ordinary=20 government soldiers (some of whom are mercenaries from the south) that=20 capitulation would lead to their slaughter, and the belief among = government=20 leaders that surrender meant trials in The Hague and terms in prison. = The belief=20 of the human-rights community in an = International Criminal Court = (ICC) trying=20 Gadhafi and the men around him = gives them=20 no room for retreat, and men without room for retreat fight hard and to = the end.=20 There was no way to negotiate capitulation unless the U.N. Security = Council=20 itself publicly approved the deal. The winks and nods that got dictators = to=20 leave in the old days aren=E2=80=99t enough anymore. All countries that = are party to the=20 Rome Statute are required to turn a leader like Gadhafi over to the ICC = for=20 trial.

Therefore, unless the U.N. Security Council publicly = strikes a deal=20 with Gadhafi, which would be opposed by the human-rights community and = would=20 become ugly, Gadhafi will not give up =E2=80=94 and neither will his = troops. There were=20 reports last week that some government soldiers had been executed. True = or not,=20 fair or not, that would not be a great motivator for = surrender.

The war began with the public mission of protecting the = people of=20 Benghazi. This quickly morphed into a war to unseat Gadhafi. The problem = was=20 that between the ideological and the military aims, the forces dedicated = to the=20 war were insufficient to execute the mission. We do not know how many = people=20 were killed in the fighting in the past six months, but pursuing the war = using=20 soft military power in this way certainly prolonged the war and likely = caused=20 many deaths, both military and civilian.

After six months, NATO got tired, and we wound up with = the assault=20 on Tripoli. The assault appears to have consisted of three parts. The = first was=20 the insertion of NATO special operations troops (in the low hundreds, = not=20 thousands) who, guided by intelligence operatives in Tripoli, attacked = and=20 destabilized the government forces in the city. The second part was an=20 information operation in which NATO made it appear that the battle was = over. The=20 bizarre incident in which Gadhafi=E2=80=99s son, Seif = al-Islam, announced as=20 being captured only to show up = in an SUV=20 looking very un-captured, was part of this game. NATO wanted it to = appear that=20 the leadership had been reduced and Gadhafi=E2=80=99s forces broken to = convince those=20 same forces to capitulate. Seif al-Islam=E2=80=99s appearance was = designed to signal his=20 troops that the war was still on.

Following the special operations strikes and the = information=20 operations, western rebels entered the city to great fanfare, including=20 celebratory gunfire into the air. The world=E2=80=99s media chronicled = the end of the=20 war as the special operations teams melted away and the victorious = rebels took=20 the bows. It had taken six months, but it was over.

And then it became obvious that it wasn=E2=80=99t over. = Five percent of=20 Libya =E2=80=94 an interesting calculation =E2=80=94 was not liberated. = Street fighting in=20 Tripoli continued. Areas of the country were still under = Gadhafi=E2=80=99s control. And=20 Gadhafi himself was not where his enemies wanted him to be. The war went = on.

A number of lessons emerge from all this. First, it is = important to=20 remember that Libya in itself may not be important to the world, but it = matters=20 to Libyans a great deal. Second, do not assume that tyrants lack = support.=20 Gadhafi didn=E2=80=99t govern Libya for 42 years without support. Third, = do not assume=20 that the amount of force you are prepared to provide is the amount of = force=20 needed. Fourth, eliminating the option of a negotiated end to the war by = the=20 means of international courts may be morally satisfying, but it causes = wars to=20 go on and casualties to mount. It is important to decide what is more = important=20 =E2=80=94 to alleviate the suffering of people or to punish the guilty. = Sometimes it is=20 one or the other. Fifth, and most important, do not kid the world about = wars=20 being over. After George W. Bush flew onto an aircraft carrier that was=20 emblazoned with a =E2=80=9Cmission accomplished=E2=80=9D banner, the = Iraq war became even more=20 violent, and the damage to him was massive. Information operations may = be useful=20 in persuading opposing troops to surrender, but political credibility = bleeds=20 away when the war is declared over and the fighting goes on.

