Reply-To: "Udo von Massenbach" From: "Udo von Massenbach" Subject: Massenbach-Letter: NEWS 26/08/11 Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2011 10:32:00 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_08F4_01CC6312.46A8A3C0" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal Importance: Normal X-Unsent: 3 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V15.4.3538.513 Dies ist eine mehrteilige Nachricht im MIME-Format. ------=_NextPart_000_08F4_01CC6312.46A8A3C0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Guten Morgen. =20 Massenbach zeitonline: Westerwelle verh=C3=B6hnt das = libysche Volk Der Au=C3=9Fenminister lobt sich f=C3=BCr seine Libyen-Politik:=20 Deutschland habe einen wichtigen Beitrag geleistet, um Gadhafi = loszuwerden.=20 Das ist zynisch. Ein Kommentar Deutschland hat sich daran gew=C3=B6hnt, ohne Au=C3=9Fenminister = auszukommen. Was unbedingt an Au=C3=9Fenpolitik n=C3=B6tig ist, = erledigen das Kanzleramt und das Verteidigungsministerium. Auch im = Ausland hat man sich darin eingerichtet, in Fragen internationaler = Politik ohne Deutschland auszukommen. Es geht, das hat zuletzt der = Libyen-Einsatz der Nato gezeigt, auch ganz gut ohne die Deutschen. ge =20 =20 Von dieser Erkenntnis ist der Mann weit entfernt, der qua Amt = zust=C3=A4ndig ist f=C3=BCr Deutschlands Au=C3=9Fenpolitik. Seit Montag = l=C3=A4sst Guido Westerwelle keine Gelegenheit aus, die vermeintlichen = deutschen Verdienste am nahen Sieg der libyschen Rebellen hervorzuheben. = Zufrieden stellte er fest: "Deutschland hat einen wichtigen Beitrag = geleistet." Die Sanktionspolitik der Bundesregierung "war = augenscheinlich erfolgreich", verk=C3=BCndete er im Deutschlandfunk = =E2=80=93 und macht noch einen weiteren Faktor aus, der Libyens = Freiheitsk=C3=A4mpfern ma=C3=9Fgeblich geholfen habe: Deutschland habe = "schon fr=C3=BCher als viele andere, sich klar gegen das Unrechtsregime = von Gadhafi gestellt." Das ist nicht nur unbeholfen, es ist zynisch. Denn in Wahrheit hat die = Bundesregierung dem libyschen Volk nicht nur nicht geholfen, als es von = Gadhafis Soldaten aus Panzern und Flugzeugen beschossen wurde. Sondern = sie hat ihm damals vor einem halben Jahr auch ziemlich explizit = mitgeteilt, wie gleichg=C3=BCltig ihr sein Schicksal ist. Es geht wohlgemerkt nicht darum, dass Deutschland keine Soldaten = f=C3=BCr die Libyen-Mission der Nato zur Verf=C3=BCgung stellen wollte. = Jedes Land kann und muss souver=C3=A4n und frei entscheiden, ob es die = letzte aller M=C3=B6glichkeiten w=C3=A4hlt oder nicht, um einen Konflikt = zu l=C3=B6sen. Im M=C3=A4rz 2011, als =C3=BCber den Einsatz der Nato in Libyen = diskutiert wurde, waren jedoch deutsche Soldaten und ihr Einsatz gar = nicht das Thema, auch wenn der Au=C3=9Fenminister das gern so darstellt. = Niemand forderte von Deutschland damals eine Beteiligung. In den USA, in = Gro=C3=9Fbritannien und Frankreich kennt man die deutschen = Befindlichkeiten bei Milit=C3=A4reins=C3=A4tzen. Und seit dem = Afghanistan-Mandat wei=C3=9F man auch um die beschr=C3=A4nkten = M=C3=B6glichkeiten der Bundeswehr. Damals ging es schlicht darum, die Internationale Gemeinschaft mit einem = UN-Mandat auszustatten, auf dessen Grundlage ein wild gewordenes Regime = daran gehindert werden konnte, mit Milit=C3=A4rgewalt gegen = Demonstranten vorzugehen. Diesem Mandat hat die Bundesregierung im = UN-Sicherheitsrat die Zustimmung versagt. Sie hat diesen Einsatz, der = Zivilisten sch=C3=BCtzen sollte, vor aller Welt missbilligt. Um so schlimmer ist es deshalb, wie Westerwelle jetzt agiert, da der = Sieg der Rebellen in Sichtweite ist. Mit seiner Selbstgerechtigkeit = verh=C3=B6hnt er das libysche Volk. Denn jeder dort wei=C3=9F, was = passiert w=C3=A4re, wenn man Gadhafis Luftwaffe nicht ausgeschaltet = h=C3=A4tte. Der Diktator h=C3=A4tte die Befreiungs-bewegung schlicht = weggebombt. Deutschland befindet sich auf einem au=C3=9Fenpolitischen Sonderweg. Das = w=C3=A4re grunds=C3=A4tzlich nicht so furchtbar schlimm, w=C3=BCrde das = Land innerhalb dieses Sonderstatus' besondere Kompetenzen entwickeln. = Denn im Br=C3=BCsseler Nato-Hauptquartier fehlt eine F=C3=A4higkeit ganz = besonders, n=C3=A4mlich: nach einem bewaffneten Konflikt nachhaltige, = staatliche Strukturen aufbauen zu k=C3=B6nnen. Westerwelle glaubt, Deutschland k=C3=B6nne das schon l=C3=A4ngst, doch = er irrt. Die Zust=C3=A4nde im Kosovo und in Afghanistan belegen es. Um = eine zerstrittene und zersplitterte Gesellschaft zu einer Nation zu = formen, ist mehr n=C3=B6tig, als Geld zur Verf=C3=BCgung zu stellen, ein = paar Br=C3=BCcken zu bauen und Polizisten nach deutschen = Ma=C3=9Fst=C3=A4ben auszubilden. Beim state building k=C3=B6nnte = Deutschland vorangehen. Dazu allerdings bed=C3=BCrfte es eines = Au=C3=9Fenministers. http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2011-08/westerwelle-libyen *************************************************************************= ******************* Asia Times: Bills paid, Iran's oil = ships again to India MONTREAL - India, which imports almost two-thirds of the oil it = consumes, has resolved a payments problem that put at risk purchases = from sanctions-bound Iran, one of its top two suppliers, according to = Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee. Iran this week confirmed that = payments were being received.=20 Payments to Iran via the Reserve Bank of India through a regional = clearing-house mechanism were halted at the end of 2010 in response to = United States pressure. The US maintains sanctions on Iran through the = Iran Sanctions Act (formerly the "Iran and Libya Sanctions Act", or = ILSA), beyond the several sets of sanctions that the United Nations = Security Council has imposed since 2006 in connection with Tehran's = failure to cooperate adequately with the International Atomic Energy = Agency over its nuclear program.=20 "We had some problem with regard to making payment for the oil=20 bill to Iran, but [the] problem has been sorted out. Regular payment is = taking place now," Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee said in the Lok = Sabha (lower house) this month, the Press Trust of India reported.=20 Iran supplies about 18% of India's oil imports, just behind Saudi Arabia = with a similar amount. Almost two-thirds of the roughly 2.2 million bpd = that India imports comes from the broader Middle East, other suppliers = being Kuwait, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates at 8-10% each. India is = projected to consume 3.3 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil in 2011, = but produced only 28% of that amount in 2009 (the last year for which = complete statistics are available).=20 Under the new payments system, funds will be routed through Halkbank, a = Turkish state-owned bank. The European Union as well as Australia, = Canada, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and even India itself = have all instituted different limited bans on various sorts of trade = and/or financial dealings with Iran.=20 Mukherjee rejected suggestions that Iran had threatened to stop oil = supplies to India. "I would like to dispel this impression that Iran has = threatened to stop supplying oil to India," he told parliament. "It may = be [a] report of some newspaper, but officially Iran has never told us = that it is going to stop the supply."=20 Iran halted oil supplies to India on August 1 due to continued overdue = payments, Fars News Agency (FNA) reported on August 15. Mangalore = refinery is the only Indian refinery that has received Iranian oil this = month, an oil official told FNA.=20 Mukherjee acknowledged that some bills remained outstanding, "which in = the course of time we would like to clear by making the payment".=20 Iran warned this week that Indian companies receiving oil from Iran = would not begin receiving new supplies until their payments had been = completed for past deliveries. "Those Indian oil refineries which have = not settled their accounts are unlikely to receive any Iranian crude = supply in the next few months," FNA reported on Monday, citing an = unnamed oil official.=20 Seyed Mohsen Qamsarri, the National Iranian Oil Company's international = affairs manager, told FNA that all Indian refineries had started paying = their debts and that more than one million euro (US$1.4 million) had = been received so far.=20 There is speculation that the US will pressure Turkey to close the = Halkbank window to Iran, as it pressured the Reserve Bank of India = before. However, there is good reason to suppose that Turkish Prime = Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is pleased at the opportunity that this = presents to install another instrument of potential control over = Teheran, in light of the growing antagonism between the two countries at = the level of regional geopolitics.=20 New Delhi consumes almost four times as much energy in crude oil and oil = products as it does in natural gas. India's OVL, the overseas investment = arm of the state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corp, is active in a host of = countries including Brazil, Columbia, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, Russia and = Sudan.=20 Recently it has also signed contracts with Kazakhstan and Indonesia. = (See Astana builds energy depth, Asia Times Online, December 17, 2010; = India-Indonesia links deepen, Asia Times Online, January 28, 2011.)=20 However, oil and gas together represent less than one-third of the = country's total energy consumption. Coal and peat still account for 42% = of total energy consumption, with combustible renewables and waste = another 26%. Consequently, the country is doing its utmost to promote = natural gas and, since 2004, has been importing liquefied natural gas = (LNG), mostly from Qatar.=20 It is cooperating on the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) = pipeline project, which it chose as against the IPI = (Iran-Pakistan-India) pipeline project.=20 That choice was mainly a result of unrealistic contract proposals from = the Iranian side (for example, the insistence on paying LNG prices for = gas received overland through a pipe) and fatigue at the behavior of = negotiators from Teheran, which continually sought to reopen chapters of = the contract already closed and treated agreed conditions as points for = continued bargaining.=20 Indeed, sanctions are not the main reason why Iran has difficulty = finding partners for cooperation or why the country has suffered from = economic maldevelopment for the past 30 years. There is little evidence = that any US administration has ever prosecuted any foreign or domestic = person or company for trading with Iran. This includes many Iranian = expatriates living in the US who make investments back home.=20 Indeed, during the first decade of this century, the US Treasury = Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control is reported to have = approved almost 10,000 exceptions to US sanctions rules.=20 Iran's problems are, rather, made in Tehran. The regime has never been = able to overcome the economic, political and bureaucratic obstacles to = rational and reliable decision-making that were first put in place = following the overthrow of the shah in 1979. First and foremost among = them is the devaluation of technical expertise in favor of ideological = purity. Organizationally speaking, the religious leaders designated to = oversee the various ministries play precisely the same role that = political commissars played in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution.=20 Despite attempts to decentralize oil and gas decision-making since the = late 1990s, the system is still in thrall to factional infighting and = political cronyism; if anything, the situation has got worse. = Information is compartmentalized and restricted, and there is no = guarantee that one part of the state bureaucracy will execute an = agreement made by another part of the bureaucracy. Political = obstructionism and economic irrationality are endemic to the Iranian = state apparatus, irrespective of international conditions.=20 In addition, Iran's constitution specifically forbids foreign entities = from owning Iranian entities or resources. Consequently, international = energy companies are reduced to concluding elaborate buy-back agreements = that provide neither decent rates of return nor any incentives to exceed = production targets.=20 Finally, Iran's constitution also forbids its government from = recognizing any jurisdiction by international tribunals. In the absence = of recourse to international arbitration tribunals, therefore, foreign = entities are limited to Iranian courts for the settlement of contract = disputes.=20 Dr Robert M Cutler (http://www.robertcutler.org), educated at the = Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The University of Michigan, = has researched and taught at universities in the United States, Canada, = France, Switzerland, and Russia. Now senior research fellow in the = Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton = University, Canada, he also consults privately in a variety of fields. =20 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/MH18Df03.html *************************************************************************= ****************************************** US bans Syrian oil, sanctions 5 energy firms WASHINGTON, Aug 18, 2011 (AFP) - The United States on Thursday banned = Syrian oil imports and sanctioned five Syrian energy companies as = Washington ratcheted up pressure to push Syrian President Bashar = al-Assad to step down.=20 President Barack Obama ordered the energy sanctions to "directly" target = Syria's petroleum exports, "a significant source of government revenue," = the Treasury Department said in a statement.=20 The sanctions ban the importation into the United States of = Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products, the department said.=20 The Obama order also prohibit US persons, wherever they are located, = from engaging in any transactions or dealings in or related to = Syrian-origin oil, it said. Sanctions were slapped on five Syrian = government companies: General Petroleum Corporation, Syrian Company for = Oil Transport, Syrian Gas Company, Syrian Petroleum Company, and Sytrol. = http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidANA20110818T141212ZEMY71/lok14122911081= 8/US_Bans_Syrian_Oil_Sanctions_5_Energy_Firms?&zawyaemailmarketing=20 Oil Syrian oil exploration first began in 1933 during the French Mandate and = the first commercial discovery was in 1956.[8] The industry took off in = 1968, when Syria's first commercial oil field began production, although = Syria did not begin exporting oil until the mid-1980s.[9] Syria is a = relatively small oil producer, accounting for just 0.5 percent of the = global production in 2010.[10][11] Although Syria is not a major oil = exporter by Middle Eastern standards, oil is a major pillar of the = economy. According to the International Monetary Fund, oil sales for = 2010 were projected to generate $3.2 billion for the Syrian government = and account for 25.1% of the state's revenue.[12] Syria is the only significant crude oil producing country in the Eastern = Mediterranean region, which includes Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, the West = Bank, and Gaza. According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Syria had 2.5 = billion barrels of petroleum reserves as of January 1, 2010.[13] Syria's = known oil reserves are mainly in the eastern part of the country in the = Deir ez-Zor Governorate near its border with Iraq and along the = Euphrates River; a number of smaller fields are located in the center of = the country.[8] In 2010, Syria produced around 385,000 barrels per day = (bbl/d) of crude oil.[11][12] Oil production has stabilized after = falling for a number of years, and is poised to turn around as new = fields come on line. In 2008, Syria produced 213 billion cubic feet = (Bcf) of natural gas, and is expected to double its gas production by = the end of 2010. While much of its oil is exported to Europe, Syria's = natural gas is used in reinjection for enhanced oil recovery and for = domestic electricity generation.[13] In 2009, Syria=E2=80=99s net petroleum exports were estimated to be = 148,000 bbl/d. All oil exports are marketed by Sytrol, Syria=E2=80=99s = state oil marketing firm, which sells most of its volumes under 12-month = contracts. Syrian crude oil exports go mostly to OECD European = countries, in particular Germany, Italy, and France, totaling an = estimated 143,000 bbl/d in 2009, according to International Energy = Agency (IEA) data.[13] The oil sector of the economy faces many challenges, such as a decline = in output and production resulting from technological problems and a = depletion of oil reserves. Syria's rate of oil production has decreased = steadily, from a peak close to 610,000 barrels per day (bpd) in 1995 = down to approximately 379,000 bpd in 2008. Meanwhile, consumption is = rising, which means that Syria could become a net oil importer within a = decade.[9] To counteract this problem, Syria has intensified oil = exploration efforts. Syria=E2=80=99s upstream oil production and = development has traditionally been the mandate of the Syrian Petroleum = Company (SPC), an arm of the Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral = Resources. The SPC has undertaken efforts to reverse the trend toward = declining oil production and exports by increasing oil exploration and = production in partnership with foreign oil companies. The SPC directly = controls about half of the country's oil production and takes a 50 = percent stake in development work with foreign partners.[13] Foreign investment is vital for improving production levels. The main = foreign producing consortium is the Al-Furat Petroleum Company, a joint = venture established in 1985, which currently includes the SPC at 50 = percent ownership, Royal Dutch Shell at 32 percent, and the remainder = held by Himalaya Energy Syria, a consortium of China National Petroleum = Company and India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation.[13] Another = important consortium is Deir Ez Zor Petroleum Company, owned by SPC and = France's Total. Shell has one of the oldest relationships with Syria, = dating back to 1949. Total formed its Syrian operation in 1988. Other = international players include: Petro Canada, UK's Gulfsands, US-Eygptian = firm IPR, Poland's Kulczyk, Croatia's INA, Russia's Stroytransgas, and = Triton Singapore.[8] Another option to handle the increase in domestic oil consumption is to = switch electric power plants from oil-fired to natural gas-fired. Proven = natural gas reserves, approximately three-quarters of which are owned by = the Syrian Petroleum Company, were estimated at 9.1 trillion cubic feet = in 2010.[14] The primary challenge for the natural gas industry is = logistics: reserves are located mainly in northeastern Syria, whereas = the population is concentrated in the west and south.[15] Although Syria produces relatively modest quantities of oil and gas, its = location is strategic in terms of regional security and prospective = energy transit routes. Regional integration in the energy sector is = expected to increase as a result of the 2008 opening of the Syrian link = of the Arab Gas Pipeline and ongoing plans for the expansion of the = pipeline network to include neighboring countries Turkey, Iraq, and = Iran.[13] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Syria *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= **************************************** *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= **************************************** Freudenberg =20 =20 =20 =20 China losing Asian = popularity contest By Jian Junbo=20 LONDON - Though China purses a "good neighbor policy" in Asia, it faces = increasing criticism from regional officials, media and populations. It = seems the time is ripe for Beijing to review and improve its Asia = strategy.=20 The latest challenge came from Japan. On August 10, chief cabinet = secretary Yukio Edano said Japan would dispatch its Self-Defense Forces = should a foreign country invade the (disputed) Senkaku Islands (called = Diaoyu islands by China). "If other countries invade the islands, [Japan = will] invoke the right of self-defense and remove them by making any = sacrifice," Edano said in Tokyo, apparently referring to China's naval = activities in the region.=20 Edano made the remarks after the publication of the 2011 Japan Defense = White Paper, which had been approved by Japanese Prime Minister Naoto = Kan's cabinet a week earlier. That paper described China's stance in its = maritime territorial disputes with its neighbors as "assertive".=20 "Given the modernization of China's naval and air forces in recent = years, its sphere of influence is likely to grow beyond its neighboring = waters =E2=80=A6 It is expected that China will try to keep expanding = the area of activities, and to make naval activities a routine practice = in waters surrounding Japan including the East China Sea and the Pacific = Ocean, as well as in the South China Sea."=20 China described the paper as "irresponsible", rejecting the suggestion = that its ongoing military modernization would impact on its regional = neighbors.=20 Before the Japanese paper, the Philippines dispatched five congressmen = and some military officials to Zhongye Island (called Pagasa Island by = the Philippines) on June 20. As these officials landed on the disputed = island - some singing the national anthem with Filipino residents - = China's foreign minister was at an Association of Southeast Asian = Nations (ASEAN) forum in Bali, Indonesia, seeking ways to ease tensions = in the South China Sea.=20 Meanwhile, territorial disputes in those waters have fueled incessant = street protests in Vietnam over the past few months against a so-called = "Chinese invasion".=20 Criticism has even come from Singapore, which has no territorial = disputes with China and is considered to have a friendlier stance in = Southeast Asia. Earlier this year, senior statesman Lee Kuan Yew said he = would like the United States rather than China as a hegemon in Asia, = because he saw the US as more benevolent.=20 Around the region, anti-Chinese rhetoric can often be found in = government officials' speeches and media commentaries.=20 No other big power like the US, the European Union or even India is = subject to so many unfriendly or hostile accusations from its neighbors. = Such remarks don't reflect well on China's efforts to build and enhance = friendly relations with its neighbors under its "good neighbor policy" = policy.=20 The diplomatic policy is based on four strategic principles: big powers = are key partners, neighboring countries are primary partners, developing = countries are the foundation of China's diplomacy and multilateral = institutions are important platforms.=20 In order to implement the strategy of making neighboring countries = primary partners, Beijing adheres to the principles of "dealing with = neighboring countries as partners and treating them with goodwill" and = of "building an amicable, tranquil and prosperous neighborhood".=20 In April at the Bo'ao Asia Forum, a regional platform for economic = integration, Chinese President Hu Jintao said that to build a harmonious = Asia, countries needed to respect the diversity of civilizations and = promote neighborly relations.=20 "We need to transform the development pattern and promote all-round = development ... We need to share development opportunities and meet = challenges together ... We need to seek common ground while shelving = difference and enhancing common security ... We need to champion mutual = benefit and deepen regional cooperation," said Hu.=20 Under its "good neighbors policy", Beijing naturally considers improving = relations with ASEAN an important strategic task. China has built up a = strategic partnership with the 10-member ASEAN since 2003, and also with = some of its members, one after another.=20 Despite all China's efforts to improve relations with its neighbors, = especially those in Southeast Asia, it seems many mistrust a smiling = Middle Kingdom. And it seems likely that as China expands its influence = due to its growing economic and military strength, these neighboring = countries will dislike China even more.=20 So why is China failing to win these countries over? There are several = reasons: some may be traced to concerned neighbors, others derive from = within China itself.=20 Firstly, there are historical reasons. Throughout ancient history, some = Asian countries under the influence of Confucian civilization would pay = tribute to China's imperial courts, including in today's Vietnam, Korea = and Japan. Some other non-Confucianized Southeast Asian countries = (including today's Philippines, Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand) also = have a record of paying tributes to China as required by its emperors.=20 There are also more modern feuds. The Chinese people have yet to heal = the psychological wounds inflicted by the Japanese invasion during World = War II. Some Southeast Asia countries were under the threat of China's = "export of revolution" in the 1950s and 1960s, and there was a bloody = border war between China and Vietnam in 1979.=20 Perhaps the biggest factor damaging mutual-trust and undermining efforts = to build partnerships are bilateral disputes over territorial = sovereignty. China has water and/or island territorial disputes in the = South China Sea or East China Sea with Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, = Malaysia, the Philippines and Japan.=20 For many East and Southeast Asian countries, China's growing economic, = military and political influence in Asia reminds them of the = China-centered tributary system in history, in which vassals around the = Middle Kingdom had to acknowledge China's dominance in the region. Fears = about the return of a new China-centered tributary system perhaps remain = a psychological barrier for some countries when it comes to believing in = Beijing's good neighbor policy.=20 Poor relations between China and its neighbors also partially result = from China's domestic conditions. Since the 1960s, many of China's = Southeast Asian neighbors have became democratized and are now = influenced by so-called cosmopolitan values, especially "democratic = peace" that maintains that democratic states will never be at war. Under = this doctrine, a non-democratic state is naturally, and constantly, on = the offensive.=20 Unfortunately, China under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party is = considered by its neighbors as an undemocratic state, despite its = pledges of a peaceful rise. While China has long given up the "export of = revolution", it has yet to clarify its strategic intent of military = modernization. For many neighboring countries, for such a big power to = lack a clearly defined global strategy is dangerous.=20 Naturally, given China's size and population, as well as its deep = cultural influence, strong economic muscle and military power, any = relatively smaller and weaker country in Asia is suspicious and = frightened over what move the big dragon will take.=20 To address this, in addition to making verbal pledges, China has to make = real efforts to show it will contribute to the benefit and stability of = the region when needed. For instance, in the aftermath of the ongoing = global financial crisis, China should have taken the lead to jointly = build a sound regional financial system that stabilized the regional = financial market.=20 China should honor its commitment to a peaceful rise with concrete = measures to help safeguard regional security and ensure peace in the = region.=20 As in China, nationalistic sentiments are growing across Asia, with = economic reasons encouraging governments - backed by the US - to take = more adventurous policy steps and challenge China.=20 Needless to say, Asia's current political tensions, arms races, = hostility and long-lasting disputes are not the ideal choice for the = region. Because of the complex state of relations, China and its = neighbors must devote more time and effort to building genuine = partnerships.=20 China should act as a responsible actor that consistently adheres to = shared principles; it should have a clear-cut, operational and pragmatic = Asia strategy.=20 Under this policy, Beijing should function as a stabilizing economic = power. This would require China to be more innovative in international = finance areas, and more courageous in initiating reforms of existing = financial systems.=20 China should help ensure regional public security with its growing = military capability. Beijing should be broader-minded than its neighbors = in regard to the use of its military to maintain regional stability by = fighting piracy, terrorism and other international crimes in the Pacific = Ocean. Instead of flexing its military muscle in territorial disputes, = China should encourage political, economic and cultural integration in = East and Southeast Asia.=20 All in all, China should reshape its Asia strategy with an aim to = functioning as a stabilizing force, while maintaining its strategy to = keep a balance with the influence of the US in this region.=20 China must show its goodwill and sincerity with words and deeds in = carrying out these policies to the letter. Only in this way can it rise = peacefully without causing alarm and be considered as a friend by its = Asian neighbors.=20 China's Asia strategy should go beyond only seeking mutual economic = benefits and encompass the responsibility to help maintain financial, = maritime and political stability. If China as a socialist state with = Confucian traditions can become a sophisticated player in a = capitalist-style market economy, it has the ability to harmonize an Asia = in diversity.=20 Dr Jian Junbo, an assistant professor of the Institute of International = Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, is currently an academic = visitor at London School of Economics and Political Science, United = Kingdom.=20 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MH17Ad01.html = *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************************ *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************** = Politics: from Vision to Action Barandat Why Assad Need Not Fear = Qaddafi=E2=80=99s Fate =20 =20 Author: Ed Husain, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies=20 August 23, 2011 Financial Times=20 The dramatic scenes in Tripoli are already being seized upon by those = keen to depose other despotic regimes. Taken alongside the unstable = situation in Syria, there is now a risk of a dangerous moment of western = triumphalism. This must be resisted, especially given that the odds of = overthrowing dictator Bashar al-Assad are so small. After months of holding his nerve, US president Barack Obama last week = succumbed to calls from commentators and Syrian opposition leaders, and = demanded Mr Assad's removal. The decision was a mistake. Earlier in the = week, Hillary Clinton, secretary of state, noted that, if the US called = for Mr Assad's head, then what?=E2=80=9D. And, indeed, then what? I lived in Syria for two years and still visit regularly, so I know only = too well that the US is viewed with deep animosity. Officials told me = many times, and with straight faces, that America is at war with Arabs = and Muslims =E2=80=93 a view also ingrained among the wider population, = particularly after the Iraq war. Calls for regime change will thus help Syria, as Mr Assad defies the = west with ease. As elsewhere in the Middle East, defying Washington is a = cause of strength and popularity, as Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran show. = Every passing day will now be seen as a humiliation for Mr Obama, while = the fragmented and shambolic Syrian opposition will be more credibly = dubbed =E2=80=9CAmerican stooges=E2=80=9D, or =E2=80=9CZionist = agents=E2=80=9D. For a population that is vehemently anti-American and = anti-Israel, such labels are powerful and destructive. The regime has been barbaric in responding to the brave people on the = streets, but we must be careful about accepting the narrative that the = whole of Syria is demanding change. The largest cities of Aleppo and = Damascus remain relatively calm, while opinion in western capitals is = led by reports generated via opposition movements, often using social = media of questionable reliability. The army has committed many = atrocities but hundreds of its members appear to have been killed, too. = In the absence of international media, it is debatable whether the = protesters are altogether peaceful. Already, calls for military intervention are being made by Syrian = opposition activists in meetings at the White House and US state = department. Yet such movements have led us astray before, as when = politicians such as Ahmed Chalabi misled the US about realities in Iraq. = In truth, Mr Assad's regime is much less likely to fall than that of = Muammer Gaddafi: there have been no high-profile political or military = defections, while Mr Assad remains relatively popular among senior = military commanders, Syrian mosque clerics, the middle-classes and = business leaders. This brings us back to the =E2=80=9Cthen what=E2=80=9D question. The = numbers being killed now will wither in comparison with a possible = future civil war, if an increasingly sectarian Syria splinters between = the ruling Alawites, the elite and urban Christians, the majority = Sunnis, the Kurds, Druze and others. There is no civil society to = engineer a peaceful transition, while Syria could plausibly become = another Lebanon, acting as a proxy battleground for regional powers. This risk partly explains why Syria's ally Turkey has exerted such = effort to rein in the slaughter, and why Saudi Arabia, Russia and China = have not joined America's lead. They all want to give Mr Assad more time = =E2=80=93 because they recognise the thin chance of getting rid of him, = and because they fear the violence that would follow if he did fall. Almost 90 per cent of Syria's crude oil exports go to European = countries. Almost $3bn of its annual trade is conducted with Turkey. = Saudi Arabia is a regional power with vested interests in the country, = and Russia and Syria enjoy historical relations, as well as arms deals. = It is these countries that now must be on the front lines of reform, = with the US largely working behind the scenes. For the west, the most powerful and poignant moment in recent months = came when US ambassador Robert Ford travelled to Hama, scene of = protests, to show solidarity and monitor the regime's actions. His quiet = move warmed usually hostile Sunni communities elsewhere in the Middle = East to America, while putting fear into the heart of the tyrant = himself. Such innovative, soft power strategies will do more to help = Syrian democracy than loud statements from the White House. The most powerful pressure on Mr Assad so far, however, has been from Al = Jazeera's Arabic coverage, which encouraged Syrians to take control of = their own destiny. This is surely right, for any long-term change must = come from within. Sadly, in the short term and in a highly volatile = region, at present Mr Assad remains the least worst option. The writer is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and = author of The Islamist=20 http://www.cfr.org/syria/why-assad-need-not-fear-qaddafis-fate/p25702?cid= =3Drss-fullfeed-why_assad_need_not_fear_qaddaf-082311&utm_source=3Dfeedbu= rner&utm_medium=3Demail&utm_campaign=3DFeed%3A+cfr_main+%28CFR.org+-+Main= +Site+Feed%29 *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ********************************************** *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ********************************************** sueddeutsche.de: Folgen der deutschen Libyen-Politik =20 - Saat des Misstrauens - Ein Kommentar von Daniel Br=C3=B6ssler Altkanzler Kohl bescheinigt Deutschland, international keine = berechenbare Gr=C3=B6=C3=9Fe mehr zu sein - und er hat recht. Mit ihrer = einsamen Entscheidung zur Nato-Operation in Libyen haben Kanzlerin = Merkel und Au=C3=9Fenminister Westerwelle den Verdacht gen=C3=A4hrt, = dass auf die deutsche Au=C3=9Fenpolitik kein Verlass ist. Die Regierung = muss deutlich machen, wo sie steht. Die Verb=C3=BCndeten haben ein = Anrecht darauf. Je kleiner die Zweifel am Ende des Regimes von Muammar al-Gaddafi = werden, desto mehr redet der Au=C3=9Fenminister. Guido Westerwelle = erinnert an die vielen Opfer der K=C3=A4mpfe in Libyen. Er = =C3=A4u=C3=9Fert Sorge, weil der verbrecherische Herrscher immer noch = nicht endg=C3=BCltig besiegt zu sein scheint und bekundet die Hoffnung, = dass die Aufst=C3=A4ndischen den Weg zur Einigkeit und zur Demokratie = finden. Er hat mit alledem Recht. Das ist so, obwohl alle Welt wei=C3=9F, dass = er so viel spricht, weil er doch noch recht behalten will mit der = einsamen Politik Deutschlands in Sachen Libyen. Falsch klingen seine = Worte nur, weil Guido Westerwelle f=C3=BCr die Leistungen der = Verb=C3=BCndeten kein Wort der Anerkennung findet. Es ist dieses = Schweigen, das beweist, dass auch Helmut Kohl recht hat. Der Altbundeskanzler bescheinigt Deutschland, seit Jahren keine = berechenbare Gr=C3=B6=C3=9Fe und kein verl=C3=A4sslicher Partner mehr zu = sein. Er meint dabei das Lavieren durch die Krise Europas, aber auch das = Verhalten im Sicherheitsrat im Falle Libyen. Die Bundesregierung hatte = sich in der Abstimmung =C3=BCber die Flugverbotszone der Stimme = enthalten und dies damit begr=C3=BCndet, man sei in einem sehr = speziellen Fall zu einer etwas anderen Einsch=C3=A4tzung gelangt als die = Partner. Eine Abw=C3=A4gung nannte es der Au=C3=9Fenminister. Das sollte = verh=C3=BCllen, dass es sich um eine historische Entscheidung handelte. = Etwas n=C3=A4her bei der Wahrheit wurde die Sorge ins Feld gef=C3=BChrt, = die Bundeswehr =C3=BCberzustrapazieren, die bereits in Afghanistan, auf = dem Balkan und den Weltmeeren eingesetzt ist. Ein Ja zur UN-Resolution, = wurde behauptet, w=C3=A4re automatisch als Ja zu einer Beteiligung an = einer Nato-Operation in Libyen verstanden worden. Nicht nur Kohl musste den Eindruck einer Entscheidung gewinnen, die nur = aus dem Moment heraus getroffen wurde in Furcht vor den W=C3=A4hlern in = Baden-W=C3=BCrttemberg und Rheinland-Pfalz, wo kurz danach = Landtagswahlen anstanden. Die Dinge liegen leider noch schlimmer, denn = es gibt sehr wohl eine Richtung und ein Ziel. Mit voller Unterst=C3=BCtzung von Kanzlerin Angela Merkel verfolgt der = Au=C3=9Fenminister eine Art Westerwelle-Doktrin. Sie postuliert = schlicht: so wenig milit=C3=A4risches Engagement im Ausland wie = m=C3=B6glich. Das gilt zwar, seit das vereinigte Deutschland = =C3=BCberhaupt wieder vor dieser Frage steht. Bis vor kurzem aber galt jener Zusatz, der Bundeswehr-Soldaten = zun=C3=A4chst ins fr=C3=BChere Jugoslawien und dann nach Afghanistan = gef=C3=BChrt hat. So viel milit=C3=A4risches Engagement im Ausland wie = n=C3=B6tig, um der internationalen Verantwortung und den Pflichten im = B=C3=BCndnis gerecht zu werden, lautet er. Von Westerwelle wird bleiben, = dass dieser Satz weggefallen ist. Zweifel an der deutschen Verl=C3=A4sslichkeit Mit den Folgen dieser Wende bekommt es die deutsche Politik k=C3=BCnftig = zu tun. Die Ehrungen, mit denen die Kanzlerin in Washington = =C3=BCberh=C3=A4uft worden ist, k=C3=B6nnen davon allenfalls ablenken. = Wenn die Bundesregierung nun darauf verweist, alle seien doch nach wie = vor nett zu ihr, so ist das r=C3=BChrend. Deutschland ist, mit Verlaub, = nicht Luxemburg. Andauerndes =C3=B6ffentliches Grollen k=C3=B6nnen sich = die Partner gar nicht erlauben. Deutschland wird gebraucht, nicht zuletzt wegen seiner Wirtschaftsmacht. = Was die Bundesregierung sicherheitspolitisch ges=C3=A4t hat, ist stilles = Misstrauen. Trotz des erheblichen Einsatzes der Bundeswehr etwa in = Afghanistan wird der Verdacht bleiben, dass auf die Deutschen im = Zweifelsfall kein Verlass ist. Die Folgen lassen sich erahnen. Kurzfristig geht es um die routiniert in Abrede gestellte deutsche = Bringschuld in Libyen. Wenngleich die Verb=C3=BCndeten und auch die = libyschen =C3=9Cbergangsf=C3=BChrer taktvoll dar=C3=BCber hinweggehen, = muss die Bundesregierung mit einer f=C3=BCrchterlichen Annahme leben: = jener, dass es heute gar keine libysche Opposition mehr g=C3=A4be, = h=C3=A4tte sich Deutschland mit seiner Skepsis durchgesetzt. Mag sein, dass Westerwelle wirklich glaubt, dass seine Sanktionspolitik = ausgereicht h=C3=A4tte, um Gaddafi zu stoppen, und dass ihn darum kein = schlechtes Gewissen plagt. Die anderen aber werden die potentielle = Schuld nicht vergessen und sie beim Aufbau in Libyen in Rechnung = stellen. So erkl=C3=A4rt sich, dass Verteidigungsminister Thomas de = Maizi=C3=A8re die Entsendung von Blauhelm-Soldaten "konstruktiv" = pr=C3=BCfen will, bevor die UN danach gefragt haben. Damit die bisherige Libyen-Politik noch einen Sinn ergibt, k=C3=A4me = aber nur eine Entsendung in einen relativ risikoarmen Einsatz in Frage. = Der Verteidigungsminister, der nach seinem Amtsantritt =C3=BCber die = Verantwortung Deutschlands in der Welt gesprochen hatte, wird = Schwierigkeiten bekommen, diesen Anspruch auch einzul=C3=B6sen. Deutschland muss erst einmal kl=C3=A4ren, welche Lehren es aus den = vergangenen 20 Jahren zieht: War es falsch, den Kosovaren zur Hilfe zu = kommen? W=C3=BCrde es nach einem neuen 11. September seine = Solidarit=C3=A4t verweigern? Bequem ist es, mit Verweis auf die Ohnmacht im Falle Syriens die = Doppelmoral in der Welt zu beklagen. Doch das kl=C3=A4rt noch nicht, was = man selbst von der Schutzverantwortung f=C3=BCr Zivilisten im = V=C3=B6lkerrecht h=C3=A4lt. Helmut Kohl hat recht. Die Deutschen = m=C3=BCssen deutlich machen, wo sie stehen. Die Verb=C3=BCndeten haben = einen Anspruch darauf zu erfahren, ob sie auf Deutschland noch = z=C3=A4hlen k=C3=B6nnen. http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/folgen-der-deutschen-libyen-politik-sa= at-des-misstrauens-1.1134712 *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************************************ *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************************************************************ = Middle East = =20 =E2=80=9CI Didn=E2=80=99t See it Coming=E2=80=9D=20 Hossam Badrawi Former National Democratic Party Secretary General Hossam Badrawi tells = how the Tahrir revolution looked from inside the regime=20 Hossam Badrawi has served as a member of the Egyptian parliament and is = a professor of medicine at Cairo University. He joined the ruling = National Democratic Party in 2000, telling the media that he hoped to = play a role in reforming Egypt from within the system. He became a = member of the NDP=E2=80=99s Policy Secretariat, headed by Gamal Mubarak, = and in February 2011 amid mass protests against the Egyptian regime he = replaced Safwat El-Sherif as NDP secretary general. He held the job for = only four days before resigning from the post and the party. Cairo = Review Managing Editor Scott MacLeod interviewed Badrawi in Cairo on = February 21, 2011. CAIRO REVIEW: What happened in Egypt? HOSSAM BADRAWI: It=E2=80=99s a revolution. It changed the status of = Egypt and it will definitely affect the future. Unexpectedly, it is the = middle-class, educated people that made the change. Other sectors of the = society have joined in. Some sectors are benefiting more. But the major = move of the people: it is much more effective than in the revolution of = 1919. And definitely more credible than 1952, because it=E2=80=99s from = the people, not the army. Egypt is making history for the Middle East. CAIRO REVIEW: Looking at it from the inside, did you see it coming? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I didn=E2=80=99t see it coming in that way. But the = ceiling of my expectations was much less than what happened. In 1990, we = were many people working for reform in Egypt from outside the = government. The structure that had all of us was the New Civic Forum, = led by Dr. Said El-Naggar. Some of us decided we can make the change = from inside. I represented that group. Others decided to make the change = as opposition. Some others stayed independent. But there is a network = between us. Because we are looking for liberal thinking. We were all for = a free economy, democracy, human rights. We decided to play different = roles from different positions. And, I used to tell my friends, the most = difficult position is mine. It is easy to be an opposition from outside. = It=E2=80=99s much more difficult on the inside and keep your credibility = by saying what you want to say. And bear in mind the fact that = you=E2=80=99re not implementing what you want. CAIRO REVIEW: What did you think would happen? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I thought by accumulated pressure, we could change = Article 77 [in the constitution] and have limitations on the = president=E2=80=99s terms, and change Article 76 for the way the = elections can be done. And at the same time, remove the emergency [law] = situation. And make the changes that implement human rights issues in = the right structure. There=E2=80=99s a document coming from me as a = responsible person for the UPR, the Universal Political Review, of Egypt = in early 2010 [and] stated all these facts. I presented it to the United = Nations despite the fact that I was in the NDP, which put me in conflict = with the party at the time. If Article 77 was going to change and limit = the president=E2=80=99s term, I was going to be so happy. I thought it = would be an opening for everything, for political reform. I would have = been satisfied if I=E2=80=99d seen limitation of terms and = implementation of human rights. Obviously, what happened [in the = revolution] is much more than that. CAIRO REVIEW: And you didn=E2=80=99t see it coming? HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I didn=E2=80=99t see it coming. I expected change, = but I didn=E2=80=99t see it coming. Not that way. I thought with the = change of the president, the whole country would be changed. I thought = [President] Mubarak should have announced he wouldn=E2=80=99t run again. = I was advocating that. I thought by just changing that, most changes = would happen by default. CAIRO REVIEW: So you didn=E2=80=99t see a popular protest movement = coming up to effect change? HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I didn=E2=80=99t see it that way. I didn=E2=80=99t = expect the middle-class people to come together that way and be that = effective. It was a good surprise. CAIRO REVIEW: Was that a common perception in the party, the president = and others didn=E2=80=99t see the wave coming? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I think so. I realized on the first day, some people = didn=E2=80=99t realize what was happening even at the time it was = happening. Every response from the president was too little too late, = all the time. As I was given the post to direct the NDP in those four = days, I had access to him and the group around him. I didn=E2=80=99t = have it before. I didn=E2=80=99t have it afterwards. But during that = time, I realized that they are responding always too late and too = little. They don=E2=80=99t evaluate the magnitude of what=E2=80=99s = happening. My role in those four days was to open everyone=E2=80=99s = eyes, that this reality has to be respected and that the president has = to step down now. That =E2=80=9Cnow=E2=80=9D was not accepted, day after = day after day. CAIRO REVIEW: Were you able to say that personally to the president? HOSSAM BADRAWI: Personally, yes, the first day I met him. I told him he = has to respect his promises to the people by amending the constitutional = term [limits] and move all his authority to his vice president. I = thought this is going to be more constitutional and that has to be done = in the way people believe it. So he has to be clear about that, that he = is not going to practice his presidency, except for one issue: to call = for the referendum on the constitution, and that people should see and = believe that is happening and it should be real. The delivery of his = speeches did not give the impression that this was real. That was the = defect. Until now I still think that moving the authority to vice = president and his stepping aside from the presidency would have led the = country in a more constitutional way than what is happening now. CAIRO REVIEW: Did you mean that he resign, or hand over power? HOSSAM BADRAWI: Hand over the power to the vice president, and to = respect the constitution, so that he would have only one role, calling = for the referendum. His role will be only one thing to do. CAIRO REVIEW: But he should remain as president? HOSSAM BADRAWI: Remain as president outside of the circle of authority. = So he passes all his authority, gives it to the vice president, and = moves geographically somewhere else, so he is not part of making = decisions. And have things done constitutionally, and call for early = elections once the constitution was amended. That was my opinion that I = told him face to face. CAIRO REVIEW: Did you ever just ask him to completely resign the = presidency, as he did on February 11? HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I didn=E2=80=99t advise that. But every day that = passed, I realized even the advice [I gave him] wouldn=E2=80=99t be = accepted [by the revolution]. On the last day, I told him that even if = you take my advice now, it can be successful only 10 or 15 percent. = You=E2=80=99re late. People do not believe there=E2=80=99s an honest = desire to step away and have the constitution be amended, and elections = to be done as early as possible. That was the safest way the country can = go, in my opinion. "I=E2=80=99m afraid of a sort of McCarthyite attitude, that once = you=E2=80=99re different in opinion, you=E2=80=99ll be taken hostage by = the fact you=E2=80=99re different. As if we are moving from one kind of = dictatorship to another kind of dictatorship." CAIRO REVIEW: What was President Mubarak=E2=80=99s reaction to that = advice? Did he deny there was a problem? HOSSAM BADRAWI: Actually not. We had meetings more than three times. On = Wednesday, I was not giving him advice. I was giving my statement as the = secretary general of the ruling party, a position he assigned me to have = two days before. I told him that from the meetings I had from different = political parties and with the people in Tahrir=E2=80=94I had many = people there with the young people=E2=80=94that my political = understanding was that the problem isn=E2=80=99t in taking the action. = The challenge is that they don=E2=80=99t believe that you are taking the = action. It wasn=E2=80=99t advice. It was a request. And when the request = was not met the way we agreed upon, I resigned. CAIRO REVIEW: He disagreed with the request? HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, he agreed. He understood it. He brought his legal = people to make his statement on Wednesday. When I left, I was expecting = him to give his statement on Wednesday, and he didn=E2=80=99t give it. = So it was clear to me that somebody else had called him. On Thursday, I = made another attempt, that he should give his statement. It is already = coming to be late. He told me that he is going to give his statement by = the end of the day. Then they waited and waited until 10 p.m. or = something like that. The statement came in my opinion with the worst = delivery, in spite of the fact that it has all the content. But the = delivery was not believable to the people. At that level I was cut from = communication. I could not be part of the decision making anymore. I = waited. I tried to communicate and couldn=E2=80=99t. So I resigned. CAIRO REVIEW: In the speech, he followed the advice? HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes, it followed my advice. But we had an agreement that = the core of his speech should be that he was giving away his authority, = clear cut. This was said in three seconds. If you look somewhere, you = might not even have noticed. The delivery of the speech was not = coinciding with the meaning. He started talking about himself and gave = the impression that he is there. This was a big mistake. He gave his = sharing of the grief of the young people who died. This was a request of = the young people I met and I asked for. He separated between the = revolutionary and the criminal acts. That was a request, that he has to = give it to the people. But at the end of the day, if history looks at = the core without the delivery system, then you realize he gave away his = powers, and gave the order for constitutional amendments. So = he=E2=80=99s not needed as a president anymore, only to call for the = referendum. He didn=E2=80=99t say that, he didn=E2=80=99t press on that, = he didn=E2=80=99t give the impression that this was the situation. The = content was there, but the meaning and understanding was not there. CAIRO REVIEW: He was not in denial about what was happening in Tahrir? = He had already dismissed the leader of the party and even Gamal Mubarak. HOSSAM BADRAWI: That was my request, by the way. That was my request. = When he assigned me as secretary general, I said everyone has to resign. = I have to have full authority to reform the party. CAIRO REVIEW: So you think he was trying to remain part of the system, = not to exit? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I think the circle around him was putting him to that = situation. I had the feeling that he really wanted a constitutional = path. And that he=E2=80=99s stepping down anyway, anytime. But again, = the decision and timing is part of the formula. And I think they were = not=E2=80=94his advisors=E2=80=94were not helpful to let him take the = right action at right time. CAIRO REVIEW: Why? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I=E2=80=99m not sure, but probably they were in denial = more than him. CAIRO REVIEW: Why did the president finally resign on the Friday? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I saw it coming. After his speech on Thursday, and what = happened Thursday night and Friday, it was clear that it is the point of = no return. I think he had no choice. CAIRO REVIEW: Did the army go to him and say he had to step down? HOSSAM BADRAWI: All theories are possible. I was cut completely after I = left the president=E2=80=99s house on Thursday. On Thursday evening and = Friday, I was like you, listening to news and seeing it on TV. I was = cut. I was not connected. I tried but I couldn=E2=80=99t. I came on TV = [and resigned]. The only way for me was to give a statement to the BBC = so it becomes public. At the end of the day, the publicity is the = reality. CAIRO REVIEW: Why do you think the revolution happened? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I think the reaction of the police was one of the = factors to create the movement. Because the excessive use of violence = was part of the accumulation of other people to come in. At one level, = the fear has gone. The numbers made it possible for the fear of the = security forces to go away. Everybody underestimated the capacity of the = youth to represent their opinion. There was underestimation of that = capacity by the whole society, even by their parents, who joined them = later. CAIRO REVIEW: What led to January 25? HOSSAM BADRAWI: It was the accumulation. I think it=E2=80=99s the human = integrity and the human rights, more than anything else. It was not = those who do not have employment. It was people with good employment in = the streets. I think it was humiliation. I call it chronic anger, a = chronic state of anger. In medicine, the chronic situation, you get = adapted to the pain until it becomes acute. The acute exacerbation made = all chronic anger come up. Part of it was, in my opinion, the way the = state was dealing with the people, humiliating them in everyday = activities. The relationship of the individuals with the police. They = way you get your services from the state, from the cabinet, from the = public officials. Everything had to do with whether you have a wasta = (connections) or pay a bribe. Everybody was telling their kids, = =E2=80=9CIf a policeman stops you, don=E2=80=99t argue.=E2=80=9D These = situations were elevating the dissatisfaction and anger. Not acute = enough to revolt, but it=E2=80=99s there. Trigged by something, = everybody came together. CAIRO REVIEW: What was the trigger? HOSSAM BADRAWI: The excessive use of violence within the police. Khaled = Said [a young Egyptian killed in police custody in Alexandria in 2010] = was part of it. And the excessive use of violence in Tahrir on the first = day. On the first day everyone was calling for freedom and justice. It = was not about food or unemployment. That was a collective request of = everyone. As they got larger and larger, the line of fear has gone. And = then with the late response, and the little response, objectives went = higher. If on January 25 the president had come out to the people and = said, =E2=80=9CI=E2=80=99m dissolving the government and not running = [for re-election],=E2=80=9D probably everyone was going to be happy. As = you go day after day, and people get hurt and die, and you are not = seeing the leader of the country coming to talk to the people for three = days, this was cumulative bad management of the crisis. It made the = chronic stage into an acute stage. CAIRO REVIEW: Was the =E2=80=9Csuccession issue=E2=80=9D a factor? The = 2010 parliamentary elections? The Gamal Mubarak question? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I add it as a factor to the chronic anger. There were no = clear-cut announcements [about Gamal Mubarak] that people could protest = against. But it created the feeling that something weird was being = cooked. The president should have come clearly and said that he = wasn=E2=80=99t going to run, and that no one from his family was going = to run, to give that kind of satisfaction. The parliamentary election in = 2010 was another important factor. In a meeting after the election, in = the party they were announcing we had the largest victory any party had. = I raised my hand and said, from a limited party point of view, it might = be true. But from a political point of view, I think this is the largest = defeat we=E2=80=99ve had. Because if you do not have opposition in the = parliament, you will have them in the streets. And if it was in my hand, = I would definitely have worked harder for the opposition to have them = represented in the parliament. And I had that conflict with the = administration, because I was sure that playing alone is not in the = benefit of the country. And having the parliament unilaterally ruled was = not going to be accepted by anyone. In spite of the fact that they had = so many proofs that they won fair and square against the Muslim = Brotherhood. It was a disaster and added to the chronic anger. CAIRO REVIEW: What was your assumption about Gamal Mubarak=E2=80=99s = intentions? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I was there for eight years, and this was never = discussed between me and him, never raised as an issue in the party. But = actions give different impressions. I don=E2=80=99t know if there was a = smaller circle talking about that and I wasn=E2=80=99t a part of it. His = presence and his leading of the party and his appearances and visits to = different areas of the country, gave the impression that he=E2=80=99s = politically portraying himself. He never talked about this with me, = maybe with others. I once told him in the party, that the relationship = of the party with the government is not [correct], because if it was = [correct], it should not depend on the president or the son of the = president. It should depend on the dynamics of politicians. There was so = much implementation of policies that we worked out that was not done. = And I cannot make any difference. It is always going back to the = president, whether he gives instructions to the government or not. It is = all a relationship between the government and the president=E2=80=99s = house. CAIRO REVIEW: The NDP is not a real party? HOSSAM BADRAWI: It was a real party, but very centralized. There were = very good people. Excellent policy papers were done with lots of efforts = from intellectuals and politicians, learning from the experiences of = other countries. But that stops here. Whether that was being taken = seriously by the government was something else. CAIRO REVIEW: In the upper levels of the NDP, was it your assumption = that Gamal was being prepared to become president? HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes. It was an assumption, yes. CAIRO REVIEW: Was this ever an issue to raise that this was not a good = idea, and could damage the president and the country? HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes. But sometimes when you say that to the person, he = says =E2=80=9CNo, I=E2=80=99m not intending,=E2=80=9D then the = discussion becomes =E2=80=9CWho said I want to do that?=E2=80=9D And the = president says =E2=80=9CMy son is just helping me.=E2=80=9D The = discussion stops. CAIRO REVIEW: What was going through your mind when you saw the NDP = headquarters being burned? HOSSAM BADRAWI: Actually, I wasn=E2=80=99t only looking at the NDP being = burned, but all police stations being burned down across the country. = And all prisons being opened for prisoners to go away. And the NDP = locations in eleven governorates being burned, and synchronized in the = same way: we get in, steal contents, burn papers, get the hard disks of = the computers. I don=E2=80=99t think this was the revolution in Tahrir. = It was much more organized than that. You have to think that there is a = mastermind. I cannot assume [who is responsible] because I don=E2=80=99t = have any evidence. Don=E2=80=99t tell me people in the streets going for = their dignity and freedom organized that. It cannot be. We have to see = who is going to benefit. The story did not come to the final chapter. So = let=E2=80=99s see who will take power, and then we=E2=80=99ll know = who=E2=80=99s the beneficiary. CAIRO REVIEW: What happens next? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I want a transition to take place in a secular, civil = structure. However, if the parliamentary elections are being held early, = I think Egypt won=E2=80=99t come to a stable situation for a long time. = If we do not give time for parties coming out of the revolution to = establish themselves and be a part of the coming elections, = we=E2=80=99re not giving them equal opportunity with others who are = already structured and ready for those elections. The army has played a = neutral role. I think they=E2=80=99re overwhelmed with responsibility = they are not trained to do. And I believe they would like to pass = authority as fast as possible. But I hope =E2=80=9Cas fast as = possible=E2=80=9D doesn=E2=80=99t affect the right decision. We have = fragmentation now. We need one-and-a-half to two years. CAIRO REVIEW: Would the Muslim Brotherhood win the election? HOSSAM BADRAWI: They would be the only party inside the parliament. The = NDP isn=E2=80=99t there. So other members would be individuals, = independents running without a cover. CAIRO REVIEW: Is the NDP finished? HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I don=E2=80=99t think so, but I think it needs years = to recover with new branding. It used to depend on being a part of the = ruling structure, so it lost its magnet for people who want to become = part of the government. But it is still the only structure that exists = other than the Brotherhood. The NDP will need three or four or five = years of working hard to change the image. There=E2=80=99s a very = negative impression. You have to rebrand. CAIRO REVIEW: Is the political role of the Mubaraks in Egypt now over? HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes, it is. CAIRO REVIEW: Does Gamal Mubarak have any chance to be part of the = rebirth of the NDP? HOSSAM BADRAWI: No. I don=E2=80=99t think he has any role in the future. CAIRO REVIEW: What are your plans? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I=E2=80=99m just listening to people, analyzing, and = giving my fair opinion. I meet with all political sectors. And I think = in the turbulence that exists, people have to wait and see. If there is = a party that can come from down up, I=E2=80=99ll join. CAIRO REVIEW: How has Egypt fundamentally changed? HOSSAM BADRAWI: There is great opportunity for Egypt to move forward = politically. It will affect the economy. I=E2=80=99m an optimistic = person by nature. I see the opportunity there. But there are huge risks. = If we fall into linear thinking that does not accept differences of = opinion=E2=80=94either a military or a conservative religious = one=E2=80=94neither would be best for the country. CAIRO REVIEW: There=E2=80=99s a risk the military might take control = completely? HOSSAM BADRAWI: I don=E2=80=99t know. They are there now. CAIRO REVIEW: You=E2=80=99re worried about the Brotherhood? HOSSAM BADRAWI: My intellectual structure is to be an open person, = respect diversity, and accept differences in opinion. I have nothing = against a woman president, or a Coptic Egyptian president, so long as = it=E2=80=99s through a democratic process. I definitely would like to = see citizenship rights regardless of any religious belief. I see that = that path might not be the path of the Muslim Brotherhood for the time = being. Yet, they have good things to offer. This is the only thing that = makes me worry. I have so many friends in the Muslim Brotherhood, good = people and excellent people. They have good intentions. They should be = part of the political scene, but they shouldn=E2=80=99t impose their = style on me. CAIRO REVIEW: Should the future system hold the former regime = accountable? HOSSAM BADRAWI: That worries me very much, the fact that everything is = being taken now by impressions. The rule of law should be the rule of = law. We cannot accuse any person and accuse and incriminate and judge at = the same time. That=E2=80=99s very scary. I=E2=80=99m afraid of a sort = of McCarthyite attitude, that once you=E2=80=99re different in opinion, = you=E2=80=99ll be taken hostage by the fact you=E2=80=99re different. As = if we are moving from one kind of dictatorship to another kind of = dictatorship. =20 http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails.aspx?aid=3D= 23 *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *********************************************** *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *********************************************** = =20 Massenbach'sRecommendation =20 = Friedrich Merz: Ja zur Wirtschaftsregierung = - Handelsblatt - Friedrich Merz fordert den Schuldenabbau - bef=C3=BCrwortet eine tiefere = politische Integration Europas -=20 Nun also doch: Die europ=C3=A4ische "Wirtschaftsregierung" kommt.=20 Nach mehr als zehn Jahren intensiven Dr=C3=A4ngens scheint die = franz=C3=B6sische Regierung am Ziel ihrer W=C3=BCnsche zu sein, die = W=C3=A4hrungspolitik und die unabh=C3=A4ngige Zentralbank politisch an = die Leine zu nehmen. Alle deutschen Regierungen haben sich seit der = Einf=C3=BChrung der W=C3=A4hrungsunion erfolgreich dagegen gewehrt; in = dieser Woche ist die deutsche Regierung auf den franz=C3=B6sischen Kurs = eingeschwenkt.=20 Nun =C3=A4ndert sich seit dem Ausbruch der Finanzkrise im Herbst 2008 = ohnehin t=C3=A4glich vieles. Der Ausspruch des damaligen Finanzministers = Peer Steinbr=C3=BCck, nach der Krise werde "nichts mehr so sein wie vor = der Krise", hat sich Gott sei Dank nicht in ganzem Umfang bewahrheitet. = In der Finanz- und W=C3=A4hrungspolitik allerdings war die Prognose = weitgehend richtig:=20 Von der politischen Unabh=C3=A4ngigkeit der Zentralbank bleibt genauso = wenig =C3=BCbrig wie von dem Verbot, in der W=C3=A4hrungsunion die = Schulden anderer L=C3=A4nder zu =C3=BCbernehmen. Klare Regeln des = EU-Vertrages und der Statuten der Zentralbank werden nicht mehr = beachtet. Aus der europ=C3=A4ischen Rechtsgemeinschaft ist eine = Ansammlung von Staaten einer W=C3=A4hrungsunion geworden, die sich nur = darin einig zu sein scheint, dass die einst feierlich versprochenen = Regeln nicht mehr gelten sollen. Europa ist auf der Rutschbahn zur = Transferunion. Es gibt kein Zur=C3=BCck mehr.=20 So widerspr=C3=BCchlich es klingt: Die Beschl=C3=BCsse von Paris = k=C3=B6nnen gleichwohl richtig sein, wenn auch das Kleingedruckte = beachtet wird, und wenn sie den Beginn einer tieferen europ=C3=A4ischen = Integration markieren und nicht allein den n=C3=A4chsten Rettungsversuch = f=C3=BCr den Euro.=20 Bei der Einf=C3=BChrung des Euros war klar, dass eine W=C3=A4hrungsunion = auf Dauer nicht ohne Politische Union funktionieren kann. Diese = Politische Union sollte dem Euro so schnell wie m=C3=B6glich folgen, der = Euro sollte die "Lokomotive" der Integration sein. Alle Beteiligten = wussten damals, dass der Anpassungsdruck auf die Arbeitsm=C3=A4rkte und = auf die nationalen Haushalte in den Euro-Staaten signifikant steigen = w=C3=BCrde. Der Stabilit=C3=A4tspakt sollte wenigstens = Haushaltsdisziplin erzwingen.=20 Aber nachdem Deutschland und Frankreich im Jahr 2003 die Regeln nicht = gegen sich gelten lassen wollten, haben sich auch andere nicht mehr = daran gebunden gef=C3=BChlt.=20 Mit der "Wirtschaftsregierung" wird jetzt der Raum gef=C3=BCllt, der = f=C3=BCr das dauerhafte Gelingen einer gemeinsamen W=C3=A4hrung = verschiedener Staaten zwingend notwendig ist. Die Wirtschaftspolitik = wird angepasst. Vor allem aber: Die ungebremste Verschuldung der = Mitgliedstaaten soll endlich einged=C3=A4mmt werden. Hier setzen die = beiden Regierungen an der richtigen Stelle an, an der Ursache der Krise. = Nat=C3=BCrlich haben Banken spekuliert und gezockt. Aber die Banken sind = nicht der Ausl=C3=B6ser. Die hemmungslose Staatsverschuldung in Amerika = und Europa, die Abh=C3=A4ngigkeit der Staatsfinanzierung von den = Kapitalm=C3=A4rkten und langanhaltende, niedrige Zinsen haben den = Teufelskreis in Gang gesetzt. Wie bei einem Alkoholiker sind erst = Gew=C3=B6hnungseffekte eingetreten, und dann musste Jahr f=C3=BCr Jahr = die Dosis erh=C3=B6ht werden. Jetzt muss der Patient auf Entzug gesetzt = werden.=20 Ob das gelingt, ist alles andere als gewiss. Auf jeden Fall m=C3=BCssen = weitere Schritte folgen. Warum muss die deutsche Bundesregierung auch im = Jahr 2012 noch 27 Milliarden Euro neue Schulden machen? Welcher Teufel = reitet einige Politiker der Koalition in dieser Lage, immer noch weitere = Ausgaben - zum Beispiel f=C3=BCr die Pflegeversicherung - auf Kosten des = Staatshaushaltes zu verlangen?=20 Und ist den Beteiligten, vor allem den nationalen Parlamenten, = eigentlich klar, dass die Euro-Staaten vor dem vermutlich = gr=C3=B6=C3=9Ften Kompetenztransfer auf die europ=C3=A4ische Ebene = stehen, den es je gegeben hat, gr=C3=B6=C3=9Fer noch als bei der = Einf=C3=BChrung des Euros selbst?=20 Europa ist eine Geschichte von gro=C3=9Fen Erfolgen und manchen = R=C3=BCckschl=C3=A4gen. Die gr=C3=B6=C3=9Ften Fortschritte gab es immer = nach gro=C3=9Fen Krisen. Wenn aus dieser Krise f=C3=BCr Europa eine = Chance werden soll, dann stehen die Staats- und Regierungschefs neben = allen tats=C3=A4chlichen Schwierigkeiten vor allem vor einer gro=C3=9Fen = kommunikativen Aufgabe. Bev=C3=B6lkerung und Parlamente m=C3=BCssen von = einem extrem schwierigen Prozess =C3=BCberzeugt werden, der zugleich in = einem Umfeld stark steigenden Wettbewerbsdrucks aus anderen Teilen der = Welt steht. Gelingen wird dies am Ende nur, wenn in einem = parlamentarischen Prozess auch die notwendigen Rechtsgrundlagen = daf=C3=BCr geschaffen werden, an die sich die Regierungen in Zukunft = dann auch halten.=20 Das war einmal der gr=C3=B6=C3=9Fte zivilisatorische Fortschritt in = Europa.=20 Der Autor ist Anwalt und war Chef der Unionsfraktion im Bundestag.=20 Sie erreichen ihn unter:=20 gastautor@handelsblatt.com=20 Merz, Friedrich=20 Handelsblatt Nr. 159 vom 18.08.2011 Seite 56=20 *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= **************************************** *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= **************************************** Israeli-Arab = Crisis Approaching By George Friedman In September, the U.N. General Assembly will vote on whether to = recognize Palestine as an independent and sovereign state with full = rights in the United Nations. In many ways, this would appear to be a = reasonable and logical step. Whatever the Palestinians once were, they = are clearly a nation in the simplest and most important sense =E2=80=94 = namely, they think of themselves as a nation. Nations are created by = historical circumstances, and those circumstances have given rise to a = Palestinian nation. Under the principle of the United Nations and the = theory of the right to national self-determination, which is the moral = foundation of the modern theory of nationalism, a nation has a right to = a state, and that state has a place in the family of nations. In this = sense, the U.N. vote will be unexceptional. However, when the United Nations votes on Palestinian statehood, it will = intersect with other realities and other historical processes. First, it = is one thing to declare a Palestinian state; it is quite another thing = to create one. The Palestinians are deeply divided between two views of = what the Palestinian nation ought to be, a division not easily overcome. = Second, this vote will come at a time when two of Israel=E2=80=99s = neighbors are coping with their own internal issues. Syria is in chaos, = with an extended and significant resistance against the regime having = emerged. Meanwhile, Egypt is struggling with internal tension over the = fall of President Hosni Mubarak and the future of the military junta = that replaced him. Add to this the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the = potential rise of Iranian power, and the potential recognition of a = Palestinian state =E2=80=94 while perfectly logical in an abstract sense = =E2=80=94 becomes an event that can force a regional crisis in the midst = of ongoing regional crises. It thus is a vote that could have = significant consequences. The Palestinian Divide Let=E2=80=99s begin with the issue not of the right of a nation to have = a state but of the nature of a Palestinian state under current = circumstances. The Palestinians are split into two major factions. The = first, Fatah, dominates the West Bank. Fatah derives its ideology from = the older, secular Pan-Arab movement. Historically, Fatah saw the = Palestinians as a state within the Arab nation. The second, Hamas, = dominates Gaza. Unlike Fatah, it sees the Palestinians as forming part = of a broader Islamist uprising, one in which Hamas is the dominant = Islamist force of the Palestinian people. The Pan-Arab rising is moribund. Where it once threatened the existence = of Muslim states, like the Arab monarchies, it is now itself threatened. = Mubarak, Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Libyan leader Moammar = Gadhafi all represented the old Pan-Arab vision. A much better way to = understand the =E2=80=9CArab Spring=E2=80=9D is that it represented the = decay of such regimes that were vibrant when they came to power in the = late 1960s and early 1970s but have fallen into ideological = meaninglessness. Fatah is part of this grouping, and while it still = speaks for Palestinian nationalism as a secular movement, beyond that it = is isolated from broader trends in the region. It is both at odds with = rising religiosity and simultaneously mistrusted by the monarchies it = tried to overthrow. Yet it controls the Palestinian proto-state, the = Palestinian National Authority, and thus will be claiming a U.N. vote on = Palestinian statehood. Hamas, on the other hand, is very much = representative of current trends in the Islamic world and holds = significant popular support, yet it is not clear that it holds a = majority position in the Palestinian nation. All nations have ideological divisions, but the Palestinians are divided = over the fundamental question of the Palestinian nation=E2=80=99s = identity. Fatah sees itself as part of a secular Arab world that is on = the defensive. Hamas envisions the Palestinian nation as an Islamic = state forming in the context of a region-wide Islamist rising. Neither = is in a position to speak authoritatively for the Palestinian people, = and the things that divide them cut to the heart of the nation. As = important, each has a different view of its future relations with = Israel. Fatah has accepted, in practice, the idea of Israel=E2=80=99s = permanence as a state and the need of the Palestinians to accommodate = themselves to the reality. Hamas has rejected it. The U.N. decision raises the stakes in this debate within the = Palestinian nation that could lead to intense conflict. As vicious as = the battle between Hamas and Fatah has been, an uneasy truce has existed = over recent years. Now, there could emerge an internationally = legitimized state, and control of that state will matter more than ever = before. Whoever controls the state defines what the Palestinians are, = and it becomes increasingly difficult to suspend the argument for a = temporary truce. Rather than settling anything, or putting Israel on the = defensive, the vote will compel a Palestinian crisis. Fatah has an advantage in any vote on Palestinian statehood: It enjoys = far more international support than Hamas does. Europeans and Americans = see it as friendly to their interests and less hostile to Israel. The = Saudis and others may distrust Fatah from past conflicts, but in the end = they fear radical Islamists and Iran and so require American support at = a time when the Americans have tired of playing in what some Americans = call the =E2=80=9Csandbox.=E2=80=9D However reluctantly, while aiding = Hamas, the Saudis are more comfortable with Fatah. And of course, the = embattled Arabist regimes, whatever tactical shifts there may have been, = spring from the same soil as Fatah. While Fatah is the preferred = Palestinian partner for many, Hamas can also use that reality to portray = Fatah as colluding with Israel against the Palestinian people during a = confrontation. For its part, Hamas has the support of Islamists in the region, = including Shiite Iranians, but that is an explosive mix to base a = strategy on. Hamas must break its isolation if it is to counter the = tired but real power of Fatah. Symbolic flotillas from Turkey are = comforting, but Hamas needs an end to Egyptian hostility to Hamas more = than anything. Egypt=E2=80=99s Role and Fatah on the Defensive Egypt is the power that geographically isolates Hamas through its treaty = with Israel and with its still-functional blockade on Gaza. More than = anyone, Hamas needs genuine regime change in Egypt. The new regime it = needs is not a liberal democracy but one in which Islamist forces = supportive of Hamas, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, come to power. At the moment, that is not likely. Egypt=E2=80=99s military has retained = a remarkable degree of control, its opposition groups are divided = between secular and religious elements, and the religious elements are = further divided among themselves =E2=80=94 as well as penetrated by an = Egyptian security apparatus that has made war on them for years. As it = stands, Egypt is not likely to evolve in a direction favorable to Hamas. = Therefore, Hamas needs to redefine the political situation in Egypt to = convert a powerful enemy into a powerful friend. Though it is not easy for a small movement to redefine a large nation, = in this case, it could perhaps happen. There is a broad sense of = unhappiness in Egypt over Egypt=E2=80=99s treaty with Israel, an issue = that comes to the fore when Israel and the Palestinians are fighting. As = in other Arab countries, passions surge in Egypt when the Palestinians = are fighting the Israelis. Under Mubarak, these passions were readily contained in Egypt. Now the = Egyptian regime unquestionably is vulnerable, and pro-Palestinian = feelings cut across most, if not all, opposition groups. It is a = singular, unifying force that might suffice to break the = military=E2=80=99s power, or at least to force the military to shift its = Israeli policy. Hamas in conflict with Israel as the United Nations votes for a = Palestinian state also places Fatah on the political defensive among the = Palestinians. Fatah cooperation with Israel while Gaza is at war would = undermine Fatah, possibly pushing Fatah to align with Hamas. Having the = U.N. vote take place while Gaza is at war, a vote possibly accompanied = by General Assembly condemnation of Israel, could redefine the region. Last week=E2=80=99s attack on the Eilat road should be understood in = this context. Some are hypothesizing that new Islamist groups forming in = the Sinai or Palestinian groups in Gaza operating outside Hamas=E2=80=99 = control carried out the attack. But while such organizations might = formally be separate from Hamas, I find it difficult to believe that = Hamas, with an excellent intelligence service inside Gaza and among the = Islamist groups in the Sinai, would not at least have known these = groups=E2=80=99 broad intentions and would not have been in a position = to stop them. Just as Fatah created Black September in the 1970s, a = group that appeared separate from Fatah but was in fact covertly part of = it, the strategy of creating new organizations to take the blame for = conflicts is an old tactic both for the Palestinians and throughout the = world. Hamas=E2=80=99 ideal attack would offer it plausible deniability = =E2=80=94 allowing it to argue it did not even know an attack was = imminent, much less carry it out =E2=80=94 and trigger an Israeli attack = on Gaza. Such a scenario casts Israel as the aggressor and Hamas as the = victim, permitting Hamas to frame the war to maximum effect in Egypt and = among the Palestinians, as well as in the wider Islamic world and in = Europe. Regional Implications and Israel=E2=80=99s Dilemma The matter goes beyond Hamas. The Syrian regime is currently fighting = for its life against its majority Sunni population. It has survived thus = far, but it needs to redefine the conflict. The Iranians and Hezbollah = are among those most concerned with the fall of the Syrian regime. Syria = has been Iran=E2=80=99s one significant ally, one strategically = positioned to enhance Iranian influence in the Levant. Its fall would be = a strategic setback for Iran at a time when Tehran is looking to enhance = its position with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Iran, which sees the = uprising as engineered by its enemies =E2=80=94 the United States, Saudi = Arabia and Turkey =E2=80=94 understandably wants al Assad to survive. Meanwhile, the fall of Syria would leave Hezbollah =E2=80=94 which is = highly dependent on the current Syrian regime and is in large part an = extension of Syrian policy in Lebanon =E2=80=94 wholly dependent on = Iran. And Iran without its Syrian ally is very far away from Hezbollah. = Like Tehran, Hezbollah thus also wants al Assad to survive. Hezbollah = joining Hamas in a confrontation with Israel would take the focus off = the al Assad regime and portray his opponents as undermining resistance = to Israel. Joining a war with Israel also would make it easier for = Hezbollah to weather the fall of al Assad should his opponents prevail. = It would help Hezbollah create a moral foundation for itself independent = of Syria. Hezbollah=E2=80=99s ability to force a draw with Israel in = 2006 constituted a victory for the radical Islamist group that increased = its credibility dramatically. The 2006 military confrontation was also a victory for Damascus, as it = showed the Islamic world that Syria was the only nation-state supporting = effective resistance to Israel. It also showed Israel and the United = States that Syria alone could control Hezbollah and that forcing Syria = out of Lebanon was a strategic error on the part of Israel and the = United States. Faced with this dynamic, it will be difficult for Fatah to maintain its = relationship with Israel. Indeed, Fatah could be forced to initiate an = intifada, something it would greatly prefer to avoid, as this would = undermine what economic development the West Bank has experienced. Israel therefore conceivably could face conflict in Gaza, a conflict = along the Lebanese border and a rising in the West Bank, something it = clearly knows. In a rare move, Israel announced plans to call up = reserves in September. Though preannouncements of such things are not = common, Israel wants to signal resolution. Israel has two strategies in the face of the potential storm. One is a = devastating attack on Gaza followed by rotating forces to the north to = deal with Hezbollah and intense suppression of an intifada. Dealing with = Gaza fast and hard is the key if the intention is to abort the evolution = I laid out. But the problem here is that the three-front scenario I laid = out is simply a possibility; there is no certainty here. If Israel = initiates conflict in Gaza and fails, it risks making a possibility into = a certainty =E2=80=94 and Israel has not had many stunning victories for = several decades. It could also create a crisis for Egypt=E2=80=99s = military rulers, not something the Israelis want. Israel also simply could absorb the attacks from Hamas to make Israel = appear the victim. But seeking sympathy is not likely to work given how = Palestinians have managed to shape global opinion. Moreover, we would = expect Hamas to repeat its attacks to the point that Israel no longer = could decline combat. War thus benefits Hamas (even if Hamas maintains plausible deniability = by having others commit the attacks), a war Hezbollah has good reason to = enter at such a stage and that Fatah does not want but could be forced = into. Such a war could shift the Egyptian dynamic significantly to = Hamas=E2=80=99 advantage, while Iran would certainly want al-Assad to be = able to say to Syrians that a war with Israel is no time for a civil war = in Syria. Israel would thus find itself fighting three battles = simultaneously. The only way to do that is to be intensely aggressive, = making moderation strategically difficult. Israel responded modestly compared to the past after the Eilat incident, = mounting only limited attacks on Gaza against mostly members of the = Palestinian Resistance Committees, an umbrella group known to have links = with Hamas. Nevertheless, Hamas has made clear that its de facto truce = with Israel was no longer assured. The issue now is what Hamas is = prepared to do and whether Hamas supporters, Saudi Arabia in particular, = can force them to control anti-Israeli activities in the region. The = Saudis want al Assad to fall, and they do not want a radical regime in = Egypt. Above all, they do not want Iran=E2=80=99s hand strengthened. But = it is never clear how much influence the Saudis or Egyptians have over = Hamas. For Hamas, this is emerging as the perfect moment, and it is hard = to believe that even the Saudis can restrain them. As for the Israelis, = what will happen depends on what others decide =E2=80=94 which is the = fundamental strategic problem that Israel has. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110822-israeli-arab-crisis-approaching?u= tm_source=3Dfreelist-f&utm_medium=3Demail&utm_campaign=3D20110823&utm_ter= m=3Dgweekly&utm_content=3Dreadmore&elq=3Dbe4fb20dde5e40f8a84b7174f2e13968= =20 *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************** *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************** see our letter on: http://www.massenbach-world.de/41259.html Wir w=C3=BCnschen Ihnen ein angenehmes Wochenende. Ihr Team. *************************************************************************= **************************************** Udo von Massenbach - B=C3=A4rbel Freudenberg-Pilster - J=C3=B6rg = Barandat =20 UdovonMassenbach@t-online.de Mail@Freudenberg-Pilster.de =20 JoergBarandat@yahoo.de ------=_NextPart_000_08F4_01CC6312.46A8A3C0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Guten Morgen.
 