Gadhafi will likely fall in the end. NATO is more = powerful then he=20 is, and enough force will be brought to bear to bring him down. The = question, of=20 course, is whether there was another way to accomplish that with less = cost and=20 more yield. Leaving aside the war-for-oil theory, if the goal was to = protect=20 Benghazi and bring down Gadhafi, greater force or a negotiated exit with = guarantees against trials in The Hague would likely have worked faster = with less=20 loss of life than the application of soft military power.

As the world contemplates the = situation in=20 Syria, this should be borne in=20 mind.

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************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ***************************************************** Zu den K=C3=BCsten = von=20 Tripolis

 

Uri=20 Avnery

 

OBWOHL UNS die=20 Bibel sagt =E2=80=9EFreue dich nicht =C3=BCber den Fall deines = Feindes=E2=80=9C (Spr=C3=BCche 24), konnte=20 ich nicht anders, als mich freuen.

Muammar=20 al-Gaddafi war der Feind jeder anst=C3=A4ndigen Person in der Welt. Er = war einer der=20 schlimmsten Tyrannen in j=C3=BCngster = Vergangenheit.

 

Diese = Tatsache war=20 verborgen hinter einer Fassade von Clownerie. Er liebte es, sich selbst = als=20 Philosoph darzustellen (s. das =E2=80=9EGr=C3=BCne Buch=E2=80=9C), als = vision=C3=A4rem Staatsmann=20 (Israelis und Pal=C3=A4stinenser m=C3=BCssen sich zum Staat Isratin = vereinen), selbst als=20 unreifem Teenager (seine unz=C3=A4hligen Uniformen und Kost=C3=BCme). = Aber haupts=C3=A4chlich=20 war er ein erbarmungsloser Diktator, umgeben von korrupten Verwandten = und=20 Freunden, die den gro=C3=9Fen Reichtum Libyens = verschwendeten.

 

Das war = f=C3=BCr jeden=20 offensichtlich, der sehen wollte. Leider gab es nicht wenige, die ihre = Augen=20 verschlossen hielten.

 

ALS ICH = meine=20 Unterst=C3=BCtzung f=C3=BCr die internationale Intervention zum Ausdruck = brachte,=20 erwartete ich, von wohlmeinenden Leuten angegriffen zu werden. Ich wurde = nicht=20 entt=C3=A4uscht.

Wie = konnte ich nur? Wie=20 konnte ich die amerikanischen Imperialisten und die gr=C3=A4ssliche NATO = unterst=C3=BCtzen? War mir denn nicht klar, dass es nur ums =C3=96l=20 ging?

Ich war = nicht=20 =C3=BCberrascht. Ich habe dies schon einmal erlebt. Als die Nato begann, = das=20 serbische Gebiet zu bombardieren, um den Verbrechen des Slobodan = Milosevic im=20 Kosovo ein Ende zu bereiten, wandten sich viele meiner politischen = Freunde gegen=20 mich.

 

War mir = denn nicht=20 klar, dass dies alles nur eine imperialistische Verschw=C3=B6rung war? = Dass die=20 hinterh=C3=A4ltigen Amerikaner Jugoslawien (oder Serbien) nur = auseinander rei=C3=9Fen=20 wollten? Dass die Nato eine b=C3=B6se Organisation war? Dass Milosevic, = auch wenn er=20 ein paar Fehler haben mag, eine progressive Menschlichkeit=20 vertrat?

 

Dies = wurde gesagt, als=20 die grausamen Akte des Massenmordes in Bosnien f=C3=BCr jeden = offensichtlich waren,=20 als Milosevic schon als kaltbl=C3=BCtiges Monster blo=C3=9Fgestellt war. = Ariel Sharon=20 bewunderte ihn.

 

Wie = k=C3=B6nnen also=20 anst=C3=A4ndige, wohlmeinende Linke, Menschen mit makelloser = humanistischer=20 Vorgeschichte, solch eine Person umarmen? Meine einzige Erkl=C3=A4rung = war, dass ihr=20 Hass auf die USA und die NATO so stark, so leidenschaftlich war, dass = jeder, der=20 von ihnen angegriffen wurde, gewiss ein Wohlt=C3=A4ter der Menschheit = sein muss und=20 alle Anklagen gegen sie reine Erfindungen waren. Sogar=20 Pol-Pot.

 

Nun = geschah es noch=20 einmal. Ich wurde bombardiert mit Mails von wohlmeinenden Leuten, die = Gaddafi=20 f=C3=BCr alle seine guten Taten lobten. Man hat den Eindruck bekommen = k=C3=B6nnen, dass er=20 ein zweiter Nelson Mandela, wenn nicht gar ein zweiter Mahatma Gandhi=20 war.

 

W=C3=A4hrend die Rebellen=20 sich schon durch seine gro=C3=9Fe ummauerte Anlage k=C3=A4mpfen, lobte = ihn der=20 sozialistische F=C3=BChrer Venezuelas Hugo Chavez als wahres Modell = aufrichtiger=20 Menschlichkeit, ein Mann, der es wagt, sich gegen die amerikanischen = Aggressoren=20 zu stellen.

 

Nun, tut = mir leid, da=20 mache ich nicht mit. Ich habe diese irrationale Abscheu vor blutigen = Diktatoren,=20 vor v=C3=B6lkerm=C3=B6rderischen Massenm=C3=B6rdern, vor F=C3=BChrern , = die gegen ihr eigenes Volk=20 Krieg f=C3=BChren. Und bei meinem fortgeschrittenen Alter ist es = schwierig, sich zu=20 =C3=A4ndern.

 

Ich bin = bereit, sogar=20 den Teufel zu unterst=C3=BCtzen, wenn es n=C3=B6tig ist, diese Art = Grausamkeit zu beenden.=20 Ich w=C3=BCrde nicht einmal nach seinen genauen Motiven fragen. Was = immer man auch=20 =C3=BCber die USA und/oder die NATO denken mag =E2=80=93 wenn sie einen = Milosevic oder einen=20 Gaddafi entwaffnen, dann haben sie meinen Segen.

WIE GROSS = ist die Rolle=20 der NATO bei der Niederlage des libyschen Diktators?

 

Die = Rebellen h=C3=A4tten=20 Tripolis nicht erreicht, gewiss nicht bis heute, wenn sie nicht die=20 NATO-Unterst=C3=BCtzung aus der Luft gehabt h=C3=A4tten. Libyen ist eine = gro=C3=9Fe W=C3=BCste. Die=20 Offensive war auf eine lange Stra=C3=9Fe angewiesen. Ohne die technische = Beherrschung=20 der Luft, w=C3=BCrden die Rebellen massakriert worden sein. Jeder, der = w=C3=A4hrend des=20 2.Weltkrieges lebte und den Feldz=C3=BCgen Rommels und Montgomery = folgte, wei=C3=9F=20 dies.

 

Ich = vermute, dass die=20 Rebellen auch Waffen und Rat erhalten haben, der ihre Offensive=20 erleichterte.

 

Aber ich = bin gegen die=20 g=C3=B6nnerhafte Behauptung, dass dies alles ein Sieg der NATO war. Es = ist die alte=20 kolonialistische Haltung in neuer Gestalt. Nat=C3=BCrlich konnten diese = armen,=20 primitiven Araber nicht alles ohne den Wei=C3=9Fen Mann = machen.

 

Aber = Kriege werden=20 nicht mit Waffen gewonnen, sie werden von Menschen gewonnen. = =E2=80=9EMit Stiefeln auf=20 dem Boden=E2=80=9C, wie die Amerikaner dies nennen. Selbst mit all der = Hilfe, die die=20 libyschen Rebellen erhielten, so unorganisiert und schlecht bewaffnet = sie waren,=20 so haben sie doch einen erstaunlichen Sieg errungen. Dies w=C3=A4re so = nicht ohne=20 wirkliche revolution=C3=A4re Leidenschaft, ohne Tapferkeit und = Entschlossenheit=20 geschehen. Es ist ein libyscher Sieg, kein englischer oder=20 franz=C3=B6sischer.