 
 
          &nbs= p;            = ;            = =20
 
Massenbach  =20          &nb= sp;    =20 zeitonline: Westerwelle verh=C3=B6hnt = das libysche=20 Volk
 
=
Der Au=C3=9Fenminister lobt sich f=C3=BCr seine = Libyen-Politik:=20
Deutschland habe einen wichtigen Beitrag = geleistet, um=20 Gadhafi loszuwerden.
Das ist zynisch. Ein=20 Kommentar
 
Deutschland hat sich daran = gew=C3=B6hnt, ohne=20 Au=C3=9Fenminister auszukommen. Was unbedingt an Au=C3=9Fenpolitik = n=C3=B6tig ist, erledigen=20 das Kanzleramt und das Verteidigungsministerium. Auch im Ausland hat man = sich=20 darin eingerichtet, in Fragen internationaler Politik ohne Deutschland=20 auszukommen. Es geht, das hat zuletzt der Libyen-Einsatz der Nato = gezeigt, auch=20 ganz gut ohne die Deutschen.

ge
Von=20 dieser Erkenntnis ist der Mann weit entfernt, der qua Amt zust=C3=A4ndig = ist f=C3=BCr=20 Deutschlands Au=C3=9Fenpolitik. Seit Montag l=C3=A4sst Guido Westerwelle = keine Gelegenheit aus, die=20 vermeintlichen deutschen Verdienste am nahen Sieg der libyschen Rebellen = hervorzuheben. Zufrieden stellte er fest: "Deutschland hat einen = wichtigen=20 Beitrag geleistet." Die Sanktionspolitik der Bundesregierung "war=20 augenscheinlich erfolgreich", verk=C3=BCndete er im Deutschlandfunk =E2=80=93 und macht noch einen weiteren Faktor aus, der = Libyens=20 Freiheitsk=C3=A4mpfern ma=C3=9Fgeblich geholfen habe: Deutschland habe = "schon fr=C3=BCher als=20 viele andere, sich klar gegen das Unrechtsregime von Gadhafi=20 gestellt."

Das ist=20 nicht nur unbeholfen, es ist zynisch. Denn in Wahrheit hat die = Bundesregierung=20 dem libyschen Volk nicht nur nicht geholfen, als es von Gadhafis = Soldaten aus=20 Panzern und Flugzeugen beschossen wurde. Sondern sie hat ihm = damals vor einem=20 halben Jahr auch = ziemlich explizit=20 mitgeteilt, wie gleichg=C3=BCltig ihr sein Schicksal = ist.

Es geht wohlgemerkt nicht darum, = dass=20 Deutschland keine Soldaten f=C3=BCr die Libyen-Mission der Nato zur = Verf=C3=BCgung stellen=20 wollte. Jedes Land kann und muss souver=C3=A4n und frei entscheiden, ob = es die letzte=20 aller M=C3=B6glichkeiten w=C3=A4hlt oder nicht, um einen Konflikt zu = l=C3=B6sen.

Im M=C3=A4rz 2011, als =C3=BCber = den Einsatz der Nato in=20 Libyen diskutiert wurde, waren jedoch deutsche Soldaten und ihr Einsatz = gar=20 nicht das Thema, auch wenn der Au=C3=9Fenminister das gern so darstellt. = Niemand=20 forderte von Deutschland damals eine Beteiligung. In den USA, in = Gro=C3=9Fbritannien=20 und Frankreich kennt man die deutschen Befindlichkeiten bei = Milit=C3=A4reins=C3=A4tzen.=20 Und seit dem Afghanistan-Mandat wei=C3=9F man auch um die = beschr=C3=A4nkten M=C3=B6glichkeiten=20 der Bundeswehr.

Damals ging es schlicht darum, = die=20 Internationale Gemeinschaft mit einem UN-Mandat auszustatten, auf dessen = Grundlage ein wild gewordenes Regime daran gehindert werden konnte, mit=20 Milit=C3=A4rgewalt gegen Demonstranten vorzugehen. Diesem Mandat hat die = Bundesregierung im UN-Sicherheitsrat die Zustimmung versagt. Sie hat = diesen=20 Einsatz, der Zivilisten sch=C3=BCtzen sollte, vor aller Welt = missbilligt.