 

Dies ist = von den=20 internationalen Medien heruntergespielt worden. Ich habe keine einzige = echte=20 Kampf-Reportage gesehen (und ich wei=C3=9F, wie das aussieht). = Journalisten haben=20 sich nicht mit Ruhm bekleckert. Sie zeigten exemplarische Feigheit, = blieben in=20 sicherem Abstand von der Front, sogar w=C3=A4hrend des Falles von = Tripolis. Im=20 Fernsehen sahen sie mit ihren gro=C3=9Fen Helmen l=C3=A4cherlich aus, = als sie von=20 barh=C3=A4uptigen K=C3=A4mpfern umgeben waren.

 

Was = her=C3=BCber kam, war=20 endloser Jubel =C3=BCber den Sieg, der scheinbar vom Himmel gefallen = war. Aber das=20 waren Heldentaten, die vom Volk begangen worden waren =E2=80=93 ja von = einem arabischen=20 Volk.

 

Dies ist = f=C3=BCr unsere=20 israelischen =E2=80=9EMilit=C3=A4rkorrespondenten=E2=80=9C und unsere = =E2=80=9EExperten von arabischen=20 Angelegenheiten=E2=80=9C besonders =C3=A4rgerlich. Daran gew=C3=B6hnt, = =E2=80=9Edie Araber=E2=80=9C zu verachten=20 oder zu hassen, schrieben sie dem Sieg der Nato zu. Es scheint, dass das = Volk=20 von Libyen eine kleinere Rolle gespielt hat, wenn =C3=BCberhaupt=20 eine.

 

Nun = plappern sie endlos=20 =C3=BCber die =E2=80=9ESt=C3=A4mme=E2=80=9C, die Demokratie und eine = ordentliche Regierung in Libyen=20 unm=C3=B6glich machen werden. Libyen sei kein wirkliches Land. Es war = ,bevor es eine=20 italienische Kolonie wurde, nie ein geeintes Volk. So etwas wie ein = libysches=20 Volk gibt es gar nicht. (Man erinnere sich, was die Franzosen =C3=BCber = die Algerier=20 und Golda Meir =C3=BCber die Pal=C3=A4stinenser = sagten).

 

Nun, = daf=C3=BCr, dass ein=20 Volk nicht existiert, k=C3=A4mpften die Libyer sehr gut. Und was die = =E2=80=9ESt=C3=A4mme=E2=80=9C angeht=20 =E2=80=93 wie kommt es, dass es nur in Afrika und Asien St=C3=A4mme = gibt, niemals unter=20 Europ=C3=A4ern? Warum nicht ein walisischer Stamm oder ein bayrischer=20 Stamm?

 

(Als ich = 1986 vor dem=20 Friedensvertrag Jordanien besuchte, wurde ich von einem sehr = zivilisierten,=20 hochrangigen jordanischen Beamten eingeladen. Nach einer interessanten=20 Unterhaltung beim Mittagessen =C3=BCberraschte er mich, als er = erw=C3=A4hnte, er w=C3=BCrde zu=20 einem bestimmten Stamm geh=C3=B6ren. Am n=C3=A4chsten Tag, als ich mit = einem Pferd nach=20 Petra ritt, fragte mich der Reiter neben mir mit leiser Stimme, ob ich = =E2=80=9Ezum=20 Stamm=E2=80=9C geh=C3=B6ren w=C3=BCrde. Ich brauchte eine Zeitlang, bis = ich verstand, dass er mich=20 fragte, ob ich Jude sei. Es scheint, dass amerikanische Juden =C3=BCber = sich selbst=20 in dieser Weise sprechen.)

 

Die = =E2=80=9ESt=C3=A4mme=E2=80=9C von Libyen=20 w=C3=BCrden in Europa =E2=80=9Eethnische Gruppen=E2=80=9C genannt und in = Israel =E2=80=9EKommunen=E2=80=9C. Der=20 Terminus =E2=80=9EStamm=E2=80=9C hat eine herablassende Assoziation. Wir = sollten diesen Ausdruck=20 nicht mehr ben=C3=BCtzen.

 

ALL JENE, die=20 die Intervention der NATO verdammen, sollten auf eine einfache Frage = antworten:=20 Wer h=C3=A4tte denn sonst diesen Job getan?

 

Die = Menschheit des 21.=20 Jahrhunderts kann keine Akte von Genoziden und Massenmorden tolerieren, = egal, wo=20 sie geschehen. Sie k=C3=B6nnen nicht zusehen, wenn Diktatoren ihr = eigenes Volk=20 abschlachten. Die Doktrin des =E2=80=9ENicht-Eingreifens=E2=80=9C in die = inneren Angelegenheiten=20 souver=C3=A4ner Staaten=E2=80=9C geh=C3=B6rt in die Vergangenheit. Wir = Juden, die wir die=20 Menschheit angeklagt haben, unt=C3=A4tig abseits gestanden zu haben, = w=C3=A4hrend=20 Millionen Juden, einschlie=C3=9Flich deutscher B=C3=BCrger, von der = legitimen deutschen=20 Regierung vernichtet wurden, schulden der Welt gewiss eine=20 Antwort.

Ich habe = einige Male=20 erw=C3=A4hnt, dass ich f=C3=BCr eine Art effektiver Weltregierung sei = und erwarte, dass es=20 sie am Ende dieses Jahrhunderts gibt. Dies w=C3=BCrde eine demokratisch = gew=C3=A4hlte=20 Welt-Exekutive einschlie=C3=9Fen, die auch milit=C3=A4rische Kr=C3=A4fte = zu ihrer Verf=C3=BCgung=20 hat, die eingreifen k=C3=B6nnen, wenn ein Weltparlament dies=20 entscheidet.

 

Damit = dies geschieht,=20 m=C3=BCssen die Vereinigten Nationen vollkommen umorganisiert werden. = Die Veto-Macht=20 muss verschwinden. Es ist unertr=C3=A4glich, dass die US mit einem Veto = die Aufnahme=20 Pal=C3=A4stinas als Mitgliedstaat verhindern oder dass Russland und = China mit einem=20 Veto eine Intervention in Syrien verhindern kann.

 

Gewiss = sollten die=20 Stimmen der Gro=C3=9Fm=C3=A4chte wie die der USA und Chinas gewichtiger = sein als - sagen=20 wir mal =E2=80=93 Luxemburg oder die Fidschi-Inseln, aber eine = Zwei-Drittel-Mehrheit in=20 der Vollversammlung sollte die Macht haben, Washington, Moskau und = Peking zu=20 =C3=BCberstimmen.

 

Das mag = Zukunftsmusik=20 sein oder, wie andere sagen, ein Hirngespinst. Was die Gegenwart = betrifft, so=20 leben wir in einer sehr unvollkommenen Welt und m=C3=BCssen mit den uns = zur Verf=C3=BCgung=20 stehenden Mitteln auskommen. Die NATO ist leider eines davon. Die EU ist = ein=20 anderes, obwohl in diesem Fall das arme, ewig von schlechtem Gewissen=20 geschlagene Deutschland sie gel=C3=A4hmt hat. Wenn Russland oder China = sich ihr=20 anschlie=C3=9Fen w=C3=BCrden, w=C3=A4re dies gut.

 

Dies ist = kein fernes=20 Problem. Gaddafi ist am Ende, aber Bashar al-Assad ist es nicht. Er = schlachtet=20 sein Volk ab, w=C3=A4hrend Sie dies lesen, und die Welt sieht hilflos=20 zu.

 

Gibt es = Freiwillige,=20 die bereit sind zu intervenieren?

 
http://www.uri-avnery.de/news/152/15/Zu-den-Kuesten-von-Tripolis&nbs= p;
 
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THE = ROVING=20 EYE =
How=20 al-Qaeda got to rule in Tripoli
By Pepe Escobar=20

His = name is=20 Abdelhakim Belhaj. Some in the Middle East might have, but few in = the=20 West and across the world would have heard of him. =

Time to catch up. Because the story of how an al-Qaeda = asset turned=20 out to be the top Libyan military commander in still war-torn Tripoli is = bound=20 to shatter - once again - that wilderness of mirrors that is the "war on = terror", as well as deeply compromising the carefully constructed = propaganda of=20 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) "humanitarian" = intervention in=20 Libya.