Um so schlimmer ist es deshalb, = wie=20 Westerwelle jetzt agiert, da der Sieg der Rebellen in Sichtweite ist. = Mit seiner=20 Selbstgerechtigkeit verh=C3=B6hnt er das libysche Volk. Denn jeder dort = wei=C3=9F, was=20 passiert w=C3=A4re, wenn man Gadhafis Luftwaffe nicht ausgeschaltet = h=C3=A4tte. Der=20 Diktator h=C3=A4tte die Befreiungs-bewegung=20 schlicht weggebombt.

Deutschland befindet sich auf = einem=20 au=C3=9Fenpolitischen Sonderweg. Das w=C3=A4re grunds=C3=A4tzlich nicht = so furchtbar schlimm,=20 w=C3=BCrde das Land innerhalb dieses Sonderstatus' besondere Kompetenzen = entwickeln.=20 Denn im Br=C3=BCsseler Nato-Hauptquartier fehlt eine F=C3=A4higkeit ganz = besonders,=20 n=C3=A4mlich: nach einem bewaffneten Konflikt nachhaltige, staatliche = Strukturen=20 aufbauen zu k=C3=B6nnen.

Westerwelle glaubt, Deutschland = k=C3=B6nne das=20 schon l=C3=A4ngst, doch er irrt. Die Zust=C3=A4nde im Kosovo und in = Afghanistan belegen=20 es. Um eine zerstrittene und zersplitterte Gesellschaft zu einer Nation = zu=20 formen, ist mehr n=C3=B6tig, als Geld zur Verf=C3=BCgung zu stellen, ein = paar Br=C3=BCcken zu=20 bauen und Polizisten nach deutschen Ma=C3=9Fst=C3=A4ben auszubilden. = Beim state=20 building k=C3=B6nnte Deutschland vorangehen. Dazu allerdings = bed=C3=BCrfte es eines=20 Au=C3=9Fenministers.

http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2011-08/westerwelle-libyen
****************************************************************= ****************************<= /DIV>
          &nbs= p;            = ;          =20 Asia Times: Bills paid, Iran's oil ships again to = India
 
MONTREAL - India, which imports almost two-thirds of the oil = it=20 consumes, has resolved a payments problem that put at risk purchases = from=20 sanctions-bound Iran, one of its top two suppliers, according to Indian = Finance=20 Minister Pranab Mukherjee. Iran this week confirmed that payments were = being=20 received.

Payments to Iran via the Reserve Bank of India through = a=20 regional clearing-house mechanism were halted at the end of 2010 in = response to=20 United States pressure. The US maintains sanctions on Iran through the = Iran=20 Sanctions Act (formerly the "Iran and Libya Sanctions Act", or ILSA), = beyond the=20 several sets of sanctions that the United Nations Security Council has = imposed=20 since 2006 in connection with Tehran's failure to cooperate adequately = with the=20 International Atomic Energy Agency over its nuclear program.

"We = had=20 some problem with regard to making payment for the oil
bill to Iran, but [the] problem has been sorted out. Regular = payment is=20 taking place now," Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee said in the Lok = Sabha=20 (lower house) this month, the Press Trust of India reported. =

Iran=20 supplies about 18% of India's oil imports, just behind Saudi Arabia with = a=20 similar amount. Almost two-thirds of the roughly 2.2 million bpd that = India=20 imports comes from the broader Middle East, other suppliers being = Kuwait, Iraq=20 and the United Arab Emirates at 8-10% each. India is projected to = consume 3.3=20 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil in 2011, but produced only 28% of = that=20 amount in 2009 (the last year for which complete statistics are = available).=20

Under the new payments system, funds will be routed through = Halkbank, a=20 Turkish state-owned bank. The European Union as well as Australia, = Canada,=20 Israel, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland and even India itself have all=20 instituted different limited bans on various sorts of trade and/or = financial=20 dealings with Iran.

Mukherjee rejected suggestions that Iran had = threatened to stop oil supplies to India. "I would like to dispel this=20 impression that Iran has threatened to stop supplying oil to India," he = told=20 parliament. "It may be [a] report of some newspaper, but officially Iran = has=20 never told us that it is going to stop the supply."

Iran halted = oil=20 supplies to India on August 1 due to continued overdue payments, Fars = News=20 Agency (FNA) reported on August 15. Mangalore refinery is the only = Indian=20 refinery that has received Iranian oil this month, an oil official told = FNA.=20

Mukherjee acknowledged that some bills remained outstanding, = "which in=20 the course of time we would like to clear by making the payment". =

Iran=20 warned this week that Indian companies receiving oil from Iran would not = begin=20 receiving new supplies until their payments had been completed for past=20 deliveries. "Those Indian oil refineries which have not settled their = accounts=20 are unlikely to receive any Iranian crude supply in the next few = months," FNA=20 reported on Monday, citing an unnamed oil official.

Seyed Mohsen = Qamsarri, the National Iranian Oil Company's international affairs = manager, told=20 FNA that all Indian refineries had started paying their debts and that = more than=20 one million euro (US$1.4 million) had been received so far. =

There is=20 speculation that the US will pressure Turkey to close the Halkbank = window to=20 Iran, as it pressured the Reserve Bank of India before. However, there = is good=20 reason to suppose that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is = pleased at=20 the opportunity that this presents to install another instrument of = potential=20 control over Teheran, in light of the growing antagonism between the two = countries at the level of regional geopolitics.

New Delhi = consumes=20 almost four times as much energy in crude oil and oil products as it = does in=20 natural gas. India's OVL, the overseas investment arm of the state-owned = Oil and=20 Natural Gas Corp, is active in a host of countries including Brazil, = Columbia,=20 Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, Russia and Sudan.

Recently it has also = signed=20 contracts with Kazakhstan and Indonesia. (See Astana = builds=20 energy depth, Asia Times Online, December 17, 2010; India-Indo= nesia=20 links deepen, Asia Times Online, January 28, 2011.)

However, = oil and=20 gas together represent less than one-third of the country's total energy = consumption. Coal and peat still account for 42% of total energy = consumption,=20 with combustible renewables and waste another 26%. Consequently, the = country is=20 doing its utmost to promote natural gas and, since 2004, has been = importing=20 liquefied natural gas (LNG), mostly from Qatar.

It is = cooperating on the=20 TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline project, which = it chose=20 as against the IPI (Iran-Pakistan-India) pipeline project.

That = choice=20 was mainly a result of unrealistic contract proposals from the Iranian = side (for=20 example, the insistence on paying LNG prices for gas received overland = through a=20 pipe) and fatigue at the behavior of negotiators from Teheran, which = continually=20 sought to reopen chapters of the contract already closed and treated = agreed=20 conditions as points for continued bargaining.

Indeed, sanctions = are not=20 the main reason why Iran has difficulty finding partners for cooperation = or why=20 the country has suffered from economic maldevelopment for the past 30 = years.=20 There is little evidence that any US administration has ever prosecuted = any=20 foreign or domestic person or company for trading with Iran. This = includes many=20 Iranian expatriates living in the US who make investments back home.=20

Indeed, during the first decade of this century, the US Treasury = Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control is reported to have = approved=20 almost 10,000 exceptions to US sanctions rules.

Iran's problems = are,=20 rather, made in Tehran. The regime has never been able to overcome the = economic,=20 political and bureaucratic obstacles to rational and reliable = decision-making=20 that were first put in place following the overthrow of the shah in = 1979. First=20 and foremost among them is the devaluation of technical expertise in = favor of=20 ideological purity. Organizationally speaking, the religious leaders = designated=20 to oversee the various ministries play precisely the same role that = political=20 commissars played in Russia after the Bolshevik revolution. =

Despite=20 attempts to decentralize oil and gas decision-making since the late = 1990s, the=20 system is still in thrall to factional infighting and political = cronyism; if=20 anything, the situation has got worse. Information is compartmentalized = and=20 restricted, and there is no guarantee that one part of the state = bureaucracy=20 will execute an agreement made by another part of the bureaucracy. = Political=20 obstructionism and economic irrationality are endemic to the Iranian = state=20 apparatus, irrespective of international conditions.

In = addition, Iran's=20 constitution specifically forbids foreign entities from owning Iranian = entities=20 or resources. Consequently, international energy companies are reduced = to=20 concluding elaborate buy-back agreements that provide neither decent = rates of=20 return nor any incentives to exceed production targets.

Finally, = Iran's=20 constitution also forbids its government from recognizing any = jurisdiction by=20 international tribunals. In the absence of recourse to international = arbitration=20 tribunals, therefore, foreign entities are limited to Iranian courts for = the=20 settlement of contract disputes.

Dr Robert M = Cutler (http://www.robertcutler.org), = educated=20 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The University of = Michigan, has=20 researched and taught at universities in the United States, Canada, = France,=20 Switzerland, and Russia. Now senior research fellow in the Institute of=20 European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, Canada, he = also=20 consults privately in a variety of fields. =20
 
 
***************************************************************= ****************************************************
US bans Syrian oil, sanctions 5 energy=20 firms
 

WASHINGTON, Aug 18, 2011 (AFP) - The United = States on=20 Thursday banned Syrian oil imports and sanctioned five Syrian energy = companies=20 as Washington ratcheted up pressure to push Syrian President Bashar = al-Assad to=20 step down.

President Barack Obama ordered the energy = sanctions to=20 "directly" target Syria's petroleum exports, "a significant source of = government=20 revenue," the Treasury Department said in a statement.

The sanctions ban the importation into the = United States=20 of Syrian-origin petroleum or petroleum products, the department = said.=20

The Obama order also prohibit US persons, = wherever they=20 are located, from engaging in any transactions or dealings in or related = to=20 Syrian-origin oil, it said. Sanctions were=20 slapped on five Syrian government companies: General Petroleum = Corporation,=20 Syrian Company for Oil Transport, Syrian Gas Company, Syrian Petroleum = Company,=20 and Sytrol.=20

http://www.zawya.com/story.cfm/sidANA20110818T141212ZEMY71/lok1412= 29110818/US_Bans_Syrian_Oil_Sanctions_5_Energy_Firms?&zawyaemailmarke= ting=20 Oil Syrian oil exploration = first began in=20 1933 during the French = Mandate and the first commercial discovery was in 1956.[8] The = industry took=20 off in 1968, when Syria's first commercial oil field began production, = although=20 Syria did not begin exporting oil until the mid-1980s.[9] Syria = is a=20 relatively small oil producer, accounting for just 0.5 percent of the = global=20 production in 2010.[10][11] = Although Syria is=20 not a = major oil=20 exporter by Middle Eastern = standards, oil is=20 a major pillar of the economy. According to the International=20 Monetary Fund, oil sales for 2010 were projected to = generate $3.2=20 billion for the Syrian government and account for 25.1% of the state's=20 revenue.[12]

Syria is the only = significant crude=20 oil producing country in the Eastern Mediterranean region, which = includes=20 Jordan, Lebanon, Israel, the West = Bank, and Gaza. According to the Oil and Gas Journal, Syria had 2.5 = billion barrels=20 of petroleum reserves as of January 1, 2010.[13] Syria's = known oil=20 reserves are mainly in the eastern part of the country in the Deir = ez-Zor=20 Governorate near its border with = Iraq=20 and along the Euphrates = River; a number of smaller fields are located in the center of = the=20 country.[8] In = 2010, Syria=20 produced around 385,000 barrels per day (bbl/d) of crude oil.[11][12] Oil = production=20 has stabilized after falling for a number of years, and is poised to = turn around=20 as new fields come on line. In 2008, Syria produced 213 billion cubic = feet (Bcf)=20 of natural gas, and is expected to double its gas production by the end = of 2010.=20 While much of its oil is exported to Europe, Syria's natural gas is used = in=20 reinjection for enhanced oil=20 recovery and for domestic electricity = generation.[13]

In 2009, Syria=E2=80=99s = net=20 petroleum=20 exports were estimated to be = 148,000 bbl/d.=20 All oil exports are marketed by Sytrol, Syria=E2=80=99s state oil = marketing firm, which=20 sells most of its volumes under 12-month contracts. Syrian crude oil = exports go=20 mostly to OECD European=20 countries, in particular Germany, Italy, and France, totaling an estimated 143,000 bbl/d in 2009, according to = International=20 Energy Agency (IEA) data.[13]

The oil sector of the = economy faces=20 many challenges, such as a decline in output and production resulting = from=20 technological problems and a depletion of oil reserves. Syria's rate of = oil=20 production has decreased steadily, from a peak close to 610,000 barrels = per day=20 (bpd) in 1995 down to approximately 379,000 bpd in 2008. Meanwhile, = consumption=20 is rising, which means that Syria could become a net oil importer within = a=20 decade.[9] To = counteract=20 this problem, Syria has intensified oil exploration efforts. = Syria=E2=80=99s upstream=20 oil production and development has traditionally been the mandate of the = Syrian Petroleum=20 Company=20 (SPC), an arm of the Syrian Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. = The SPC=20 has undertaken efforts to reverse the trend toward declining oil = production and=20 exports by increasing oil exploration and production in partnership with = foreign=20 oil companies. The SPC directly controls about half of the country's oil = production and takes a 50 percent stake in development work with foreign = partners.[13]

Foreign=20 investment is vital for improving production levels. The main foreign = producing=20 consortium is the Al-Furat Petroleum Company, a joint venture = established in=20 1985, which currently includes the SPC at 50 percent ownership, = Royal Dutch=20 Shell at 32 percent, and the = remainder held=20 by Himalaya Energy Syria, a consortium of China = National=20 Petroleum Company and India's Oil = and Natural Gas=20 Corporation.[13] Another = important=20 consortium is Deir Ez Zor Petroleum Company, owned by SPC and France's Total. Shell has one of the oldest relationships with Syria, = dating back=20 to 1949. Total formed its Syrian operation in 1988. Other international = players=20 include: Petro = Canada, UK's Gulfsands, US-Eygptian firm IPR, Poland's Kulczyk, Croatia's = INA, Russia's = Stroytransgas, and Triton Singapore.[8]

Another option to handle = the increase=20 in domestic oil consumption is to switch electric power plants from = oil-fired to=20 natural gas-fired. Proven natural gas reserves, approximately = three-quarters of=20 which are owned by the Syrian Petroleum Company, were estimated at 9.1 = trillion=20 cubic feet in 2010.[14] The = primary=20 challenge for the natural gas industry is logistics: reserves are = located mainly=20 in northeastern Syria, whereas the population is concentrated in the = west and=20 south.[15]

Although Syria produces = relatively=20 modest quantities of oil and gas, its location is strategic in terms of = regional=20 security and prospective energy transit routes. Regional integration in = the=20 energy sector is expected to increase as a result of the 2008 opening of = the=20 Syrian link of the Arab Gas=20 Pipeline and ongoing plans for the = expansion=20 of the pipeline network to include neighboring countries Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.[13]

http://en.wikipedi= a.org/wiki/Economy_of_Syria

 

************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *****************************************************
************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *****************************************************
 
<= /TR>
 3D"B=C3=A4rbel<= /STRONG>Freudenberg=20
 
          &n= bsp;           &nb= sp;           &nbs= p;         =20 China losing Asian popularity contest
By Jian Junbo
 
LONDON - Though China purses a "good neighbor policy" in = Asia, it=20 faces increasing criticism from regional officials, media and = populations. It=20 seems the time is ripe for Beijing to review and improve its Asia = strategy.=20

The latest challenge came from Japan. On August 10, chief = cabinet=20 secretary Yukio Edano said Japan would dispatch its Self-Defense Forces = should a=20 foreign country invade the (disputed) Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu = islands by=20 China). "If other countries invade the islands, [Japan will] invoke the = right of=20 self-defense and remove them by making any sacrifice," Edano said in = Tokyo,=20 apparently referring to China's naval activities in the region. =
Edano made=20 the remarks after the publication of the 2011 Japan Defense White=20 Paper, which had been approved by Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan's = cabinet a=20 week earlier. That paper described China's stance in its maritime = territorial=20 disputes with its neighbors as "assertive".

"Given the = modernization of=20 China's naval and air forces in recent years, its sphere of influence is = likely=20 to grow beyond its neighboring waters =E2=80=A6 It is expected that = China will try to=20 keep expanding the area of activities, and to make naval activities a = routine=20 practice in waters surrounding Japan including the East China Sea and = the=20 Pacific Ocean, as well as in the South China Sea."

China = described the=20 paper as "irresponsible", rejecting the suggestion that its ongoing = military=20 modernization would impact on its regional neighbors.

Before the = Japanese paper, the Philippines dispatched five congressmen and some = military=20 officials to Zhongye Island (called Pagasa Island by the Philippines) on = June=20 20. As these officials landed on the disputed island - some singing the = national=20 anthem with Filipino residents - China's foreign minister was at an = Association=20 of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) forum in Bali, Indonesia, seeking = ways to=20 ease tensions in the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, territorial = disputes in=20 those waters have fueled incessant street protests in Vietnam over the = past few=20 months against a so-called "Chinese invasion".

Criticism has = even come=20 from Singapore, which has no territorial disputes with China and is = considered=20 to have a friendlier stance in Southeast Asia. Earlier this year, senior = statesman Lee Kuan Yew said he would like the United States rather than = China as=20 a hegemon in Asia, because he saw the US as more benevolent. =

Around the=20 region, anti-Chinese rhetoric can often be found in government = officials'=20 speeches and media commentaries.

No other big power like the US, = the=20 European Union or even India is subject to so many unfriendly or hostile = accusations from its neighbors. Such remarks don't reflect well on = China's=20 efforts to build and enhance friendly relations with its neighbors under = its=20 "good neighbor policy" policy.

The diplomatic policy is based on = four=20 strategic principles: big powers are key partners, neighboring countries = are=20 primary partners, developing countries are the foundation of China's = diplomacy=20 and multilateral institutions are important platforms.

In order = to=20 implement the strategy of making neighboring countries primary partners, = Beijing=20 adheres to the principles of "dealing with neighboring countries as = partners and=20 treating them with goodwill" and of "building an amicable, tranquil and=20 prosperous neighborhood".

In April at the Bo'ao Asia Forum, a = regional=20 platform for economic integration, Chinese President Hu Jintao said that = to=20 build a harmonious Asia, countries needed to respect the diversity of=20 civilizations and promote neighborly relations.

"We need to = transform=20 the development pattern and promote all-round development ... We need to = share=20 development opportunities and meet challenges together ... We need to = seek=20 common ground while shelving difference and enhancing common security = ... We=20 need to champion mutual benefit and deepen regional cooperation," said = Hu.=20

Under its "good neighbors policy", Beijing naturally considers = improving=20 relations with ASEAN an important strategic task. China has built up a = strategic=20 partnership with the 10-member ASEAN since 2003, and also with some of = its=20 members, one after another.

Despite all China's efforts to = improve=20 relations with its neighbors, especially those in Southeast Asia, it = seems many=20 mistrust a smiling Middle Kingdom. And it seems likely that as China = expands its=20 influence due to its growing economic and military strength, these = neighboring=20 countries will dislike China even more.
So why is China failing to = win these=20 countries over? There are several reasons: some may be traced to = concerned=20 neighbors, others derive from within China itself.

Firstly, = there are=20 historical reasons. Throughout ancient history, some Asian countries = under the=20 influence of Confucian civilization would pay tribute to China's = imperial=20 courts, including in today's Vietnam, Korea and Japan. Some other=20 non-Confucianized Southeast Asian countries (including today's = Philippines,=20 Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand) also have a record of paying tributes = to China=20 as required by its emperors.

There are also more modern feuds. = The=20 Chinese people have yet to heal the psychological wounds inflicted by = the=20 Japanese invasion during World War II. Some Southeast Asia countries = were under=20 the threat of China's "export of revolution" in the 1950s and 1960s, and = there=20 was a bloody border war between China and Vietnam in 1979. =

Perhaps the=20 biggest factor damaging mutual-trust and undermining efforts to build=20 partnerships are bilateral disputes over territorial sovereignty. China = has=20 water and/or island territorial disputes in the South China Sea or East = China=20 Sea with Vietnam, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and = Japan.=20

For many East and Southeast Asian countries, China's growing = economic,=20 military and political influence in Asia reminds them of the = China-centered=20 tributary system in history, in which vassals around the Middle Kingdom = had to=20 acknowledge China's dominance in the region. Fears about the return of a = new=20 China-centered tributary system perhaps remain a psychological barrier = for some=20 countries when it comes to believing in Beijing's good neighbor policy.=20

Poor relations between China and its neighbors also partially = result=20 from China's domestic conditions. Since the 1960s, many of China's = Southeast=20 Asian neighbors have became democratized and are now influenced by = so-called=20 cosmopolitan values, especially "democratic peace" that maintains that=20 democratic states will never be at war. Under this doctrine, a = non-democratic=20 state is naturally, and constantly, on the offensive. =

Unfortunately,=20 China under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party is considered by its = neighbors as an undemocratic state, despite its pledges of a peaceful = rise.=20 While China has long given up the "export of revolution", it has yet to = clarify=20 its strategic intent of military modernization. For many neighboring = countries,=20 for such a big power to lack a clearly defined global strategy is = dangerous.=20

Naturally, given China's size and population, as well as its = deep=20 cultural influence, strong economic muscle and military power, any = relatively=20 smaller and weaker country in Asia is suspicious and frightened over = what move=20 the big dragon will take.

To address this, in addition to making = verbal=20 pledges, China has to make real efforts to show it will contribute to = the=20 benefit and stability of the region when needed. For instance, in the = aftermath=20 of the ongoing global financial crisis, China should have taken the lead = to=20 jointly build a sound regional financial system that stabilized the = regional=20 financial market.

China should honor its commitment to a = peaceful rise=20 with concrete measures to help safeguard regional security and ensure = peace in=20 the region.

As in China, nationalistic sentiments are growing = across=20 Asia, with economic reasons encouraging governments - backed by the US - = to take=20 more adventurous policy steps and challenge China.

Needless to = say,=20 Asia's current political tensions, arms races, hostility and = long-lasting=20 disputes are not the ideal choice for the region. Because of the complex = state=20 of relations, China and its neighbors must devote more time and effort = to=20 building genuine partnerships.

China should act as a responsible = actor=20 that consistently adheres to shared principles; it should have a = clear-cut,=20 operational and pragmatic Asia strategy.

Under this policy, = Beijing=20 should function as a stabilizing economic power. This would require = China to be=20 more innovative in international finance areas, and more courageous in=20 initiating reforms of existing financial systems.

China should = help=20 ensure regional public security with its growing military capability. = Beijing=20 should be broader-minded than its neighbors in regard to the use of its = military=20 to maintain regional stability by fighting piracy, terrorism and other=20 international crimes in the Pacific Ocean. Instead of flexing its = military=20 muscle in territorial disputes, China should encourage political, = economic and=20 cultural integration in East and Southeast Asia.

All in all, = China=20 should reshape its Asia strategy with an aim to functioning as a = stabilizing=20 force, while maintaining its strategy to keep a balance with the = influence of=20 the US in this region.

China must show its goodwill and = sincerity with=20 words and deeds in carrying out these policies to the letter. Only in = this way=20 can it rise peacefully without causing alarm and be considered as a = friend by=20 its Asian neighbors.

China's Asia strategy should go beyond only = seeking=20 mutual economic benefits and encompass the responsibility to help = maintain=20 financial, maritime and political stability. If China as a socialist = state with=20 Confucian traditions can become a sophisticated player in a = capitalist-style=20 market economy, it has the ability to harmonize an Asia in diversity.=20

Dr Jian Junbo, an assistant professor of the Institute = of=20 International Studies at Fudan University, Shanghai, China, is currently = an=20 academic visitor at London School of Economics and Political Science, = United=20 Kingdom.
 
http://www.atim= es.com/atimes/China/MH17Ad01.html
 =20 ************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************
************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ****************************************************
 
           =             &= nbsp;           &n= bsp;           &nb= sp;           &nbs= p;          =20 Politics: from = Vision to=20 Action
 
Barandat=20            =             &= nbsp;      =20 Why Assad=20 Need Not Fear Qaddafi=E2=80=99s Fate=20           = ;            =         =20        =20
                         &nbs= p;            = ;     =20
Author:
Ed Husain, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern=20 Studies
August 23, 2011
Financial = Times

The=20 dramatic scenes in = Tripoli are already being seized upon by those keen to depose = other=20 despotic regimes. Taken alongside the unstable situation in = Syria, there is now a risk of a dangerous moment of western=20 triumphalism. This must be resisted, especially given that the odds of=20 overthrowing dictator Bashar al-Assad are so small.
 
After months of holding his nerve, US = president=20 Barack Obama last week succumbed to calls from commentators and Syrian=20 opposition leaders, and demanded Mr Assad's = removal. The decision was a mistake. Earlier in the week, = Hillary=20 Clinton, secretary of state, noted that, if the US called for Mr Assad's = head,=20 then what?=E2=80=9D. And, indeed, then what?
 
I lived in Syria for two years and = still visit=20 regularly, so I know only too well that the US is viewed with deep = animosity.=20 Officials told me many times, and with straight faces, that America is = at war=20 with Arabs and Muslims =E2=80=93 a view also ingrained among the wider = population,=20 particularly after the Iraq war.
 
Calls for regime change will thus = help Syria, as=20 Mr Assad defies the west with ease. As elsewhere in the Middle East, = defying=20 Washington is a cause of strength and popularity, as Hamas, Hezbollah = and Iran=20 show. Every passing day will now be seen as a humiliation for Mr Obama, = while=20 the fragmented and shambolic Syrian = opposition will be more credibly dubbed =E2=80=9CAmerican = stooges=E2=80=9D, or =E2=80=9CZionist=20 agents=E2=80=9D. For a population that is vehemently anti-American and = anti-Israel, such=20 labels are powerful and destructive.
 
The regime has been barbaric in = responding to the=20 brave people on the streets, but we must be careful about accepting the=20 narrative that the whole of Syria is demanding = change. The=20 largest cities of Aleppo and Damascus remain relatively calm, while = opinion in=20 western capitals is led by reports generated via opposition movements, = often=20 using social media of questionable reliability. The army has committed = many=20 atrocities but hundreds of its members appear to have been killed, too. = In the=20 absence of international media, it is debatable whether the protesters = are=20 altogether peaceful.
 
Already, calls for military = intervention are=20 being made by Syrian opposition activists in meetings at the White House = and US=20 state department. Yet such movements have led us astray before, as when=20 politicians such as Ahmed Chalabi misled the US about realities in Iraq. = In=20 truth, Mr Assad's regime is much less likely to fall than that of = Muammer=20 Gaddafi: there have been no high-profile political or military = defections, while=20 Mr Assad remains relatively popular among senior military commanders, = Syrian=20 mosque clerics, the middle-classes and business leaders.
 
This brings us back to the = =E2=80=9Cthen what=E2=80=9D question.=20 The numbers being killed now will wither in comparison with a possible = future=20 civil war, if an increasingly sectarian Syria splinters between the = ruling=20 Alawites, the elite and urban Christians, the majority Sunnis, the = Kurds, Druze=20 and others. There is no civil society to engineer a peaceful transition, = while=20 Syria could plausibly become another Lebanon, acting as a proxy = battleground for=20 regional powers.
 
This risk partly explains why = Syria's ally = Turkey has exerted such effort to rein in the slaughter, and = why Saudi=20 Arabia, Russia and China have not joined America's lead. They all want = to give=20 Mr Assad more time =E2=80=93 because they recognise the thin chance of = getting rid of=20 him, and because they fear the violence that would follow if he did=20 fall.
 
Almost 90 per cent of Syria's crude oil = exports go to European countries. Almost $3bn of its annual = trade is=20 conducted with Turkey. Saudi Arabia is a regional power with vested = interests in=20 the country, and Russia and Syria enjoy historical relations, as well as = arms=20 deals. It is these countries that now must be on the front lines of = reform, with=20 the US largely working behind the scenes.
 
For the west, the most powerful and = poignant=20 moment in recent months came when US ambassador Robert Ford travelled to = Hama,=20 scene of protests, to show solidarity and monitor the regime's actions. = His=20 quiet move warmed usually hostile Sunni communities elsewhere in the = Middle East=20 to America, while putting fear into the heart of the tyrant himself. = Such=20 innovative, soft power strategies will do more to help Syrian democracy = than=20 loud statements from the White House.
 
The most powerful pressure on Mr = Assad so far,=20 however, has been from Al Jazeera's Arabic coverage, which encouraged = Syrians to=20 take control of their own destiny. This is surely right, for any = long-term=20 change must come from within. Sadly, in the short term and in a highly = volatile=20 region, at present Mr Assad remains the least worst option.
 
The = writer is a=20 senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and author of The=20 Islamist
 
http://www.cfr.org/syria/why-assad-need-not-fear-q= addafis-fate/p25702?cid=3Drss-fullfeed-why_assad_need_not_fear_qaddaf-082= 311&utm_source=3Dfeedburner&utm_medium=3Demail&utm_campaign=3D= Feed%3A+cfr_main+%28CFR.org+-+Main+Site+Feed%29
=
 
 
****************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *******************************************************************
****************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *******************************************************************
sueddeutsche.de: Folgen der deutschen Libyen-Politik=20  
 
- Saat des=20 Misstrauens -
 
Ein = Kommentar von=20 Daniel = Br=C3=B6ssler
 

Altkanzler Kohl=20 bescheinigt Deutschland, international keine berechenbare = Gr=C3=B6=C3=9Fe mehr zu sein -=20 und er hat recht. Mit ihrer einsamen Entscheidung zur Nato-Operation in = Libyen=20 haben Kanzlerin Merkel und Au=C3=9Fenminister Westerwelle den Verdacht = gen=C3=A4hrt, dass=20 auf die deutsche Au=C3=9Fenpolitik kein Verlass ist. Die Regierung muss = deutlich=20 machen, wo sie steht. Die Verb=C3=BCndeten haben ein Anrecht=20 darauf.

Je kleiner die Zweifel am = Ende des=20 Regimes von Muammar al-Gaddafi werden, desto mehr redet der = Au=C3=9Fenminister. Guido=20 Westerwelle erinnert an die vielen Opfer der K=C3=A4mpfe in Libyen. Er = =C3=A4u=C3=9Fert Sorge,=20 weil der verbrecherische Herrscher immer noch nicht endg=C3=BCltig = besiegt zu sein=20 scheint und bekundet die Hoffnung, dass die Aufst=C3=A4ndischen den Weg = zur Einigkeit=20 und zur Demokratie finden.

Er hat mit alledem Recht. Das = ist so,=20 obwohl alle Welt wei=C3=9F, dass er so viel spricht, weil er doch noch = recht behalten=20 will mit der einsamen Politik Deutschlands in Sachen Libyen. Falsch = klingen=20 seine Worte nur, weil Guido Westerwelle f=C3=BCr die Leistungen der = Verb=C3=BCndeten kein=20 Wort der Anerkennung findet. Es ist dieses Schweigen, das beweist, dass = auch=20 Helmut Kohl recht hat.

Der Altbundeskanzler = bescheinigt=20 Deutschland, seit Jahren keine berechenbare Gr=C3=B6=C3=9Fe und kein = verl=C3=A4sslicher Partner=20 mehr zu sein. Er meint dabei das Lavieren durch die Krise Europas, aber = auch das=20 Verhalten im Sicherheitsrat im Falle Libyen. Die Bundesregierung hatte = sich in=20 der Abstimmung =C3=BCber die Flugverbotszone der Stimme enthalten und = dies damit=20 begr=C3=BCndet, man sei in einem sehr speziellen Fall zu einer etwas = anderen=20 Einsch=C3=A4tzung gelangt als die Partner.

Eine Abw=C3=A4gung nannte es = der=20 Au=C3=9Fenminister. Das sollte verh=C3=BCllen, dass es sich um eine = historische=20 Entscheidung handelte. Etwas n=C3=A4her bei der Wahrheit wurde die Sorge = ins Feld=20 gef=C3=BChrt, die Bundeswehr =C3=BCberzustrapazieren, die bereits in = Afghanistan, auf dem=20 Balkan und den Weltmeeren eingesetzt ist. Ein Ja zur UN-Resolution, = wurde=20 behauptet, w=C3=A4re automatisch als Ja zu einer Beteiligung an einer = Nato-Operation=20 in Libyen verstanden worden.

Nicht nur Kohl musste den = Eindruck einer=20 Entscheidung gewinnen, die nur aus dem Moment heraus getroffen wurde in = Furcht=20 vor den W=C3=A4hlern in Baden-W=C3=BCrttemberg und Rheinland-Pfalz, wo = kurz danach=20 Landtagswahlen anstanden. Die Dinge liegen leider noch schlimmer, denn = es gibt=20 sehr wohl eine Richtung und ein Ziel.

Mit voller = Unterst=C3=BCtzung von=20 Kanzlerin Angela Merkel verfolgt der Au=C3=9Fenminister eine Art = Westerwelle-Doktrin.=20 Sie postuliert schlicht: so wenig milit=C3=A4risches Engagement im = Ausland wie=20 m=C3=B6glich. Das gilt zwar, seit das vereinigte Deutschland = =C3=BCberhaupt wieder vor=20 dieser Frage steht.

Bis vor kurzem aber = galt jener=20 Zusatz, der Bundeswehr-Soldaten zun=C3=A4chst ins fr=C3=BChere = Jugoslawien und dann nach=20 Afghanistan gef=C3=BChrt hat. So viel milit=C3=A4risches Engagement im = Ausland wie n=C3=B6tig,=20 um der internationalen Verantwortung und den Pflichten im B=C3=BCndnis = gerecht zu=20 werden, lautet er. Von Westerwelle wird bleiben, dass dieser Satz = weggefallen=20 ist.

Zweifel = an der=20 deutschen Verl=C3=A4sslichkeit

Mit den Folgen dieser Wende = bekommt es=20 die deutsche Politik k=C3=BCnftig zu tun. Die Ehrungen, mit denen die = Kanzlerin in=20 Washington =C3=BCberh=C3=A4uft worden ist, k=C3=B6nnen davon allenfalls = ablenken. Wenn die=20 Bundesregierung nun darauf verweist, alle seien doch nach wie vor nett = zu ihr,=20 so ist das r=C3=BChrend. Deutschland ist, mit Verlaub, nicht Luxemburg. = Andauerndes=20 =C3=B6ffentliches Grollen k=C3=B6nnen sich die=20 Partner gar nicht erlauben.

Deutschland wird gebraucht, = nicht zuletzt=20 wegen seiner Wirtschaftsmacht. Was die Bundesregierung = sicherheitspolitisch=20 ges=C3=A4t hat, ist stilles Misstrauen. Trotz des erheblichen Einsatzes = der=20 Bundeswehr etwa in Afghanistan wird der Verdacht bleiben, dass auf die = Deutschen=20 im Zweifelsfall kein Verlass ist. Die Folgen lassen sich=20 erahnen.

Kurzfristig geht es um die = routiniert in=20 Abrede gestellte deutsche Bringschuld in Libyen. Wenngleich die = Verb=C3=BCndeten und=20 auch die libyschen =C3=9Cbergangsf=C3=BChrer taktvoll dar=C3=BCber = hinweggehen, muss die=20 Bundesregierung mit einer f=C3=BCrchterlichen Annahme leben: jener, dass = es heute gar=20 keine libysche Opposition mehr g=C3=A4be, h=C3=A4tte sich Deutschland = mit seiner Skepsis=20 durchgesetzt.

Mag sein, dass Westerwelle = wirklich=20 glaubt, dass seine Sanktionspolitik ausgereicht h=C3=A4tte, um Gaddafi = zu=20 stoppen, und dass ihn darum kein schlechtes Gewissen plagt. Die = anderen=20 aber werden die potentielle Schuld nicht vergessen und sie beim Aufbau = in Libyen=20 in Rechnung stellen. So erkl=C3=A4rt sich, dass Verteidigungsminister = Thomas de=20 Maizi=C3=A8re die Entsendung von Blauhelm-Soldaten "konstruktiv" = pr=C3=BCfen will, bevor=20 die UN danach gefragt haben.

Damit die bisherige = Libyen-Politik noch=20 einen Sinn ergibt, k=C3=A4me aber nur eine Entsendung in einen relativ = risikoarmen=20 Einsatz in Frage. Der Verteidigungsminister, der nach seinem Amtsantritt = =C3=BCber=20 die Verantwortung Deutschlands in der Welt gesprochen hatte, wird=20 Schwierigkeiten bekommen, diesen Anspruch auch = einzul=C3=B6sen.

Deutschland muss erst einmal = kl=C3=A4ren,=20 welche Lehren es aus den vergangenen 20 Jahren zieht: War es falsch, den = Kosovaren zur Hilfe zu kommen? W=C3=BCrde es nach einem neuen 11. = September seine=20 Solidarit=C3=A4t verweigern?

Bequem ist es, mit Verweis = auf die=20 Ohnmacht im Falle Syriens die Doppelmoral in der Welt zu beklagen. Doch = das=20 kl=C3=A4rt noch nicht, was man selbst von der Schutzverantwortung = f=C3=BCr Zivilisten im=20 V=C3=B6lkerrecht h=C3=A4lt. Helmut Kohl hat recht. Die Deutschen = m=C3=BCssen deutlich machen,=20 wo sie stehen. Die Verb=C3=BCndeten haben einen Anspruch darauf zu = erfahren, ob sie=20 auf Deutschland noch z=C3=A4hlen k=C3=B6nnen.

http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/= folgen-der-deutschen-libyen-politik-saat-des-misstrauens-1.1134712

************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************
************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *********************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ****************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************

         &nbs= p;            = ;            =             &= nbsp;           &n= bsp;           &nb= sp;           &nbs= p;            = ; =20 Middle East         &nbs= p;            = ;            =             &= nbsp;           &n= bsp;  =20

=E2=80=9CI Didn=E2=80=99t See it Coming=E2=80=9D =

Hossam=20 Badrawi

Former National Democratic Party Secretary = General=20 Hossam Badrawi tells how the Tahrir revolution looked from inside the = regime=20

Hossam = Badrawi has=20 served as a member of the Egyptian parliament and is a professor of = medicine at=20 Cairo University. He joined the ruling National Democratic Party in = 2000,=20 telling the media that he hoped to play a role in reforming Egypt from = within=20 the system. He became a member of the NDP=E2=80=99s Policy Secretariat, = headed by Gamal=20 Mubarak, and in February 2011 amid mass protests against the Egyptian = regime he=20 replaced Safwat El-Sherif as NDP secretary general. He held the job for = only=20 four days before resigning from the post and the party. Cairo Review = Managing=20 Editor Scott MacLeod interviewed Badrawi in Cairo on February 21,=20 2011.
CAIRO REVIEW: What happened = in=20 Egypt?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: It=E2=80=99s a revolution. It = changed the status=20 of Egypt and it will definitely affect the future. Unexpectedly, it is = the=20 middle-class, educated people that made the change. Other sectors of the = society=20 have joined in. Some sectors are benefiting more. But the major move of = the=20 people: it is much more effective than in the revolution of 1919. And = definitely=20 more credible than 1952, because it=E2=80=99s from the people, not the = army. Egypt is=20 making history for the Middle East.

CAIRO REVIEW: Looking at it = from the=20 inside, did you see it coming?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I = didn=E2=80=99t see it coming=20 in that way. But the ceiling of my expectations was much less than what=20 happened. In 1990, we were many people working for reform in Egypt from = outside=20 the government. The structure that had all of us was the New Civic = Forum, led by=20 Dr. Said El-Naggar. Some of us decided we can make the change from = inside. I=20 represented that group. Others decided to make the change as opposition. = Some=20 others stayed independent. But there is a network between us. Because we = are=20 looking for liberal thinking. We were all for a free economy, democracy, = human=20 rights. We decided to play different roles from different positions. = And, I used=20 to tell my friends, the most difficult position is mine. It is easy to = be an=20 opposition from outside. It=E2=80=99s much more difficult on the inside = and keep your=20 credibility by saying what you want to say. And bear in mind the fact = that=20 you=E2=80=99re not implementing what you want.

CAIRO REVIEW: What did you = think would=20 happen?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I thought = by=20 accumulated pressure, we could change Article 77 [in the constitution] = and have=20 limitations on the president=E2=80=99s terms, and change Article 76 for = the way the=20 elections can be done. And at the same time, remove the emergency [law]=20 situation. And make the changes that implement human rights issues in = the right=20 structure. There=E2=80=99s a document coming from me as a responsible = person for the=20 UPR, the Universal Political Review, of Egypt in early 2010 [and] stated = all=20 these facts. I presented it to the United Nations despite the fact that = I was in=20 the NDP, which put me in conflict with the party at the time. If Article = 77 was=20 going to change and limit the president=E2=80=99s term, I was going to = be so happy. I=20 thought it would be an opening for everything, for political reform. I = would=20 have been satisfied if I=E2=80=99d seen limitation of terms and = implementation of human=20 rights. Obviously, what happened [in the revolution] is much more than=20 that.