Muammar Gaddafi's fortress of Bab-al-Aziziyah was = essentially=20 invaded and conquered last week by Belhaj's men - who were at=20
the forefront of a militia of Berbers from the mountains = southwest=20 of Tripoli. The militia is the so-called Tripoli Brigade, trained in = secret for=20 two months by US Special Forces. This turned out to be the rebels' most=20 effective militia in six months of tribal/civil war.
Already last = Tuesday,=20 Belhaj was gloating on how the battle was won, with Gaddafi forces = escaping=20 "like rats" (note that's the same metaphor used by Gaddafi himself to = designate=20 the rebels).

Abdelhakim Belhaj, aka Abu Abdallah al-Sadek, is a = Libyan=20 jihadi. Born in May 1966, he honed his skills with the mujahideen in the = 1980s=20 anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan.

He's the founder of the Libyan = Islamic=20 Fighting Group (LIFG) and its de facto emir - with Khaled Chrif = and Sami=20 Saadi as his deputies. After the Taliban took power in Kabul in 1996, = the LIFG=20 kept two training camps in Afghanistan; one of them, 30 kilometers north = of=20 Kabul - run by Abu Yahya - was strictly for al-Qaeda-linked jihadis.=20

After 9/11, Belhaj moved to Pakistan and also to Iraq, where he=20 befriended none other than ultra-nasty Abu Musab al-Zarqawi - all this = before=20 al-Qaeda in Iraq pledged its allegiance to Osama bin Laden and Ayman = al-Zawahiri=20 and turbo-charged its gruesome practices.

In Iraq, Libyans = happened to=20 be the largest foreign Sunni jihadi contingent, only losing to the = Saudis.=20 Moreover, Libyan jihadis have always been superstars in the top echelons = of=20 "historic" al-Qaeda - from Abu Faraj al-Libi (military commander until = his=20 arrest in 2005, now lingering as one of 16 high-value detainees in the = US=20 detention center at Guantanamo) to Abu al-Laith al-Libi (another = military=20 commander, killed in Pakistan in early 2008).

Time for an=20 extraordinary rendition

The LIFG had been on the US Central = Intelligence Agency's radars since 9/11. In 2003, Belhaj was finally = arrested in=20 Malaysia - and then transferred, extraordinary rendition-style, to a = secret=20 Bangkok prison, and duly tortured.

In 2004, the Americans = decided to=20 send him as a gift to Libyan intelligence - until he was freed by the = Gaddafi=20 regime in March 2010, along with other 211 "terrorists", in a public = relations=20 coup advertised with great fanfare.

The orchestrator was no less = than=20 Saif Islam al-Gaddafi - the modernizing/London School of Economics face = of the=20 regime. LIFG's leaders - Belhaj and his deputies Chrif and Saadi - = issued a=20 417-page confession dubbed "corrective studies" in which they declared = the jihad=20 against Gaddafi over (and illegal), before they were finally set free. =

A=20 fascinating account of the whole process can be seen in a report called=20 "Combating Terrorism in Libya through Dialogue and Reintegration". [1] = Note that=20 the authors, Singapore-based terrorism "experts" who were wined and = dined by the=20 regime, express the "deepest appreciation to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and = the=20 Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation for making this = visit=20 possible".

Crucially, still in 2007, then al-Qaeda's number two, = Zawahiri, officially announced the merger between the LIFG and al-Qaeda = in the=20 Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM). So, for all practical purposes, since then, = LIFG/AQIM=20 have been one and the same - and Belhaj was/is its emir. =

In 2007,=20 LIFG was calling for a jihad against Gaddafi but also against the US and = assorted Western "infidels".

Fast forward to last February when, = a free=20 man, Belhaj decided to go back into jihad mode and align his forces with = the=20 engineered uprising in Cyrenaica.

Every intelligence agency in = the US,=20 Europe and the Arab world knows where he's coming from. He's already = made sure=20 in Libya that himself and his militia will only settle for sharia = law.=20

There's nothing "pro-democracy" about it - by any stretch of the = imagination. And yet such an asset could not be dropped from NATO's war = just=20 because he was not very fond of "infidels".