CAIRO REVIEW: And you = didn=E2=80=99t see it=20 coming?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I didn=E2=80=99t see it = coming. I expected=20 change, but I didn=E2=80=99t see it coming. Not that way. I thought with = the change of=20 the president, the whole country would be changed. I thought [President] = Mubarak=20 should have announced he wouldn=E2=80=99t run again. I was advocating = that. I thought by=20 just changing that, most changes would happen by=20 default.

CAIRO REVIEW: So you = didn=E2=80=99t see a=20 popular protest movement coming up to effect=20 change?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I = didn=E2=80=99t see it=20 that way. I didn=E2=80=99t expect the middle-class people to come = together that way and=20 be that effective. It was a good surprise.

CAIRO REVIEW: Was that a = common=20 perception in the party, the president and others didn=E2=80=99t see the = wave=20 coming?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I think so. = I realized=20 on the first day, some people didn=E2=80=99t realize what was happening = even at the time=20 it was happening. Every response from the president was too little too = late, all=20 the time. As I was given the post to direct the NDP in those four days, = I had=20 access to him and the group around him. I didn=E2=80=99t have it before. = I didn=E2=80=99t have=20 it afterwards. But during that time, I realized that they are responding = always=20 too late and too little. They don=E2=80=99t evaluate the magnitude of = what=E2=80=99s happening.=20 My role in those four days was to open everyone=E2=80=99s eyes, that = this reality has to=20 be respected and that the president has to step down now. That = =E2=80=9Cnow=E2=80=9D was not=20 accepted, day after day after day.

CAIRO REVIEW: Were you able = to say that=20 personally to the president?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Personally, = yes, the=20 first day I met him. I told him he has to respect his promises to the = people by=20 amending the constitutional term [limits] and move all his authority to = his vice=20 president. I thought this is going to be more constitutional and that = has to be=20 done in the way people believe it. So he has to be clear about that, = that he is=20 not going to practice his presidency, except for one issue: to call for = the=20 referendum on the constitution, and that people should see and believe = that is=20 happening and it should be real. The delivery of his speeches did not = give the=20 impression that this was real. That was the defect. Until now I still = think that=20 moving the authority to vice president and his stepping aside from the=20 presidency would have led the country in a more constitutional way than = what is=20 happening now.

CAIRO REVIEW: Did you mean = that he=20 resign, or hand over power?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Hand over = the power to=20 the vice president, and to respect the constitution, so that he would = have only=20 one role, calling for the referendum. His role will be only one thing to = do.

CAIRO REVIEW: But he should = remain as=20 president?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Remain as = president=20 outside of the circle of authority. So he passes all his authority, = gives it to=20 the vice president, and moves geographically somewhere else, so he is = not part=20 of making decisions. And have things done constitutionally, and call for = early=20 elections once the constitution was amended. That was my opinion that I = told him=20 face to face.

CAIRO REVIEW: Did you ever = just ask him=20 to completely resign the presidency, as he did on February=20 11?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I = didn=E2=80=99t advise=20 that. But every day that passed, I realized even the advice [I gave him] = wouldn=E2=80=99t be accepted [by the revolution]. On the last day, I = told him that even=20 if you take my advice now, it can be successful only 10 or 15 percent. = You=E2=80=99re=20 late. People do not believe there=E2=80=99s an honest desire to step = away and have the=20 constitution be amended, and elections to be done as early as possible. = That was=20 the safest way the country can go, in my = opinion.

 

"I=E2=80=99m=20 afraid of a sort of McCarthyite attitude, that once you=E2=80=99re = different in opinion,=20 you=E2=80=99ll be taken hostage by the fact you=E2=80=99re different. As = if we are moving from=20 one kind of dictatorship to another kind of=20 dictatorship."

CAIRO REVIEW: What was = President=20 Mubarak=E2=80=99s reaction to that advice? Did he deny there was a=20 problem?


HOSSAM BADRAWI: Actually = not. We had=20 meetings more than three times. On Wednesday, I was not giving him = advice. I was=20 giving my statement as the secretary general of the ruling party, a = position he=20 assigned me to have two days before. I told him that from the meetings I = had=20 from different political parties and with the people in Tahrir=E2=80=94I = had many people=20 there with the young people=E2=80=94that my political understanding was = that the problem=20 isn=E2=80=99t in taking the action. The challenge is that they = don=E2=80=99t believe that you=20 are taking the action. It wasn=E2=80=99t advice. It was a request. And = when the request=20 was not met the way we agreed upon, I = resigned.

CAIRO REVIEW: He disagreed = with the=20 request?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, he = agreed. He=20 understood it. He brought his legal people to make his statement on = Wednesday.=20 When I left, I was expecting him to give his statement on Wednesday, and = he=20 didn=E2=80=99t give it. So it was clear to me that somebody else had = called him. On=20 Thursday, I made another attempt, that he should give his statement. It = is=20 already coming to be late. He told me that he is going to give his = statement by=20 the end of the day. Then they waited and waited until 10 p.m. or = something like=20 that. The statement came in my opinion with the worst delivery, in spite = of the=20 fact that it has all the content. But the delivery was not believable to = the=20 people. At that level I was cut from communication. I could not be part = of the=20 decision making anymore. I waited. I tried to communicate and = couldn=E2=80=99t. So I=20 resigned.

CAIRO REVIEW: In the speech, he followed = the=20 advice?

 

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes, it = followed my=20 advice. But we had an agreement that the core of his speech should be = that he=20 was giving away his authority, clear cut. This was said in three = seconds. If you=20 look somewhere, you might not even have noticed. The delivery of the = speech was=20 not coinciding with the meaning. He started talking about himself and = gave the=20 impression that he is there. This was a big mistake. He gave his sharing = of the=20 grief of the young people who died. This was a request of the young = people I met=20 and I asked for. He separated between the revolutionary and the criminal = acts.=20 That was a request, that he has to give it to the people. But at the end = of the=20 day, if history looks at the core without the delivery system, then you = realize=20 he gave away his powers, and gave the order for constitutional = amendments. So=20 he=E2=80=99s not needed as a president anymore, only to call for the = referendum. He=20 didn=E2=80=99t say that, he didn=E2=80=99t press on that, he = didn=E2=80=99t give the impression that=20 this was the situation. The content was there, but the meaning and = understanding=20 was not there.

CAIRO REVIEW: He was not in = denial=20 about what was happening in Tahrir? He had already dismissed the leader = of the=20 party and even Gamal Mubarak.

HOSSAM BADRAWI: That was my = request, by=20 the way. That was my request. When he assigned me as secretary general, = I said=20 everyone has to resign. I have to have full authority to reform the=20 party.

CAIRO REVIEW: So you think = he was=20 trying to remain part of the system, not to=20 exit?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I think the = circle=20 around him was putting him to that situation. I had the feeling that he = really=20 wanted a constitutional path. And that he=E2=80=99s stepping down = anyway, anytime. But=20 again, the decision and timing is part of the formula. And I think they = were=20 not=E2=80=94his advisors=E2=80=94were not helpful to let him take the = right action at right=20 time.

CAIRO REVIEW:=20 Why?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I=E2=80=99m = not sure, but=20 probably they were in denial more than him.

CAIRO REVIEW: Why did the = president=20 finally resign on the Friday?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I saw it = coming. After=20 his speech on Thursday, and what happened Thursday night and Friday, it = was=20 clear that it is the point of no return. I think he had no=20 choice.

CAIRO REVIEW: Did the army = go to him=20 and say he had to step down?

HOSSAM=20 BADRAWI: All=20 theories are possible. I was cut completely after I left the = president=E2=80=99s house=20 on Thursday. On Thursday evening and Friday, I was like you, listening = to news=20 and seeing it on TV. I was cut. I was not connected. I tried but I = couldn=E2=80=99t. I=20 came on TV [and resigned]. The only way for me was to give a statement = to the=20 BBC so it becomes public. At the end of the day, the publicity is the=20 reality.

CAIRO REVIEW: Why do you = think the=20 revolution happened?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I think the = reaction of=20 the police was one of the factors to create the movement. Because the = excessive=20 use of violence was part of the accumulation of other people to come in. = At one=20 level, the fear has gone. The numbers made it possible for the fear of = the=20 security forces to go away. Everybody underestimated the capacity of the = youth=20 to represent their opinion. There was underestimation of that capacity = by the=20 whole society, even by their parents, who joined them=20 later.

CAIRO REVIEW: What led to = January=20 25?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: It was the=20 accumulation. I think it=E2=80=99s the human integrity and the human = rights, more than=20 anything else. It was not those who do not have employment. It was = people with=20 good employment in the streets. I think it was humiliation. I call it = chronic=20 anger, a chronic state of anger. In medicine, the chronic situation, you = get=20 adapted to the pain until it becomes acute. The acute exacerbation made = all=20 chronic anger come up. Part of it was, in my opinion, the way the state = was=20 dealing with the people, humiliating them in everyday activities. The=20 relationship of the individuals with the police. They way you get your = services=20 from the state, from the cabinet, from the public officials. Everything = had to=20 do with whether you have a wasta (connections) or pay a bribe. Everybody = was=20 telling their kids, =E2=80=9CIf a policeman stops you, don=E2=80=99t = argue.=E2=80=9D These situations=20 were elevating the dissatisfaction and anger. Not acute enough to = revolt, but=20 it=E2=80=99s there. Trigged by something, everybody came=20 together.

CAIRO REVIEW: What was the=20 trigger?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: The = excessive use of=20 violence within the police. Khaled Said [a young Egyptian killed in = police=20 custody in Alexandria in 2010] was part of it. And the excessive use of = violence=20 in Tahrir on the first day. On the first day everyone was calling for = freedom=20 and justice. It was not about food or unemployment. That was a = collective=20 request of everyone. As they got larger and larger, the line of fear has = gone.=20 And then with the late response, and the little response, objectives = went=20 higher. If on January 25 the president had come out to the people and = said, =E2=80=9CI=E2=80=99m=20 dissolving the government and not running [for re-election],=E2=80=9D = probably everyone=20 was going to be happy. As you go day after day, and people get hurt and = die, and=20 you are not seeing the leader of the country coming to talk to the = people for=20 three days, this was cumulative bad management of the crisis. It made = the=20 chronic stage into an acute stage.

CAIRO REVIEW: Was the = =E2=80=9Csuccession=20 issue=E2=80=9D a factor? The 2010 parliamentary elections? The Gamal = Mubarak=20 question?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I add it as = a factor to=20 the chronic anger. There were no clear-cut announcements [about Gamal = Mubarak]=20 that people could protest against. But it created the feeling that = something=20 weird was being cooked. The president should have come clearly and said = that he=20 wasn=E2=80=99t going to run, and that no one from his family was going = to run, to give=20 that kind of satisfaction. The parliamentary election in 2010 was = another=20 important factor. In a meeting after the election, in the party they = were=20 announcing we had the largest victory any party had. I raised my hand = and said,=20 from a limited party point of view, it might be true. But from a = political point=20 of view, I think this is the largest defeat we=E2=80=99ve had. Because = if you do not=20 have opposition in the parliament, you will have them in the streets. = And if it=20 was in my hand, I would definitely have worked harder for the opposition = to have=20 them represented in the parliament. And I had that conflict with the=20 administration, because I was sure that playing alone is not in the = benefit of=20 the country. And having the parliament unilaterally ruled was not going = to be=20 accepted by anyone. In spite of the fact that they had so many proofs = that they=20 won fair and square against the Muslim Brotherhood. It was a disaster = and added=20 to the chronic anger.

CAIRO REVIEW: What was your = assumption=20 about Gamal Mubarak=E2=80=99s = intentions?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I was there = for eight=20 years, and this was never discussed between me and him, never raised as = an issue=20 in the party. But actions give different impressions. I don=E2=80=99t = know if there was=20 a smaller circle talking about that and I wasn=E2=80=99t a part of it. = His presence and=20 his leading of the party and his appearances and visits to different = areas of=20 the country, gave the impression that he=E2=80=99s politically = portraying himself. He=20 never talked about this with me, maybe with others. I once told him in = the=20 party, that the relationship of the party with the government is not = [correct],=20 because if it was [correct], it should not depend on the president or = the son of=20 the president. It should depend on the dynamics of politicians. There = was so=20 much implementation of policies that we worked out that was not done. = And I=20 cannot make any difference. It is always going back to the president, = whether he=20 gives instructions to the government or not. It is all a relationship = between=20 the government and the president=E2=80=99s = house.

CAIRO REVIEW: The NDP is = not a real=20 party?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: It was a = real party,=20 but very centralized. There were very good people. Excellent policy = papers were=20 done with lots of efforts from intellectuals and politicians, learning = from the=20 experiences of other countries. But that stops here. Whether that was = being=20 taken seriously by the government was something = else.

CAIRO REVIEW: In the upper = levels of=20 the NDP, was it your assumption that Gamal was being prepared to become=20 president?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes. It was = an=20 assumption, yes.

CAIRO REVIEW: Was this ever = an issue to=20 raise that this was not a good idea, and could damage the president and = the=20 country?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes. But = sometimes when=20 you say that to the person, he says =E2=80=9CNo, I=E2=80=99m not = intending,=E2=80=9D then the discussion=20 becomes =E2=80=9CWho said I want to do that?=E2=80=9D And the president = says =E2=80=9CMy son is just=20 helping me.=E2=80=9D The discussion stops.

CAIRO REVIEW: What was = going through=20 your mind when you saw the NDP headquarters being=20 burned?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Actually, I = wasn=E2=80=99t only=20 looking at the NDP being burned, but all police stations being burned = down=20 across the country. And all prisons being opened for prisoners to go = away. And=20 the NDP locations in eleven governorates being burned, and synchronized = in the=20 same way: we get in, steal contents, burn papers, get the hard disks of = the=20 computers. I don=E2=80=99t think this was the revolution in Tahrir. It = was much more=20 organized than that. You have to think that there is a mastermind. I = cannot=20 assume [who is responsible] because I don=E2=80=99t have any evidence. = Don=E2=80=99t tell me=20 people in the streets going for their dignity and freedom organized = that. It=20 cannot be. We have to see who is going to benefit. The story did not = come to the=20 final chapter. So let=E2=80=99s see who will take power, and then = we=E2=80=99ll know who=E2=80=99s the=20 beneficiary.

CAIRO REVIEW: What happens=20 next?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I want a = transition to=20 take place in a secular, civil structure. However, if the parliamentary=20 elections are being held early, I think Egypt won=E2=80=99t come to a = stable situation=20 for a long time. If we do not give time for parties coming out of the = revolution=20 to establish themselves and be a part of the coming elections, = we=E2=80=99re not giving=20 them equal opportunity with others who are already structured and ready = for=20 those elections. The army has played a neutral role. I think = they=E2=80=99re overwhelmed=20 with responsibility they are not trained to do. And I believe they would = like to=20 pass authority as fast as possible. But I hope =E2=80=9Cas fast as = possible=E2=80=9D doesn=E2=80=99t=20 affect the right decision. We have fragmentation now. We need = one-and-a-half to=20 two years.

CAIRO REVIEW: Would the = Muslim=20 Brotherhood win the election?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: They would = be the only=20 party inside the parliament. The NDP isn=E2=80=99t there. So other = members would be=20 individuals, independents running without a = cover.

CAIRO REVIEW: Is the NDP=20 finished?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No, I = don=E2=80=99t think so,=20 but I think it needs years to recover with new branding. It used to = depend on=20 being a part of the ruling structure, so it lost its magnet for people = who want=20 to become part of the government. But it is still the only structure = that exists=20 other than the Brotherhood. The NDP will need three or four or five = years of=20 working hard to change the image. There=E2=80=99s a very negative = impression. You have=20 to rebrand.

CAIRO REVIEW: Is the = political role of=20 the Mubaraks in Egypt now over?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: Yes, it=20 is.

CAIRO REVIEW: Does Gamal = Mubarak have=20 any chance to be part of the rebirth of the=20 NDP?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: No. I = don=E2=80=99t think he=20 has any role in the future.

CAIRO REVIEW: What are your = plans?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I=E2=80=99m = just listening to=20 people, analyzing, and giving my fair opinion. I meet with all political = sectors. And I think in the turbulence that exists, people have to wait = and see.=20 If there is a party that can come from down up, I=E2=80=99ll=20 join.

CAIRO REVIEW: How has Egypt = fundamentally changed?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: There is = great=20 opportunity for Egypt to move forward politically. It will affect the = economy.=20 I=E2=80=99m an optimistic person by nature. I see the opportunity there. = But there are=20 huge risks. If we fall into linear thinking that does not accept = differences of=20 opinion=E2=80=94either a military or a conservative religious = one=E2=80=94neither would be best=20 for the country.

CAIRO REVIEW: = There=E2=80=99s a risk the=20 military might take control = completely?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: I = don=E2=80=99t know. They are=20 there now.

CAIRO REVIEW: = You=E2=80=99re worried about the=20 Brotherhood?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: My = intellectual=20 structure is to be an open person, respect diversity, and accept = differences in=20 opinion. I have nothing against a woman president, or a Coptic Egyptian=20 president, so long as it=E2=80=99s through a democratic process. I = definitely would like=20 to see citizenship rights regardless of any religious belief. I see that = that=20 path might not be the path of the Muslim Brotherhood for the time being. = Yet,=20 they have good things to offer. This is the only thing that makes me = worry. I=20 have so many friends in the Muslim Brotherhood, good people and = excellent=20 people. They have good intentions. They should be part of the political = scene,=20 but they shouldn=E2=80=99t impose their style on = me.

CAIRO REVIEW: Should the = future system=20 hold the former regime accountable?

HOSSAM BADRAWI: That = worries me very=20 much, the fact that everything is being taken now by impressions. The = rule of=20 law should be the rule of law. We cannot accuse any person and accuse = and=20 incriminate and judge at the same time. That=E2=80=99s very scary. = I=E2=80=99m afraid of a sort=20 of McCarthyite attitude, that once you=E2=80=99re different in opinion, = you=E2=80=99ll be taken=20 hostage by the fact you=E2=80=99re different. As if we are moving from = one kind of=20 dictatorship to another kind of dictatorship.         &nbs= p;            = ;            =        =20

http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/CairoReview/Pages/articleDetails= .aspx?aid=3D23

************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************************************************
************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ************************************************************
          =             &= nbsp;           &n= bsp;           &nb= sp;           &nbs= p;            = ;       =20
Massenbach's= = Recommendation  =20
 
         &nbs= p;            = ;            =             &= nbsp;           &n= bsp;           &nb= sp;           &nbs= p;            = ;     =20 Friedrich=20 Merz: Ja zur Wirtschaftsregierung - Handelsblatt=20 -
 
Friedrich = Merz fordert den=20 Schuldenabbau - bef=C3=BCrwortet eine tiefere politische Integration = Europas=20 -

Nun also doch: Die europ=C3=A4ische = "Wirtschaftsregierung" kommt.=20

Nach mehr als zehn Jahren intensiven Dr=C3=A4ngens scheint die = franz=C3=B6sische=20 Regierung am Ziel ihrer W=C3=BCnsche zu sein, die W=C3=A4hrungspolitik = und die unabh=C3=A4ngige=20 Zentralbank politisch an die Leine zu nehmen. Alle deutschen Regierungen = haben=20 sich seit der Einf=C3=BChrung der W=C3=A4hrungsunion erfolgreich dagegen = gewehrt; in=20 dieser Woche ist die deutsche Regierung auf den franz=C3=B6sischen Kurs=20 eingeschwenkt.

Nun =C3=A4ndert sich seit dem Ausbruch der = Finanzkrise im=20 Herbst 2008 ohnehin t=C3=A4glich vieles. Der Ausspruch des damaligen = Finanzministers=20 Peer Steinbr=C3=BCck, nach der Krise werde "nichts mehr so sein wie vor = der Krise",=20 hat sich Gott sei Dank nicht in ganzem Umfang bewahrheitet. In der = Finanz- und=20 W=C3=A4hrungspolitik allerdings war die Prognose weitgehend richtig: =

Von der=20 politischen Unabh=C3=A4ngigkeit der Zentralbank bleibt genauso wenig = =C3=BCbrig wie von=20 dem Verbot, in der W=C3=A4hrungsunion die Schulden anderer L=C3=A4nder = zu =C3=BCbernehmen.=20 Klare Regeln des EU-Vertrages und der Statuten der Zentralbank werden = nicht mehr=20 beachtet. Aus der europ=C3=A4ischen Rechtsgemeinschaft ist eine = Ansammlung von=20 Staaten einer W=C3=A4hrungsunion geworden, die sich nur darin einig zu = sein scheint,=20 dass die einst feierlich versprochenen Regeln nicht mehr gelten sollen. = Europa=20 ist auf der Rutschbahn zur Transferunion. Es gibt kein Zur=C3=BCck mehr. =

So=20 widerspr=C3=BCchlich es klingt: Die Beschl=C3=BCsse von Paris = k=C3=B6nnen gleichwohl richtig=20 sein, wenn auch das Kleingedruckte beachtet wird, und wenn sie den = Beginn einer=20 tieferen europ=C3=A4ischen Integration markieren und nicht allein den = n=C3=A4chsten=20 Rettungsversuch f=C3=BCr den Euro.

Bei der Einf=C3=BChrung des = Euros war klar,=20 dass eine W=C3=A4hrungsunion auf Dauer nicht ohne Politische Union = funktionieren=20 kann. Diese Politische Union sollte dem Euro so schnell wie m=C3=B6glich = folgen, der=20 Euro sollte die "Lokomotive" der Integration sein. Alle Beteiligten = wussten=20 damals, dass der Anpassungsdruck auf die Arbeitsm=C3=A4rkte und auf die = nationalen=20 Haushalte in den Euro-Staaten signifikant steigen w=C3=BCrde. Der = Stabilit=C3=A4tspakt=20 sollte wenigstens Haushaltsdisziplin erzwingen.

Aber nachdem = Deutschland=20 und Frankreich im Jahr 2003 die Regeln nicht gegen sich gelten lassen = wollten,=20 haben sich auch andere nicht mehr daran gebunden gef=C3=BChlt. =

Mit der=20 "Wirtschaftsregierung" wird jetzt der Raum gef=C3=BCllt, der f=C3=BCr = das dauerhafte=20 Gelingen einer gemeinsamen W=C3=A4hrung verschiedener Staaten zwingend = notwendig ist.=20 Die Wirtschaftspolitik wird angepasst. Vor allem aber: Die ungebremste=20 Verschuldung der Mitgliedstaaten soll endlich einged=C3=A4mmt werden. = Hier setzen die=20 beiden Regierungen an der richtigen Stelle an, an der Ursache der Krise. = Nat=C3=BCrlich haben Banken spekuliert und gezockt. Aber die Banken sind = nicht der=20 Ausl=C3=B6ser. Die hemmungslose Staatsverschuldung in Amerika und = Europa, die=20 Abh=C3=A4ngigkeit der Staatsfinanzierung von den Kapitalm=C3=A4rkten und = langanhaltende,=20 niedrige Zinsen haben den Teufelskreis in Gang gesetzt. Wie bei einem=20 Alkoholiker sind erst Gew=C3=B6hnungseffekte eingetreten, und dann = musste Jahr f=C3=BCr=20 Jahr die Dosis erh=C3=B6ht werden. Jetzt muss der Patient auf Entzug = gesetzt werden.=20

Ob das gelingt, ist alles andere als gewiss. Auf jeden Fall = m=C3=BCssen=20 weitere Schritte folgen. Warum muss die deutsche Bundesregierung auch im = Jahr=20 2012 noch 27 Milliarden Euro neue Schulden machen? Welcher Teufel reitet = einige=20 Politiker der Koalition in dieser Lage, immer noch weitere Ausgaben - = zum=20 Beispiel f=C3=BCr die Pflegeversicherung - auf Kosten des = Staatshaushaltes zu=20 verlangen?

Und ist den Beteiligten, vor allem den nationalen=20 Parlamenten, eigentlich klar, dass die Euro-Staaten vor dem vermutlich = gr=C3=B6=C3=9Ften=20 Kompetenztransfer auf die europ=C3=A4ische Ebene stehen, den es je = gegeben hat,=20 gr=C3=B6=C3=9Fer noch als bei der Einf=C3=BChrung des Euros selbst? =

Europa ist eine=20 Geschichte von gro=C3=9Fen Erfolgen und manchen R=C3=BCckschl=C3=A4gen. = Die gr=C3=B6=C3=9Ften=20 Fortschritte gab es immer nach gro=C3=9Fen Krisen. Wenn aus dieser Krise = f=C3=BCr Europa=20 eine Chance werden soll, dann stehen die Staats- und Regierungschefs = neben allen=20 tats=C3=A4chlichen Schwierigkeiten vor allem vor einer gro=C3=9Fen = kommunikativen Aufgabe.=20 Bev=C3=B6lkerung und Parlamente m=C3=BCssen von einem extrem schwierigen = Prozess =C3=BCberzeugt=20 werden, der zugleich in einem Umfeld stark steigenden Wettbewerbsdrucks = aus=20 anderen Teilen der Welt steht. Gelingen wird dies am Ende nur, wenn in = einem=20 parlamentarischen Prozess auch die notwendigen Rechtsgrundlagen = daf=C3=BCr geschaffen=20 werden, an die sich die Regierungen in Zukunft dann auch halten. =

Das war=20 einmal der gr=C3=B6=C3=9Fte zivilisatorische Fortschritt in Europa. =

Der Autor ist=20 Anwalt und war Chef der Unionsfraktion im Bundestag.

Sie = erreichen ihn=20 unter:
gastautor@handelsblatt.com

Merz, Friedrich=20

Handelsblatt Nr. 159 vom 18.08.2011 Seite 56 =
 
 
<= FONT=20 size=3D1=20 face=3DArial>****************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************
************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *****************************************************
         &nb= sp;           &nbs= p;            = ;            =       =20  Israeli-Arab Crisis=20 Approaching

By George = Friedman

In September, the U.N. General = Assembly will vote=20 on whether to recognize Palestine as an independent and sovereign state = with=20 full rights in the United Nations. In many ways, this would appear to be = a=20 reasonable and logical step. Whatever the Palestinians once were, they = are=20 clearly a nation in the simplest and most important sense =E2=80=94 = namely, they think=20 of themselves as a nation. Nations are created by historical = circumstances, and=20 those circumstances have given rise to a Palestinian nation.=20 Under the principle of the United Nations and the theory of the right to = national self-determination, which is the moral foundation of the modern = theory=20 of nationalism, a nation has a right to a state, and that state has a = place in=20 the family of nations. In this sense, the U.N. vote will be=20 unexceptional.

However, when the United Nations votes = on=20 Palestinian statehood, it will intersect with other realities and other=20 historical processes. First, it is one thing to declare a Palestinian = state; it=20 is quite another thing to create one. The Palestinians are deeply = divided=20 between two views of what the Palestinian nation ought to be, a division = not=20 easily overcome. Second, this vote will come at a time when two of = Israel=E2=80=99s=20 neighbors are coping with their own internal issues. Syria is in chaos,=20 with an extended and significant resistance against the regime having = emerged.=20 Meanwhile, Egypt is struggling with internal tension over the fall of = President=20 Hosni Mubarak and the future of the military junta that replaced him. = Add to=20 this the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the potential rise of Iranian power, and the potential = recognition=20 of a Palestinian state =E2=80=94 while perfectly logical in an abstract = sense =E2=80=94 becomes=20 an event that can force a regional crisis in the midst of ongoing = regional=20 crises. It thus is a vote that could have significant = consequences.

The Palestinian Divide

Let=E2=80=99s begin with the issue not = of the right of a=20 nation to have a state but of the nature of a Palestinian state under = current=20 circumstances. The Palestinians are split into two major=20 factions. The first, Fatah, = dominates the=20 West Bank. Fatah derives its ideology from the older, secular Pan-Arab = movement.=20 Historically, Fatah saw the Palestinians as a state within the Arab = nation. The=20 second, Hamas, dominates Gaza. Unlike Fatah, it sees the Palestinians as = forming=20 part of a broader Islamist uprising, one in which Hamas is the dominant = Islamist=20 force of the Palestinian people.

The Pan-Arab rising is moribund. Where = it once=20 threatened the existence of Muslim states, like the Arab monarchies, it = is now=20 itself threatened. Mubarak, Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Libyan = leader=20 Moammar Gadhafi all represented the old Pan-Arab vision. A much better = way to=20 understand the =E2=80=9CArab Spring=E2=80=9D is that=20 it represented the decay of such regimes that were vibrant when they = came to=20 power in the late 1960s and early 1970s but have fallen into ideological = meaninglessness. Fatah is part of this grouping, and while it still = speaks for=20 Palestinian nationalism as a secular movement, beyond that it is = isolated from=20 broader trends in the region. It is both at odds with rising religiosity = and=20 simultaneously mistrusted by the monarchies it tried to overthrow. Yet = it=20 controls the Palestinian proto-state, the Palestinian National = Authority, and=20 thus will be claiming a U.N. vote on Palestinian statehood. Hamas, on = the other=20 hand, is very much representative of current trends in the Islamic world = and=20 holds significant popular support, yet it is not clear that it holds a = majority=20 position in the Palestinian nation.

All nations have ideological = divisions, but the=20 Palestinians are divided over the fundamental question of the = Palestinian=20 nation=E2=80=99s identity. Fatah sees itself as part of a secular Arab = world that is on=20 the defensive. Hamas envisions the Palestinian nation as an Islamic = state=20 forming in the context of a region-wide Islamist rising. Neither is in a = position to speak authoritatively for the Palestinian people, and the = things=20 that divide them cut to the heart of the nation. As important, each has = a=20 different view of its future relations with Israel. Fatah has accepted, = in=20 practice, the idea of Israel=E2=80=99s permanence as a state and the = need of the=20 Palestinians to accommodate themselves to the reality. Hamas has = rejected=20 it.

The U.N. decision raises the stakes in = this debate=20 within the Palestinian nation that could lead to intense conflict. As = vicious as=20 the battle between Hamas and Fatah has been, an uneasy truce has existed over = recent years.=20 Now, there could emerge an internationally legitimized state, and = control of=20 that state will matter more than ever before. Whoever controls the state = defines=20 what the Palestinians are, and it becomes increasingly difficult to = suspend the=20 argument for a temporary truce. Rather than settling anything, or = putting Israel=20 on the defensive, the vote will compel a Palestinian crisis.

Fatah has an advantage in any vote on = Palestinian=20 statehood: It enjoys far more international support than Hamas does. = Europeans=20 and Americans see it as friendly to their interests and less hostile to = Israel.=20 The Saudis and others may distrust Fatah from past conflicts, but in the = end=20 they fear radical Islamists and Iran and so require American support at = a time=20 when the Americans have tired of playing in what some Americans call the = =E2=80=9Csandbox.=E2=80=9D However reluctantly, while aiding Hamas, the = Saudis are more=20 comfortable with Fatah. And of course, the embattled Arabist regimes, = whatever=20 tactical shifts there may have been, spring from the same soil as Fatah. = While=20 Fatah is the preferred Palestinian partner for many, Hamas can also use = that=20 reality to portray Fatah as colluding with Israel against the = Palestinian people=20 during a confrontation.

For its part, Hamas has the support of = Islamists=20 in the region, including Shiite Iranians, but that is an explosive mix = to base a=20 strategy on. Hamas must break its isolation if it is to counter the = tired but=20 real power of Fatah. Symbolic flotillas from Turkey are comforting, but = Hamas=20 needs an end to Egyptian hostility to Hamas more than anything.

Egypt=E2=80=99s Role and Fatah on the = Defensive

Egypt is the power that geographically = isolates=20 Hamas through its treaty with Israel and with its still-functional = blockade on=20 Gaza. More than anyone, Hamas needs genuine regime change in Egypt. The = new=20 regime it needs is not a liberal democracy but one in which Islamist = forces=20 supportive of Hamas, namely the Muslim Brotherhood,=20 come to power.

At the moment, that is not likely. = Egypt=E2=80=99s military has retained a = remarkable degree of=20 control, its opposition groups = are divided=20 between secular and religious elements, and the religious elements are = further=20 divided among themselves =E2=80=94 as well as penetrated by an Egyptian = security=20 apparatus that has made war on them for years. As it stands, Egypt is = not likely=20 to evolve in a direction favorable to Hamas. Therefore, Hamas needs to = redefine=20 the political situation in Egypt to convert a powerful enemy into a = powerful=20 friend.

Though it is not easy for a small = movement to=20 redefine a large nation, in this case, it could perhaps happen. There is = a broad=20 sense of unhappiness in Egypt over Egypt=E2=80=99s treaty with Israel, = an issue that=20 comes to the fore when Israel and the Palestinians are fighting. As in = other=20 Arab countries, passions surge in Egypt when the Palestinians are = fighting the=20 Israelis.

Under Mubarak, these passions were = readily=20 contained in Egypt. Now the Egyptian regime unquestionably is = vulnerable, and=20 pro-Palestinian feelings cut across most, if not all, opposition groups. = It is a=20 singular, unifying force that might suffice to break the = military=E2=80=99s power, or at=20 least to force the military to shift its Israeli policy.

Hamas in conflict with Israel as the = United=20 Nations votes for a Palestinian state also places Fatah on the political = defensive among the Palestinians. Fatah cooperation with Israel while = Gaza is at=20 war would undermine Fatah, possibly pushing Fatah to align with Hamas. = Having=20 the U.N. vote take place while Gaza is at war, a vote possibly = accompanied by=20 General Assembly condemnation of Israel, could redefine the = region.

Last week=E2=80=99s attack on the Eilat road should be understood in this context. Some are hypothesizing = that new=20 Islamist groups forming in the Sinai or Palestinian groups in Gaza = operating=20 outside Hamas=E2=80=99 control carried out the attack. But while such = organizations=20 might formally be separate from Hamas, I find it difficult to believe = that=20 Hamas, with an excellent intelligence service inside Gaza and among the = Islamist=20 groups in the Sinai, would not at least have known these groups=E2=80=99 = broad=20 intentions and would not have been in a position to stop them. Just as = Fatah=20 created Black September in the 1970s, a group that appeared separate = from Fatah=20 but was in fact covertly part of it, the strategy of creating new = organizations=20 to take the blame for conflicts is an old tactic both for the = Palestinians and=20 throughout the world.

Hamas=E2=80=99 ideal attack would = offer it plausible=20 deniability =E2=80=94 allowing it to argue it did not even know an = attack was imminent,=20 much less carry it out =E2=80=94 and trigger an Israeli attack on Gaza. = Such a scenario=20 casts Israel as the aggressor and Hamas as the victim, permitting Hamas = to frame=20 the war to maximum effect in Egypt and among the Palestinians, as well = as in the=20 wider Islamic world and in Europe.

Regional Implications and = Israel=E2=80=99s=20 Dilemma

The matter goes beyond Hamas. The = Syrian regime is currently fighting for its=20 life against its majority = Sunni=20 population. It has survived thus far, but it needs to redefine the = conflict. The=20 Iranians and Hezbollah are among those most concerned with the fall of = the=20 Syrian regime. Syria has been Iran=E2=80=99s one significant = ally, one strategically positioned to enhance = Iranian influence=20 in the Levant. Its fall would be a strategic setback for Iran at a time = when=20 Tehran is looking to enhance its position with the U.S. withdrawal from = Iraq.=20 Iran, which sees the uprising as engineered by its enemies =E2=80=94 the = United States,=20 Saudi Arabia and Turkey =E2=80=94 understandably wants al Assad to = survive.

Meanwhile, the fall of Syria would = leave Hezbollah=20 =E2=80=94 which is highly dependent on the current Syrian regime and is = in large part an=20 extension of Syrian policy in Lebanon =E2=80=94 wholly dependent on = Iran. And Iran=20 without its Syrian ally is very far away from Hezbollah. Like Tehran, = Hezbollah=20 thus also wants al Assad to survive. Hezbollah joining Hamas in a = confrontation=20 with Israel would take the focus off the al Assad regime and portray his = opponents as undermining resistance to Israel. Joining a war with Israel = also=20 would make it easier for Hezbollah to weather the fall of al Assad = should his=20 opponents prevail. It would help Hezbollah create a moral foundation for = itself=20 independent of Syria. Hezbollah=E2=80=99s ability to force a draw = with Israel in=20 2006 constituted a victory for = the radical=20 Islamist group that increased its credibility dramatically.

The 2006 military confrontation was = also a victory=20 for Damascus, as it showed the Islamic world that Syria was the only=20 nation-state supporting effective resistance to Israel. It also showed = Israel=20 and the United States that Syria alone could control Hezbollah and that = forcing=20 Syria out of Lebanon was a strategic error on the part of Israel and the = United=20 States.

Faced with this dynamic, it will be = difficult for=20 Fatah to maintain its relationship with Israel. Indeed, Fatah could be = forced to=20 initiate an intifada, something it would greatly prefer to avoid, as = this would=20 undermine what economic development the West Bank has = experienced.

Israel therefore conceivably could = face conflict=20 in Gaza, a conflict along the Lebanese border and a rising in the West = Bank,=20 something it clearly knows. In a rare move, Israel announced plans to = call up=20 reserves in September. Though preannouncements of such things are not = common,=20 Israel wants to signal resolution.

Israel has two strategies in the face = of the=20 potential storm. One is a devastating attack on Gaza followed by = rotating forces=20 to the north to deal with Hezbollah and intense suppression of an = intifada.=20 Dealing with Gaza fast and hard is the key if the intention is to abort = the=20 evolution I laid out. But the problem here is that the three-front = scenario I=20 laid out is simply a possibility; there is no certainty here. If Israel=20 initiates conflict in Gaza and fails, it risks making a possibility into = a=20 certainty =E2=80=94 and Israel has not had many stunning victories for = several decades.=20 It could also create a crisis for Egypt=E2=80=99s military rulers, not = something the=20 Israelis want.

Israel also simply could absorb the = attacks from=20 Hamas to make Israel appear the victim. But seeking sympathy is not = likely to=20 work given how Palestinians have managed to shape global opinion. = Moreover, we=20 would expect Hamas to repeat its attacks to the point that Israel no = longer=20 could decline combat.

War thus benefits Hamas (even if Hamas = maintains=20 plausible deniability by having others commit the attacks), a war = Hezbollah has=20 good reason to enter at such a stage and that Fatah does not want but = could be=20 forced into. Such a war could shift the Egyptian dynamic significantly = to Hamas=E2=80=99=20 advantage, while Iran would certainly want al-Assad to be able to say to = Syrians=20 that a war with Israel is no time for a civil war in Syria. Israel would = thus=20 find itself fighting three battles simultaneously. The only way to do = that is to=20 be intensely aggressive, making moderation strategically = difficult.

Israel responded modestly compared to = the past=20 after the Eilat incident, mounting only limited attacks on Gaza against = mostly=20 members of the Palestinian Resistance Committees, an umbrella group = known to=20 have links with Hamas. Nevertheless, Hamas has made clear that its de = facto=20 truce with Israel was no longer assured. The issue now is what Hamas is = prepared=20 to do and whether Hamas supporters, Saudi Arabia in particular, can = force them=20 to control anti-Israeli activities in the region. The Saudis want al = Assad to=20 fall, and they do not want a radical regime in Egypt. Above all, they do = not=20 want Iran=E2=80=99s hand strengthened. But it is never clear how much = influence the=20 Saudis or Egyptians have over Hamas. For Hamas, this is emerging as the = perfect=20 moment, and it is hard to believe that even the Saudis can restrain = them. As for=20 the Israelis, what will happen depends on what others decide =E2=80=94 = which is the=20 fundamental strategic problem that Israel has.

 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110822-israeli-arab-crisis-appr= oaching?utm_source=3Dfreelist-f&utm_medium=3Demail&utm_campaign=3D= 20110823&utm_term=3Dgweekly&utm_content=3Dreadmore&elq=3Dbe4f= b20dde5e40f8a84b7174f2e13968 
************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ***************************************
************************************************************= *************************************************************************= *************************************************************************= ***************************************
see our letter on:  = http://www.massenbach-world.de/41259.html
 
Wir w=C3=BCnschen Ihnen = ein angenehmes=20 Wochenende. Ihr Team.
 
********************************************************= *********************************************************
Udo=20 von Massenbach   -   B=C3=A4rbel = Freudenberg-Pilster  =20 -   J=C3=B6rg=20 Barandat
        &nbs= p;            = ;            =           =20
UdovonMassenbach@t-online.de  =20 Mail@Freudenberg-Pilster.de  
          &nbs= p;           =20 JoergBarandat@yahoo.de
 
= ------=_NextPart_000_08F4_01CC6312.46A8A3C0--