The late July = killing of=20 rebel military commander General Abdel Fattah Younis - by the rebels = themselves=20 - seems to point to Belhaj or at least people very close to him. =

It's=20 essential to know that Younis - before he defected from the regime - had = been in=20 charge of Libya's special forces fiercely fighting the LIFG in Cyrenaica = from=20 1990 to 1995.

The Transitional National Council (TNC), according = to one=20 of its members, Ali Tarhouni, has been spinning Younis was killed by a = shady=20 brigade known as Obaida ibn Jarrah (one of the Prophet Mohammed's = companions).=20 Yet the brigade now seems to have dissolved into thin air. =

Shut up or=20 I'll cut your head off

Hardly by = accident, all=20 the top military rebel commanders are LIFG, from Belhaj in Tripoli to = one Ismael=20 as-Salabi in Benghazi and one Abdelhakim al-Assadi in Derna, not to = mention a=20 key asset, Ali Salabi, sitting at the core of the TNC. It was Salabi who = negotiated with Saif al-Islam Gaddafi the "end" of LIFG's jihad, thus = assuring=20 the bright future of these born-again "freedom fighters".

It = doesn't=20 require a crystal ball to picture the consequences of LIFG/AQIM - having = conquered military power and being among the war "winners" - not = remotely=20 interested in relinquishing control just to please NATO's whims.=20

Meanwhile, amid the fog of war, it's unclear whether Gaddafi is = planning=20 to trap the Tripoli brigade in urban warfare; or to force the bulk of = rebel=20 militias to enter the huge Warfallah tribal areas.

Gaddafi's = wife=20 belongs to the Warfallah, Libya's largest tribe, with up to 1 million = people and=20 54 sub-tribes. The inside word in Brussels is that NATO expects Gaddafi = to fight=20 for months if not years; thus the Texas George W Bush-style bounty on = his head=20 and the desperate return to NATO's plan A, which was always to take him = out.=20

Libya may now be facing the specter of a twin-headed guerrilla = Hydra;=20 Gaddafi forces against a weak TNC central government and NATO boots on = the=20 ground; and the LIFG/AQIM nebula in a jihad against NATO (if they are = sidelined=20 from power).

Gaddafi may be a dictatorial relic of the past, but = you=20 don't monopolize power for four decades for nothing, and without your=20 intelligence services learning a thing or two.

From the = beginning,=20 Gaddafi said this was a foreign-backed/al-Qaeda operation; he was right=20 (although he forgot to say this was above all neo-Napoleonic French = President=20 Nicolas Sarkozy's war, but that's another story).

He also said = this was=20 a prelude for a foreign occupation whose target was to privatize and = take over=20 Libya's natural resources. He may - again =E2=80=93 turn out to be = right.

The=20 Singapore "experts" who praised the Gaddafi regime's decision to free = the LIFG's=20 jihadis qualified it as "a necessary strategy to mitigate the threat = posed to=20 Libya".

Now, LIFG/AQIM is finally poised to exercise its options = as an=20 "indigenous political force".

Ten years after 9/11, it's hard = not to=20 imagine a certain decomposed skull in the bottom of the Arabian Sea = boldly=20 grinning to kingdom come.

Note
1. Click = here

Pepe Escobar is the author of = Globalistan:=20 How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War=20 (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red=20 Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His=20 new book, just out, is Obama=20 does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009). =

He may=20 be reached at pepeasia@yahoo.com.

To=20 follow Pepe's articles on the Great Arab Revolt, please click here. =
 
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see our letter on:  = http://www.massenbach-world.de/41259.html  
Wir w=C3=BCnschen Ihnen ein angenehmes Wochenende. = Ihr=20 Team.
 
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Udo=20 von Massenbach   -   B=C3=A4rbel = Freudenberg-Pilster  =20 -   J=C3=B6rg=20 Barandat
        &nbs= p;            = ;            =           =20
UdovonMassenbach@t-online.de  =20 Mail@Freudenberg-Pilster.de  
          &nbs= p;           =20 JoergBarandat@yahoo.de
 
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